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The dissertation attempts to understand the causes and correlates of democratic 
consolidation in occupied territories. A Marginal Value Model attempts to explain the 
consolidation of democracy in these cases as a function of international threat dynamics 
and the relationship between the occupiers and the occupied regime. The dissertation 
tests the Marginal Value Model and its corresponding hypotheses against four case 
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that democracies are more likely to consolidate when there is an external threat, when the 
occupier credibly protects the new regime against this threat, and when the occupier 
provides additional goods to the domestic population. These tests find support for the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
The Big Picture 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of the foreign-imposed democratic regime is one of great 
importance at this point in history. Rare but consequential, forced liberalization is and has 
been a test of the efficacy of great power resources under certain conditions, and thus a 
test of the efficacy of great powers themselves. This dissertation will address the 
following question: what are the policies and prevailing conditions that favor survival in 
foreign-imposed democratic regimes? The question is of extreme relevance to the 
recently concluded democratization project in Iraq and ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, as 
well as the controversial democratic experiment taking place under the Palestinian 
Authority. Why was democratization relatively swift and stable in Japan and Germany as 
compared to the contestation that has dogged the new regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Pei 2003, Porch 2003, Dawisha 2005, Bensahel 2006, Barak 2007)? The answer to this 
question will shed light on enduring puzzles in power politics, such as the fungibility of 
power, and why an occupier with a favorable and asymmetrical balance of forces can 






Foreign-imposed regime change is a relatively rare phenomenon and forced 
democratization even rarer. However, these cases are important because of the attractive 
benefits of increased freedom, security and perhaps prosperity for both states in the event 
of success, the obviously high economic and security costs to the target state and region 
in the event of failure, and the economic and human cost of the endeavor for the 
intervening state, magnified by the uncertainty of success (Russett and Oneal 2001, 
Plumper and Martin 2003, Thompson 2004, Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter 2008). If imposed 
democratization has a sufficiently positive effect on freedom levels and regime longevity 
within a target polity while improving security condition for both parties, the risks and 
costs of such a policy may be acceptable. However, attempting such a policy without an 
informed model increases the probability that the costs will outweigh the benefits. It is 
possible that the intervention will have the opposite intended effect. Failure to 
democratize in and of itself may non-trivially delegitimize democracy as an alternative 
regime type of non-democratic societies in the future, either through adverse norm 
diffusion, historical memory, or modification of the perceived costs and benefits based on 
the information revealed by the case. Moreover, a failed intervention will reduce the 
security of both the initiator and the target by introducing new sources of instability into 
the international system (Rubin 2000, Murdoch and Sandler 2002, Kang and Meernik 
2006, Coyne 2006). Any violation of sovereignty is typically an expensive undertaking, 
but interventions may lead to invasions, and invasions to occupations, adding dollars to 
the wrong side of the ledger and names to the eternal list of the fallen. 
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 This work aims to address these questions and contribute to literatures in political 
science international relations, public policy and history.  The majority of the (small but 
growing) literature on foreign imposed regime changes (FIRCs) has employed a largely 
quantitative methodology and a large-n sample, as noted above. While this is appropriate 
for a systematic understanding of the correlates between imposed regimes and stability or 
other outcomes, it is problematic at best. While large-n models can measure the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables, the underlying processes 
remain theoretical, unexamined, and/or untested. On the other hand, with a small-n 
process-tracing approach, we can derive a better understanding of these underlying 
processes. This particular research project will trace the process from intervention to 
democratization in multiple cases, exploring the factors that intervene to produce or 
prevent consolidation of the new regime. This approach aims to move beyond an existing 
literature that currently focuses on “what” towards an understanding of “why” and 
“how.”  
Second, an in-depth and systematic exploration into democratic FIRCs could lead 
to the wiser implementation of related policies. The FIRC option is high risk, high cost, 
and high payoff. Many FIRCs involve a costly military invasion followed by a costly 
multiyear occupation, so maximizing successes and returns are key. Consider the 
unfortunate case of South Vietnam, wherein an inconsistent liberalization policy cost well 
over a million lives, resulted in no lasting increase in freedom in the target region and 
undermined existing democratic institutions south of the 17th Parallel. On the other hand, 
consider the cases of Germany and Japan: these former authoritarian and belligerent 
regimes, destroyed by fire bombings and two nuclear attacks, climbed to top the tier of 
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economic powerhouses as highly democratic and peaceful regimes. Consider also the 
high stakes of the ongoing democratization projects in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia 
and Palestine. Understanding this topic is crucial to future planning and safe stewardship 
of the institutions that protect political freedom for millions living under fragile regimes. 
Third, the previous US presidential administration reserved the right to employ 
regime change as a tool in the War on Terror. In a democratic society, the government 
has a mandate to most appropriately apply its economic resources to extract tangible 
benefits, and to refrain from risking the lives of its citizens for non-trivial, non-capricious 
undertakings. It is the hopeful by-product of this research to make such policy less 
capricious and more rational—or at least to provide those in power and those in 
opposition with more reliable information—and to help refute or confirm the efficacy of 





 The following literature review surveys the broad inquiry into the drives of 
democratic consolidation and consolidation failure. The majority of the literature is 
comparative in nature, exploring the endogenous processes and characteristics that dictate 
whether democracies collapse, thrive or merely survive. The primary focus in this subset 
of the literature is on constitutions, electoral regimes, parliamentarianism vs. 
presidentialism, political economies, historical legacies, cultural patterns, generational 
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replacement, learning and the role of time itself. Less explored are the effects of interstate 
politics on democratization. This sub-canon is growing, but small. More importantly, the 
small body of work in this area fails to satisfy. It suffers from questionable 
methodological choices, contradictory findings and problems of external validity. I 
review this literature, its successes and failures, and conclude that there are approaches 
that are more suitable to the problem at hand. 
It is important to survey the broader consolidation literature and not simply the 
much smaller, less developed body of work addressing the role of interstate politics. For 
one, before we explore the role of foreign occupation in the consolidation of democracy 
we must specify what democratic consolidation is. This proves surprisingly difficult. As 
is often the case in political science (and social science in general), the concept suffers 
from a specification problem. I resolve this problem (for the purposes of this dissertation, 
not for the discipline as a whole, of course) at the outset. Second, this literature is 
essentially a survey of rival hypotheses. If one can perfectly specify a model of 
democratic consolidation in imposed democracies using solely the endogenous variables 
that apply to all democracies, then a model based on international-level conditions is 
superfluous. Third, to justify this project one must demonstrate that there are gaps in the 
literature. This review finds that, yes, there are lacunae, and a model of democratization 
that specifically incorporates foreign occupation can fill some of them. Fourth, in an 
occupation, the occupying forces actually have some influence on the supposedly 
endogenous variables that are so prominent in the literature. Depending on the level of 
involvement, the occupiers are often responsible for designing electoral procedures, 
balancing legislative and executive powers and authoring the constitution itself. The 
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occupiers control trade, regulate economic activity and authoritatively redistribute 
massive amounts of value within and across borders. The occupiers may even play a role 
in political education, thereby modifying cultural patters and mediating the effects of 
generational replacement. For each of these reasons, it is important that we review the 
broader literature on democratic consolidation: not just so we might discover new 
relationships, but also to explore how the presence and behavior of an occupying power 
might influence the relationships we already recognize. 
 
What is Democratic Consolidation? 
 The term “democratic consolidation” itself is contested. As the literature evolved 
in the wake of the Cold War, “democratic consolidation” took on a variety of meanings 
as diverse as legitimation, value diffusion, neutralization of antidemocratic opponents, 
civilian control of the military, the elimination of authoritarian opposition, party building, 
stabilization of electoral rules, routinization of political behavior, decentralization, 
introduction of direct democracy, judicial reform, economic development and economic 
stabilization (Schedler 1998). In many cases these are examples of processes that favor 
consolidation. In others they are consolidation resultants. If we are to understand how 
foreign intervention may facilitate or retard democratic consolidation, we must first settle 
on a working definition. 
The source of the confusion is the latent nature of the consolidation process. We 
cannot directly observe consolidation—in fact we can only directly observe when 
consolidation fails. But the boundary of consolidation is a fuzzy one. (Schedler 2001a). 
That democracies may continue to survive due to exogenous factors unrelated to 
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consolidation complicates the issue (Svolik 2008).1 In the absence of direct, ex ante 
information, observers grasp for proxy variables. Huntington (1991) claims that we can 
pick out consolidated democracies by observing party turnover and diplomatic relations. 
In this scheme, a democracy is likely consolidated if the government shifts shifted twice 
from one party to another and if the state maintains positive relations with other 
democratic regimes. Svolik (2008) relies on a model he designed to predict reversals, and 
then fits that model to existing data. Here, consolidation is a continuous variable that is 
essentially the inverse of the probability of regime collapse. But there is still a lack of 
consensus as to what investigators should be looking for. Is consolidation evident when 
we see actors playing by the rules of a democratic regime? Are regimes consolidated 
when popular attitudes towards democratic institutions are favorable? Are democracies 
consolidated when the favorable institutions and overriding conditions are observed? 
Schedler (2001b) argues that the best approach is the one that takes into account the 
behavior of domestic actors: are they “playing by the rules,” looking for ways around the 
rules that constrain them or actively looking to eliminate the rules and establish a new set 
of rules that is more favorable to them and less so to everyone else? According to 
Schedler, it is this behavior is the most causally adjacent to the phenomena of regime 
collapse. Yes, it is possible that, before actors start subverting the regime, their 
1 The problem is akin to determining the structural integrity of a house from the outside 
alone. A house with a dilapidated exterior but a healthy frame that sits on bedrock could 
stand for decades. Conversely, a house with a beautiful façade built on shifting soil an 
held up by a frame riddled with termites might blow over from the lightest breeze. We 
cannot tell from a snapshot which house is stronger or weaker; we can only observe 
whether the house stands or not. Instead, we must rely on more subtle indicators. Does it 
lean a certain way? How long do houses that lean so far stand before they fall? What is 
the typical life span of a house built in a similar style in a similar neighborhood and 
climate? Denied a more direct inspection we must rely on methods that are more 
superficial and actuarial in nature. 
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preferences might be reflected in societal attitudes towards democratic institutions. It is 
also likely that such actors would be more successful when institutions are too weak to 
marginalize, prevent or deter them. However, it is also true that weak institutions do not 
always remain weak, and that even weak institutions might persist if there is no threat to 
them from inside or out. It is also true that subversive behavior is risky (Lichbach 1998), 
and that the preferences motivating risky behavior tend to be latent prior to the moment 
of decision (Holt and Laury 2002). In other words, a survey of public attitudes might 
indicate positive affect for the regime only because those surveyed were not given 
sufficient incentive to demonstrate their dissatisfaction. Thus, it is best to rely on the 
observation of actual behavior. Observing costly anti-government behavior is a strong 
signal of the weakness of the regime precisely because of the signal’s cost. The 
shortcoming to this approach it is that destabilizing behavior might not become 
observable until the regime is already on the verge of collapse, but that is okay for the 
purpose of this project. We do not seek to construct an early warning system for 
democratic recidivism, but rather we seek objective ex post facto indicators such as 
delicacy and durability that might serve as dependent variables. The measure of 
consolidation in this dissertation will therefore take Schedler’s approach, defining it as 
the absence of behavior that seeks to undermine the regime. 
 
Inherent Instability 
 Democratic consolidation is an interesting topic precisely because some 
democracies revert back to authoritarianism. Theoretical treatments of democratization 
and consolidation claim that democracies are inherently unstable to begin with. 
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Democratic systems must not bar the possibility that the winning coalition today might be 
the losing coalition sometime tomorrow, and thus democracies operate in—nay, depend 
on—an environment of some uncertainty. This uncertainty means that, given enough 
time, all members of the selectorate may be negatively affected by policies that 
redistribute economic resources and political power. The potential for redistribution 
creates an incentive for out groups to overthrow the existing order and replace it with one 
that is less uncertain and more favorable to them (Boix 2003). Instability is also a product 
of the relatively low costs of defecting from the winning coalition in democratic regimes 
(Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005). Winning coalitions in democratic regimes garner 
support by distributing public goods, since democratic selectorates are too large to buy 
off with private goods. Public goods are enjoyed by the entire selectorate, however, not 
just the winning coalition. As a result, pretenders to the throne can free ride off public 
goods while simultaneously attempting to position themselves as the winning coalition. 
The lack of barriers to peaceful competition results in an inherent instability in the 
composition of the winning coalition and, necessarily, a bit of uncertainty about future 
policy. This is unavoidable. As Przeworski (1986) writes, the “process of establishing a 
democracy is the process of institutionalizing uncertainty, of subjecting all interests to 
uncertainty.” This uncertainty stems from the reality that, for a regime to be democratic, 
no coalition is guaranteed an opportunity to form a government. Furthermore, all regime 
transitions result in information deficits. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, Part IV, 6) 
characterize democratic transitions as naturally uncertain, during which “the rules of the 
political game are not defined… in constant flux… [and] arduously contested.” Put 
another way, “the emergence of uncertainty marks the beginning of regime change” 
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(Schedler 2001a, 2). Democracies produce a certain amount of uncertainty and new 
democracies produce even more. 
 Diamond (1990) reveals additional sources of political instability in democracies. 
He points out that democratic institutions are essentially collections of paradoxes: 
democracies must permit political competition but constrain it in such a way that it plays 
by the rules; democracies must be responsive to preferences but not be so responsive that 
the winning coalition can permanently change the rules of the game; democracies must 
be constrained by the consent of the governed but still able to implement unpopular 
policies in times of crisis. Fortunately, these are not true paradoxes (they can be resolved) 
but rather opportunities for the new regime to satisfice. New democratic regimes 
inadvertently create some of this instability through their own behavior. Linz and Stepan 
(1978), with support from Haggard and Kaufmann (1995), find that new regimes try to 
solve too many problems at once, overburdening themselves and raising expectations to 
unreasonable levels. Some of this instability is evident in the revision of democratic 
institutions. Alexander (2001) points to the fact that institutional arrangements—such as 
federalism, parliamentary-presidential balance, electoral systems, and guarantee of 
negative and positive rights—remain in flux even in the longest-lived democracies.  
 This is not to say that democratic states are mired in perpetual uncertainty with no 
capacity to self-stabilize. While Przeworksi is correct that democracies cannot guarantee 
the success of any given coalition, it is also correct that democracies are better at 
producing information about the distribution of preferences across society, better at 
producing the information about how political actors pursue power, and more efficient at 
distributing this information as it is produced. Alexander (2002) argues that there is just 
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as much variation in uncertainty within regime types as there is across. Democratic 
institutions produce information about how social, economic and political conflicts will 
be resolved, and in doing so encourage sub-state actors to converge on a smaller set of 
policy options. 
The role of uncertainty is especially relevant in the case of imposed democracies, 
wherein the presence of an outside force heavily distorts the rules of political 
competition. Occupation governments serve at the pleasure of the occupiers until they see 
cause to leave or unless the occupiers make the costs of the occupation unbearable. 
Occupiers choose the winning coalition and their continued presence is a threat to 
political competition of all sorts. Put simply, occupation governments are inherently 
antidemocratic. However, this could work in the favor of nascent democratic regimes. 
Given their preponderance, occupation governments can prevent redistributive activities 
that generate opposition to the regime. Or, alternatively, the occupation government may 
redistribute value in such a way that the distribution of value will be more favorable to 
future consolidation. An occupation government might be far more capable of 
withstanding retaliation by disinherited parties than an infant democratic government, 
and would therefore be the more suitable regime to undertake such reforms when 
necessary. Additionally, if new democracies falter by trying to solve too many problems, 
a better-resourced occupation government could lend its hand. Since the occupier’s 
power and presence produce strong incentives and disincentives for certain types of 
political behavior, the occupier is in a unique position to save unconsolidated regimes 




The Role of Time 
 Scholars are split over whether new democracies are more or less stable than 
longer-lived democracies. Some hypothesize that new democracies will enjoy a 
“honeymoon effect,” during which they will have more leeway for undertaking painful 
economic reforms and other redistributive policies. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) find 
that the capacity to sustain early challenges to the regime is a function of the ineptitude 
and illegitimacy of the previous regime. In other words, democratic regimes enjoy a 
grace period only when they replace autocratic regimes that presided over a period of low 
growth or contraction. Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2003) find no evidence of a 
honeymoon; quite the contrary, they find that new democracies are more susceptible to 
negative economic shocks. Linz and Stepan (1978, 1996) find that new democracies are 
generally more vulnerable when they are young. Svolik (2008) agrees, adding that the 
extant literature underestimates the likelihood of collapse in the first few years. 
Specifically, his models indicate that democracies of less than seven years’ duration are 
more likely than not to regress. Moreover, the probability of regime collapse remains 
greater than one-in-ten until the fifty-second year of democratic rule (when controlling for 
development, growth and presidentialism). As far as imposed democracies are concerned, 
Enterline and Greig (2008b) find that they are just as fragile in their early years—30% 
fail by their tenth anniversary. 
Time is an important variable in the case of imposed democracies that are, by 
definition, new. More importantly, occupation governments may play the role of 
caretaker so that the democratic regime has enough time to consolidate. Occupations are 
not permanent and, when conducted by democracies, are very sensitive to their own time 
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effects. However, an occupation that enjoys support and resources can stick around. If 
democracies need time to grow, then a prudent occupation could shelter and nurture said 
democracy until it is strong enough to stand on its own.  
 
The Role of Institutions 
 Research investigating the relationship between regime survival and institutional 
design is prominent in the literature on consolidation, and is particularly relevant to 
democratic imposition (where it is often the imposer who is building these institutions in 
the first place). Institutions are central to democracy, serving as a stable platform on 
which political actors can peacefully compete for the opportunity to form a winning 
coalition (Alexander 2001). Since losing coalitions have an incentive to overturn the 
system when the stakes are high, it is the role of institutions to credibly commit the 
winning coalition to open and competitive selection mechanisms (Collier 2009). Without 
credible constraints on the winning coalition, political contestants are driven to extremes 
to secure power or to protect themselves from the powerful. Democracies must set the 
rules for democratic political conduct, punish those who cheat, effectively check arbitrary 
leaders, replace arbitrary rules with rational ones, and devolve rulemaking authority to 
the general population (Moore, Jr. 1966). These rules originate on parchment as laws, 
regulations and constitutional provisions. While not a sufficient condition for fixing the 
behavior of political agents, legal documents produce information about the payoffs of 




One of the ongoing debates regarding democratic institutions concerns the effect 
of presidentialism or parliamentarianism on democratic consolidation. More often than 
not, studies demonstrate a negative correlation between presidential regimes—where the 
chief executive is elected separate from the legislature and retains an independent base of 
power—and regime survival. Linz and Stepan find that parliamentary systems generally 
survive longer than presidential ones (1996). Huntington (1991) found that parliamentary 
democracy was more successful than presidential democracy during the third wave of 
democratization. Przeworski, et al. (1996) confirms these findings, as do Stepan and 
Skach (1993), who find that presidential regimes revert to authoritarianism thrice the rate 
of parliamentary regimes. Svolik’s (2008) findings suggest that presidential democracies 
almost never consolidate, or rather that the probability of democratic reversal in 
presidential regimes inevitably exceeds 10% even when controlling for development, 
growth and regime longevity. Presidential systems may be especially hazardous to first-
time democracies, or democracies with no history of democratization prior to the last 
authoritarian regime (Hiroi and Omori 2009). Why would parliamentary systems be less 
prone to reversal? Haggard and Kaufman (1995) find that executives in presidential 
systems are less likely to cooperate and coordinate with the legislature—and vice versa—
to resolve crises. Therefore, presidential systems fall prey to gridlock at the very moment 
when decisiveness is at a premium. If a democratic state faces a crisis and the 
government fails to act, the incentive to replace the regime with a more decisive, less 
deliberative government increases. Cohen (1997) confirms this hypothesis, finding that 
proportional democracies (most commonly found in parliamentary democracies) are 
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more successful in mediating civil conflict than majoritarian democracies (which tend to 
co-occur with presidential regimes). 
The efficacy of parliamentary democracy is largely dependent on the electoral 
system and the effect it has on party representation in the legislature. New democracies 
are most successful when the party distribution in the first elections reflects the 
ideological distribution of the electorate—but not too perfectly (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986). If the distribution of preferences in the electorate is either exceptionally wide or 
bimodal, a faithful reflection of the true distribution of preferences will result in party 
fragmentation and polarization. Fragmentation is problematic as it endows minority 
parties with a veto over government formation and increases the minimum number of 
parties required for a coalition. Polarization thwarts government formation and policy 
making by depriving plurality parties of ideologically adjacent coalition partners. Since 
the probability of fragmentation increases with the total number of parties in the 
legislature, single-member, first-past-the-post districts, along with electoral thresholds for 
participation in the legislature, reduce the chances of fragmentation. This, in turn, lowers 
the probability of gridlock (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Elgie 2008). Bandelj and Radu 
(2006) confirm that higher electoral thresholds correlate with democratic consolidation 
among post-communist democracies. The need to satisfice between deliberation and 
decisiveness highlights the role that parties play in democratic consolidation. Parties are 
responsible for aggregating constituent preferences and translating them into policy (Lai 
and Melkonian-Hoover 2005). They also facilitate the peaceful transfer of power—the 
costs of electoral failure are lower because the party can live to fight another day. Strong 
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party competition has been linked to reduced rates of democratic reversal and may 
solidify norms of peaceful political competition (Linz and Stepan 1996, Ibid). 
Due in part to the coordination problems faced by parliamentary democracies, 
there is a smaller but non-trivial collection of studies that find a negative correlation 
between parliamentarianism and regime survival. For instance, Hiroi and Omori (2009) 
find that parliamentary regimes are more likely to collapse in re-democratized states. 
However, pro-parliamentary findings vastly outnumber pro-presidential findings. Most 
contradictory to the hypothesis that presidential systems are more stable are studies 
indicating gridlock—the supposed scourge of parliaments—to be more debilitating in 
presidential systems (Elgie 2008, Stepan and Skach 1993). Furthermore, semi-
presidential regimes (such as Weimar Germany) should be less stable than pure 
presidential regimes, since power sharing could introduce additional conflicts of interest 
between the executive and legislative branches. Przeworski, et al. (1996) tangentially 
confirms this hypothesis, finding that the combination of presidentialism and party 
fragmentation severely harms the prospect of consolidation in new democracies. On the 
other hand, Elgie (2008) finds that mixed systems are not significantly correlated to 
democratic reversal.  
If we broaden the definition of “institutions” to include the military, Samuel 
Huntington (1991) is very clear about their “designs.” Democracy necessitates the 
removal of the armed forces from policymaking. A system of government dependent on 
self-enforcing rules and egalitarian political competition cannot co-exist with elements 
that curtail an elected regime’s monopoly over the use of violence and retain a 
disproportionate capacity to influence outcomes. For democracy to succeed, it must 
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subordinate the military to civilian control. In pursuit of this aim, Huntington 
recommends that new democracies purge disloyal officers, clarify and enforce the chain 
of command, reduce ground forces to a reasonable size, increase compensation to 
remaining loyal elements, redeploy forces away from the capital and to the borders (or 
overseas), and develop a battery of active civilian supporters willing to take to the streets 
in the event of a military coup. This is compatible with Stepan’s (1986) assertion that 
“externally monitored redemocratization” (such as the cases of West Germany and 
postwar Japan) is most successful when previous institutions, including the military, have 
been utterly reduced—paving the way for the imposers and the new civilian regime to 
rebuild institutions as they see fit. 
Finally, there is a vein of literature that asks whether stabilizing institutions—
security provision, contract enforcement, social safety nets—is necessary prior to the 
implementation of elections and legislatures. The general consensus is that they are. Linz 
and Stepan (1996) go so far as to say that state consolidation is a necessary precondition 
of democratic consolidation. Enterline and Greig (2008a) find that rebuilding the military 
correlates negatively with political instability in imposed regimes once domestic force 
levels exceed 150,000 troops. Møller and Skaaning (2011) reiterate these findings. They 
find that electoral rights, political liberties and rule of law are far more likely to increase 
once the new regime has established a monopoly on the use of force within its territory. 
As Linz (1997, 118) writes, “No state, no Rechtstaat [rule of law], no democracy.”  
And yet, we must be careful not to credit variance in institutional design with too 
much empirical weight. First of all, the literature is not in total agreement on the role of 
federalism, presidentialism or party system. Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2003) 
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find no relationship between presidentialism, fractionalization and democratic survival. 
Haggard and Kaufman find that presidentialism and parliamentarianism can both 
paralyze crisis response in different ways. Boix (2003) finds that institutional design has 
little effect on consolidation in societies with high inequality or factor specificity. Diskin, 
Diskin and Hazan (2005) find no relationship between federalism, proportionality of the 
legislature, and democratic consolidation. Gasiorowski and Power (1998) find no 
evidence of a relationship between presidentialism, party systems, and consolidation 
when controlling for incomes, democratic neighborhoods, and inflation. Ulfelder and 
Lustik (2007) also reject the relationship between presidentialism and reversal when 
controlling for growth and development. 
Second of all, institutions may help powerful actors credibly commit to the 
pursuance of democratic politics in the future, but they are necessary components—not 
sufficient ones (Alexander 2001). Institutions may constrain the translation of political 
preferences into representation and policy, but they do not constrain the original 
preferences of the electorate (Alexander 2002). This is problematic, because the range of 
electoral preferences independently affects the probability of party fragmentation, 
polarization, and the capacity for disenfranchised actors to attack the new regime from 
the outside. Simply put, stable democracy requires not only the stabilization of the 
translation of preference to policy, but the moderation of those preferences, as well.  
 
The Political Economy of Consolidation 
 The relationship between economics and democratization is complex, so much so 
that it is often difficult to tell which way the causal arrow is pointing. Nevertheless, 
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among the most common findings in the democratization literature is the positive 
relationship between democracy and incomes, and that economic contractions are 
hazardous to democratic regimes, especially new ones (Geddes 1999). Bernhard, 
Reenock and Nordstrom (2003) find that growing economies and rising incomes reduce 
the chance of a democratic reversal. Przeworski, et al. (1996) find that states are more 
likely to remain democratic if they are already affluent and production is on the rise. 
Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) confirm this specifically in the case of re-democratizing 
states. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that poor democracies are especially 
susceptible to reversals, and that regime collapse is hastened by shrinking incomes and 
sluggish growth. Arguably, the most important finding about the relationship between 
development and democracy is that, while high incomes do not predict the transition from 
autocracy to democracy, they do correlate negatively with transitions from democracy 
back to autocracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Specifically, once average incomes 
surpass $4,000 per year (contemporary), the probability of democratic reversal is 
essentially nil. Diskin, Diskin and Hazan (2005) and Gasiorowski and Power (1998) 
confirm these findings. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) find that democracies are less 
vulnerable to recession in cases where the previous autocratic regime collapsed during an 
economic contraction. Enterline and Greig (2008a, 2008b) find that the poorest and most 
stagnant imposed democracies are the most likely to experience political instability and 
regime collapse. Svolik (2008) also finds that incomes correlate positively with 
consolidation, but more importantly reveals that unconsolidated democracies are harmed 
by recession while consolidated democracies weather recession just fine. Inflation and 
deflation also appear linked to democratic reversal. Przeworski, et al. (1996) finds that 
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moderate inflation (between 6% and 30%) is most conducive to the survival of 
democratic regimes. Gasiorowski and Power (1998) find that high inflation early in the 
life of a democratic regime is especially hazardous, while Haggard and Kaufman (1995) 
find that the stabilization of prices is a necessary precondition for economic growth and 
thus, consolidation. 
Why are growth and development good for democracy? There is no shortage of 
plausible causal explanations. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) suggest that growth 
produces value that the winning coalition can use to compensate losers, thus depriving 
out-groups of a grievance that they could use to rally a challenge against the new regime, 
as well as simply lessening the net economic incentives for rebellion. Mousseau (2000) 
submits that market prosperity fosters values that are specifically conducive to 
democracy, including full faith and credit, independent decision making, and peaceful 
negotiation and compromise. Since party identification is weak in the first elections of a 
new democratic regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), prosperity and poverty may 
establish the primary incentive structure for choosing between parties, or choosing to 
vote at all, in the early years of the regime. 
On the other hand, development and growth may only be proxies for other causal 
processes. Incomes and production are positively correlated with the modernization of the 
political economy—the replacement of ancient feudal modes of production with modern, 
commercial economies. This is the process—combined with a balance between 
aristocracy and monarchy and an independent trading class—that Barrington Moore 
(1966) credits for the rise of democracy in the United Kingdom, United States and 
France. Moore famously wrote, “No bourgeois, no democracy,” (Moore, Jr. 1966, 418) 
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but that was not the only necessary condition he specified. Yes, there must be a capitalist 
class, but traders, bankers and manufacturers must be wealthy and powerful enough to 
marginalize landed interests such as the peasantry and landed aristocracy. The high levels 
of inequality in the feudal countryside raise the stakes of political competition, producing 
incentives for landowners to prevent democratization and for peasants to pursue harsh 
redistribution. If antiquated feudal production modes survive a democratic transition, they 
will likely seek to reverse said democratic transition, or at least retard the process of 
consolidation. 
Growth and development also co-vary with capital mobility and income equality, 
two processes which Boix (2003) considers essential for democratic transition and 
consolidation. Since democracies carry with them an inherent capacity for redistribution, 
high levels of inequality mean higher stakes for haves and have-nots. Those at the top of 
the wealth and income ladder face the possibility of a winning coalition comprised of the 
(far more numerous) lower classes, which could in turn use the instruments of state to 
relieve the upper classes of their wealth. In unequal societies, the incentives for the lower 
classes to pursue such a policy, as well as the absolute cost of such policies on wealth 
holders, are even higher. Higher risk of economic loss in unequal democracies translates 
into greater incentives to remove the existing regime. Greater equality, on the other hand, 
means lower stakes for rich elites and lesser incentives to challenge democratic 
processes—and less of an incentive for have-nots to pursue redistributive policies in the 
first place. Boix’s findings on the relationship between consolidation and income 
inequality confirm Przeworski, et al. (1996), who found that equalization of incomes 
correlates with democratic regime survival. 
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Boix finds that the same applies to capital specificity. In democracies with more 
open economies, capital tends to be more mobile (less specific) and harder to tax. Thus, 
the capacity for democratic governments to redistribute wealth is reduced, and the threat 
to wealth holders alleviated, independent of prior inequality. Therefore, capital 
mobility—which can be achieved by lowering trade and investment barriers and 
introducing convertible currency—has the same effect as egalitarian incomes in 
improving the chances of democratic consolidation.2 Boix also sees an interactive effect 
between economic variables and institutional ones. In asset specific political economies, 
presidential systems heighten the risks of redistribution and harm the prospects for 
consolidation. Federal systems, on the other hand, reduce the capacity for central 
governments to pursue redistribution. 
Boix’s claims about the benefits of openness aside, Bresser Pereira, Maravall and 
Przeworski (1993) caution against the dangers of sudden trade and capital liberalization 
in democracies. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) find that economic liberalization without 
rehabilitation of state capacity will lead to stagnation and anti-democratic challenges:  
“wherever democratic governments followed neo-liberal tenets, the outcome has been 
stagnation, increased poverty, political discontent, and the debilitation of democracy.” 
Indeed, liberalization—and the volatility that accompanies exposure to the global 
market—may initially plunge a state into recession if it has to abandon corrective 
exchange and interest rate measures (Frieden 2007, Stiglitz 1999). 
2 Boix (2003) is also careful to note that economic openness results in factor price 
equalization, which will depress the wages of laborers in labor-poor societies (such as the 
United States). This could exacerbate inequality and cancel out the benefits of reduced 
capital specificity.  
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Finally, scholars recommend caution when extrapolating economic findings in 
particular to new cases, as well as in their application in the policymaking. Haggard and 
Kaufman (1995) warn that it is difficult to differentiate “good” economic performance 
from “bad” without an appropriate reference point. For instance, a state with 5% GDP 
growth is a huge success if it is a western industrialized state, but a developing state with 
a similar rate of growth would be considered developmentally moribund. In addition, 
short-term growth may be funded by unsustainable policies (such as high inflation) that 
will undermine economic performance in the long run. All things considered, one must 
always remain vigilant of lagged effects. Growth, in particular, may not generate regime 
survival benefits until several years after the boom phase (Tang 2008). There are even 
some who claim that the relationship between recession and regime death is insignificant 
(Ulfelder and Lustik 2007, Bandelj and Radu 2006). In terms of imposed democracies, 
economic drivers are of special significance. It is up to the occupier how much they 
decide to manage the domestic affairs of the target state, including macroeconomic 
policy. If a state wishes to impose democracy, it will have to constantly consider the 
effect that occupation policy will have on inflation, growth and incomes. Moreover, the 
occupier may find it prudent to take a proactive approach and improve the economic 
prospects of the target state. 
The role that an occupation government would play in terms of the institutions of 
a new democracy is obvious. Occupiers have veto power over the occupied state’s 
choices, constitutional decisions included. The occupier could play a direct role in 
building the new regime—choosing the electoral system, determining the character of the 
legislature and the powers of the executive. Alternatively, the occupation government 
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could play an advisory and confirmatory role, allowing domestic actors their own 
government so long as it meets certain criteria. Or, the occupation may not involve itself 
in this process at all. The point is that the occupation has the choice to involve itself in 
this process or not, and thus retains control over the most important decisions related to 
the consolidation of the regime. 
 
The Roles of Culture, Learning and History 
 Democratic regimes, being those that serve at the pleasure of the electorate, may 
be sensitive to public attitudes about the desirability of democracy itself. It is for this 
reason that cultural orientation and historical memory may play a role in successful 
consolidation. While attitudes themselves do not seem to be well correlated with collapse 
or survival (Fails and Pierce 2010, Gasiorowski and Power 1998, Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997), there is better evidence for the role of ethnic division. Since ethno-
linguistic, religious and social cleavages are often (if inconsistently) linked to civil wars, 
and since civil wars have the capacity to overthrow regimes, a common hypothesis is that 
such cleavages are a threat to democracy. They may also interfere in policymaking and 
coalition formation by polarizing the electorate. Bandelj and Radu (2006) find that ethno-
linguistic fractionalization predicts reversal in democratic post-communist states, while 
Enterline and Greig (2008a, 2008b) find that imposed democracies are more unstable and 
less likely to consolidate when fractionalization is high. Huntington (1991) offers the 
caveat that elections may serve only to emphasize religious or ethno-linguistic divisions. 
Presumably, conflict between these groups is more likely to concern indivisible goods—
such as identity definition or the right to exist—which cannot be efficiently redistributed 
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by democratic institutions and which present high stakes regardless of the type of 
democracy in place. In contrast, Diskin, Diskin and Hazan (2005) find no link between 
fractionalization and democratic reversal. 
 Several scholars claim to have uncovered a relationship between previous 
experience with democracy and the likelihood of success the second (or third, or nth) 
time around. Huntington claims this to be the case. Diskin, Diskin and Hazan (2005) find 
that previous democratization prevents democratic reversals later on, even when 
controlling for foreign intervention, economic contraction, and cultural cleavage. Like 
theories about the consolidating effects of democratic neighborhoods, there is a dearth of 
causal relationships that explain these findings (see next section). Unlike democratic 
neighborhoods, however, there seems to be no agreement on what direction the arrow 
points (if there is any relationship at all). This is not surprising. If a state has a history of 
previous democratization, it must also have a history of democratic collapse. 
Accordingly, Przeworski, et al. (1996) contradicts Diskin, Diskin and Hazan, finding a 
negative relationship between previous democratization (and overthrow) and future 
consolidation. Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2003) find that previous democratic 
regimes have no significant effect on future democratic survival. 
 While occupying regimes have little control over a target society’s culture, and no 
control over its history, these variables are important in terms of establishing a base 
probability for consolidation. Foreign powers that arrive in states with a history or culture 
that is less conducive to democratic consolidation will have a harder time achieving their 
goals. They will need to expend more resources, and perhaps time, narrowing the 
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spectrum of political contestation so as to empower democrats and marginalize radicals. 
In order to empower a pro-democratic coalition, it helps if there is one to begin with. 
 
 
The Role of Interstate Politics 
Specifically germane to this project is a small but growing literature that explores 
the relationship between interstate political dynamics and successful consolidation, 
including the direct intervention of state actors to effect regime change. Imposed 
democracies are a special case, as the new regime was imposed by interests abroad and 
not by a domestic popular mandate. This raises questions about the legitimacy and 
stability of imposed democratic regimes. Diamond (1992) cautions that “exporting” 
democracy—imposing institutions that popular back home but not necessarily 
appropriate in the target state—is rarely successful, and that states cannot impose a 
democracy where there is no preference for it on the ground. Whitehead (1986) finds that 
public declarations in support of democratic transition correlate poorly with actual 
transition and consolidation. Coyne’s (2008) work justifies skepticism about the efficacy 
of direct intervention for the purpose of democratization. While it is tempting to 
extrapolate from the successes of West Germany and Japan after WWII, it is questionable 
as to whether the conditions that made those successes possible will repeat themselves. 
Moreover, full-scale occupations are expensive and maintain questionable legitimacy 
among the electorate, a view espoused by Stepan (1986). Instead, Coyne favors a “hands-
off” approach that would minimize direct intervention and maximize the role of liberal 
economics, opening up the regime to foreign trade and investment in a way that would 
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generate pro-democracy attitudes among the target populations. Ulfelder’s (2008) work, 
which shows that membership in trade organizations reduces the chance of democratic 
reversal, supports Coyne’s position on free trade. 
 On the other hand, Grimm (2008) finds that imposed democracies, specifically 
those following a war, are more likely to survive when state apparatuses are 
reconstructed. She offers that successful democratizers must ensure welfare, rebuild the 
state, and establish rule of law in order to give the populace in the occupied state an 
incentive to support the new regime. This implies that those who wish to impose 
democracy, particularly following wars and during occupations, should be active in 
rebuilding or replacing the institutions that they just helped destroy. Von Hippel (2000) 
agrees, claiming that re-establishing security, empowering civil society and strengthening 
democratic institutions are all necessary conditions for post-intervention democratization. 
Diamond (1992) suggests that foreign assistance is prudent in helping new regimes 
weather economic reform early in their existence. Stepan (1986), despite cautioning that 
analogous opportunities are unlikely to present themselves again, supports the notion that 
destruction and reconstruction of state institutions (as occurred in Japan and West 
Germany) is a prerequisite for the successful imposition of democracy. Meernik (1996) 
shows that absolute democracy levels do not increase in response to American military 
intervention, but he also finds that democracy levels do rise relative to a target state’s 
neighbors, especially when combined with the deployment of ground forces and a 
declaration of preference for democratization. Peceny’s (1999) work supports Meernik’s 
first point and adds that intervention combined with rhetorical support for free and fair 
elections predicts increased democracy. 
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 Colaresi and Thompson (2003) find that external threats increase the likelihood of 
democratic reversals. This effect is exacerbated in young and economically open regimes. 
They offer the theory that external threats justify the suspension of political freedoms and 
open candidate recruitment, allowing those in power to abolish the regimes that might 
remove them. They also theorize that older regimes are less likely to resort to anti-
democratic policies, as they are more likely to have developed a foreign policy 
establishment that can provide security efficiently. Walt (1996) would agree that younger 
democracies are more vulnerable to foreign threats, but would add that these regimes are 
actually more likely to generate new threats because they are prone to foreign policy 
miscalculations. In other words, democratization creates the very threats that compromise 
the regime. Diskin, Diskin and Hazan (2005) also find a relationship between foreign 
involvement and the likelihood that a democratic regime will fail. Edelstein disagrees 
(2004, 2008). He finds that external threats increase the likelihood that occupiers will 
fulfill the goals they set out, including democratization. 
 Rounding out the findings regarding democracy and international dynamics, 
democratic neighborhoods seem to have an independent, positive effect on the 
democratization and democratic longevity (Gleditsch 2002, Gasiorowski and Power 
1998, Przeworski, Alvarez, et al. 1996, Starr and Lindborg 2003). The converse may also 
be true: democracies in neighborhoods where other democracies are collapsing may be 
more prone to collapse themselves (Starr and Lindborg 2003). Bernhard, Reenock and 
Nordstrom (2003) challenge the neighborhood effect, finding no significant relationship 
between regional democracy and democratic consolidation when controlling for 
economic conditions and institutional design. While Pevehouse (2002a, 2002b) finds that 
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membership in international organizations aids the transition of autocracies to 
democracies, Ulfelder (2008) finds that membership predicts consolidation only in the 
case of organizations dedicated to free trade and human rights. 
 
Summation of Democratization Literature 
 There is general consensus on a range of findings. Older democracies are less 
likely to revert to authoritarianism. Party fragmentation and polarization correlate well 
with democratic reversals. The persistence of military elements from the previous regime 
is a threat to continued democratization. New democracies are more likely to survive if 
they successfully re-establish the basic institutions of statehood, such as a monopoly over 
political violence, as well as the rule of law. Most democracies are capitalist, rich and 
egalitarian, but not all capitalist, wealthy or egalitarian states are democracies. The 
persistence of ancient modes of production in modern societies presents a serious 
roadblock to successful consolidation. Recession, inequality, excessive inflation and 
deflation indicate democratic reversal, while growth, moderate inflation and high, 
egalitarian incomes predict survival. Capital mobility and free trade predict survival, but 
exposure to international trade without the proper state institutions in place is a forecast 
for regime collapse.  
 Other findings have majority, but contested, support. Younger democracies are 
more at risk for democratic reversal, although researchers dispute the susceptibility of 
brand new democratic regimes. Presidential democracies are more likely to revert than 
parliamentary democracies, although this relationship may be moderated by economic 
development, inequality, and democratic history. Federalism may or may not correlate 
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with regime survival. Some studies find that democracies are more successful the second 
time around, while other studies find just the opposite, and others still find no 
relationship. Foreign-imposed democracies may be more successful when the intervening 
state takes a hands-on approach in the target state—or they may be less so. Democracies 
in democratic neighborhoods are more likely to succeed, but we do not know why; it may 
be related to the fact that new democracies are less successful when external threats are 
more extreme. 
Certain compelling and persistent theories find little to no support in the recent 
literature. Mixed parliamentary-presidential regimes may or may not be more fragile than 
purely parliamentary or purely presidential regimes. Rapid growth does not appear to 
trigger democratic reversal. Negative affect towards democratic institutions does not tend 
to predict regime collapse, nor do ethno-linguistic or religious fractionalization. 
Of all the literatures presented here, the one with the biggest gap between research 
produced and real-world importance is that which deals with democratization and 
interstate politics. This is also the area in which the sample sizes are smallest. The three 
pieces in this review that most specifically address this question are Coyne (2008) and 
Enterline and Greig (2008a, 2008b). Considering the dearth of cases of foreign imposed 
democratization, perhaps it is not surprising that these are the three pieces with the most 
severe theoretical, methodological and evidentiary shortcomings. The pieces by Enterline 
and Greig produce very interesting results but do so by drawing from a questionable 
sample. In what appears to be an effort to expand the sample to the point at which a 
large-n examination would be possible, Enterline and Greig include cases that do not 
faithfully represent the concept of polity imposition. Their criteria lump together regime 
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change following military defeat with those that follow rhetorical calls by legislators for 
free elections (Enterline and Greig 2008a; p. 891). The sample also conflates autonomous 
postcolonial democratizers with foreign-imposed democratization attempts, so that the 
gradual, peaceful democratization of Canada—previously a compliant outpost of the 
British Empire—is part of the same population post-WWII Germany and Japan. Of the 
ninety-four cases in their sample, only seventeen involved a military victory by the 
imposer (p. 896). In only 27% of the event-years does the imposer deploy ground forces 
the target polity (p. 898). Moreover, their specification of instability is overbroad as well, 
including mundane disturbances such as protests and strikes (p. 895). The researchers do 
not seem to make any attempt to select out peaceful demonstrations that may not 
represent actual challenges to the regime, nor do they seem to consider the fact that 
strikes and protests are indicators of a healthy civil society, and thus may actually 
indicate consolidation rather than instability.  
Coyne’s treatment differs from Enterline and Greig’s in that it employs a small-n 
empirical narrative methodology, but it nevertheless suffers from a questionable research 
design in addition to serious historical inaccuracies. While Coyne’s sampling criteria are 
more faithful to what most would consider an attempt at foreign imposed regime change, 
there are some troubling inconsistencies. For instance, he counts the US interventions in 
Cambodia in 1970-73 and Somalia in 1993-95 as “occupations” (p. 15) even though the 
former was an air war accompanied by a brief invasion, while the latter was primarily 
concerned with peacekeeping rather than regime imposition. On the other hand, he 
inexplicably excludes the occupation of the German Rhineland following the Great War, 
during which an American military government (alongside France and the United 
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Kingdom) controlled a third of the territory between the Rhine and the Franco-Belgian 
frontier from late 1918 through early 1923.3 Sample problems aside, the main 
shortcomings here concern the narrative itself. A narrative approach is supposed to yield 
empirical benefits by tracing causal processes, yet Coyne often fails to provide evidence 
that reveals a causal chain between independent and dependent variables. His methods 
are not incapable of rejecting rival hypotheses, but at no point does he share compelling 
evidence for his conclusion that free trade is actually generating norms or building 
incentive structures that condition political behavior. Finally, his historical data are 
suspect at best. In the cases of West Germany and Japan, he claims that the US and its 
partners avoided credibility and legitimacy issues since the state institutions in the 
occupied countries had largely survived the war. This position directly contradicts Stepan 
(1986), who cites the absolute dismantlement of the instruments of state by the Allies in 
West Germany and Japan as an explanation for the success of democratization in those 
cases. While in fact Coyne’s description may properly characterize the occupation of 
Japan, it ignores volumes of historical and political treatments about the occupation of 
Germany.  
In terms of the broader literature, this project can shine little light on those 
theories on which we as a discipline lack consensus. However, the role of the occupier is 
important to those relationships on which there is more agreement. As the preponderant 
power in the territory, the occupying force enjoys outsized influence over the 
construction of new institutions and the redistribution of public and private value. 
3 Some democratization scholars truncate the Weimar experience from their sample due 
to the lack of data about economic performance prior to WWII, but this was not the case 
for Coyne, who included no fewer than ten cases that occurred prior to 1918. 
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Moreover, the occupation establishes the informational parameters of the regime by 
signaling to domestic actors who and who may not participate in formal political 
institutions and establishing incentives for domestic actors who work within those 
parameters. In doing so, the occupation can mitigate the negative aspects of uncertainty 
in new democratic regimes. In order for a democratic regime to successfully consolidate, 
occupying powers must behave in such a way as to narrow the acceptable spectrum of 
political contestation in favor of actors who prefer democracy as well as build institutions 




 The relative absence of literature on imposed democratization, and the 
problematic nature of the literature that does exist, presents us with an opportunity. The 
relevance of this area of inquiry to modern international relations and American foreign 
policy demands that curious scholars seize the opportunity to undertake a rigorous 
inquiry into the process of democratic consolidation and survival in imposed regimes. 
The cautionary examples provided above suggest that we should avoid embellishing the 
sample for the purpose of satisfying a methodological requirement. They also implore us 
to be careful and thorough in collecting and evaluating the data (not that this is something 
that a researcher should have to learn via cautionary tales) and explicit in describing 
causal processes. 
 This is the type of inquiry that I aim to conduct here. In the next chapter, I shall 
describe a research design that proposes the use of small-n comparative case study and 
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process tracing to test the relationship between a few of the variables presented above and 
the likelihood of imposed democratic regime survival. This project will draw cases from 
a population defined by narrow criteria that is faithful to the idea of foreign imposed 
regime change. It will employ a large body of historical literature to triangulate events 
constituting a pathway to or away from regime collapse. It will certainly not artificially 
expand the sample for reasons of convenience or claim historical facts that are not 
supported by multiple secondary and/or primary sources. It is this research design and 
this project that I will unfold in the chapters ahead. The following chapter will present the 
research design for investigating the causes of instability and consolidation in imposed 
democracies. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 will consist of historical case studies that test the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 7 will summarize the findings from the four 
cases and test hypotheses across cases. 
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter’s review explored the existing body of knowledge on 
democratic consolidation. The following chapter proposes a model that attempts to 
explain the success and failure of democratic consolidation in occupied regimes that 
incorporates and adds to the literature. Going forward, I argue that there is a common 
thread that ties together most of the theories about democratic consolidation. In essence, 
these theories all propose that consolidated democracies have successfully narrowed the 
spectrum of acceptable political contestation. The literature on democracy and instability 
explains the importance of allowing a certain amount of uncertainty as to permit the 
transfer of power between winning coalitions, but not so much as that transfer would 
result in a winning coalition intent on dismantling the regime. Uncertainty within certain 
boundaries is only possible once radical elements that might infiltrate the regime have 
been marginalized or eliminated—in other words, once the acceptable spectrum of 
political behavior is narrow and inclusive of moderates alone. The literature on 
democratic political economy focuses on marginalizing or preventing the formation of a 
constituency that has a stake in dismantling the regime. The acceptable political economy 
is one in which the distribution of resources and policies of redistribution do not 
encourage moderates to become radicals—a political economy that narrows the 
acceptable spectrum of contestation. The literature on institution focuses on building 
institutions that is responsive and inclusive enough to empower moderate, democratic 
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actors but not so responsive or inclusive that it allows antidemocratic elements to gain 
power through legal means; democratic institutions have to simultaneously represent 
moderates and marginalize radicals. Again, the story returns to the narrowing of the 
spectrum of political contestation. Therefore, a model that explains the role that occupiers 
play in the consolidation of democratic regimes must explain the role that the occupation 
plays in the narrowing of the spectrum of political contestation.  
 
 
Narrowing the Spectrum of Political Contestation 
 Democratic regimes are insecure so long as there are organized elements within 
the territory that have the capacity and the will to revise or violate the rules set by 
democratic institutions. Additionally, democratic institutions are ineffective if the 
distribution of preferences is so wide that it cannot be reconciled by legislative 
compromise. Of the terms that scholars have conflated with democratic consolidation 
(according to Schedler 1998), many are synonymous with narrowing political 
contestation, including neutralization of antidemocratic opponents, civilian control of the 
military and the elimination of authoritarian opposition. When the distribution of 
preferences across the selectorate is narrow, outcomes are more predictable, radical 
elements are marginalized, and democracy stabilizes (Alexander 2002). Even when 
legislatures marginalize radical antidemocratic organizations, they do not necessarily 
narrow the range of actual preferences—only how they are expressed in government 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). This may prevent an internal coup, but it may also raise 
the stakes for those who find themselves disenfranchised by exclusionary electoral laws. 
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It will not hinder those who are prone to non-democratic channels to usurp the dominant 
regime. 
 A broad range of political preferences is the source of some of the uncertainty in 
new democratic regimes that is described by Schedler (2001a) and O’Donnell and 
Schmitter. The rules are arduously contested in new regimes in part because some 
pretenders are unwilling to suffer what Przeworksi (1986) calls “institutionalized 
uncertainty,” meaning that actors in democratic regimes cannot win a permanent spot in 
the winning coalition. Moreover, models that emphasize economic variables sometimes 
depend on constraining the range of political preferences. Constituencies in regimes with 
high inequality are likely to harbor a broader range of political preferences (especially 
when it comes to economic policy) than those in more equal democracies (all else equal). 
Just as democracies with growing economies may be more capable of buying out the 
losers of economic redistribution, they may also be more capable of buying out the losers 
of political redistribution (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Democracy has a great potential 
for economic redistribution (Boix 2003), but it carries a near certain probability of 
political redistribution—this is the entire point of institutionalized uncertainty. 
Huntington (1991) and Stepan (1986) rely on a similar concept when they discuss 
the removal of unfriendly military elements in new democracies. Moore’s (1966) theory 
about reactionary landed classes retarding democratic transitions is also an argument 
about narrowing the spectrum of political competition. Polarization and fragmentation in 
highly proportional legislatures with low electoral thresholds (Haggard and Kaufman 
1995, Elgie 2008, Przeworski, Alvarez, et al. 1996) are far more intractable when actual 
preferences in the selectorate are broadly distributed and/or bimodal. Theories that 
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prioritize the establishment of state institutions in new democracies (Stepan 1986, 
Enterline and Greig 2008a, Møller and Skaaning 2011, Linz 1997, von Hippel 2000) 
highlight the importance of a new democratic regime’s ability to punish internal threats. 
Even Walt’s (1996) findings about regime change, uncertainty and war are compatible 
with this concept—foreign powers may have less information about a new regime’s 
intent when the range of actors who may capture the state is excessively broad.  
 
 
Occupations as Caretaker States 
Democratic regimes in sovereign states are solely responsible for constraining the 
spectrum of acceptable political contestation. However, in occupied states, there is 
another player who can play this role in imposed democracies: the imposer. Depending 
on the nature of the imposition, and therefore on the relationship between the occupying 
powers and the domestic government of the occupied state, occupation policy can have a 
strong effect on the distribution of political interests in the democratizing state. The 
authors of the new regime are responsible for designing the institutions that will establish 
the rules of the game, including relations between local and central governments and 
determining the type of legislative and executive systems. Formative elected 
governments have the responsibility of fashioning economic and foreign policy in order 
to promote growth, control inflation, and deter threats. But these are also responsibilities 
that the occupation can assume, if it so chooses. Moreover, the imposer has two 
advantages over the new regime: a preponderance of force to impose its will and the 
capacity to remain in power despite the preferences of domestic actors. It can do more 
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than set policy: it can forcefully rectify inequalities and unilaterally marginalize or 
eliminate undesirable actors. Now, how the imposer should use its predominance of 
capabilities in this manner is a matter of dispute? The following chapters will investigate 
this question, but the point remains: the occupation can fulfill the responsibilities of the 
new regime, and more. Knowing that an occupying force can take over the reins of 
state, temporarily, for a new democracy, one might ask what action an occupier can 
undertake to narrow the range of acceptable political contestation. The regular 
democratization literature provides some answers: encourage parliamentary regimes and 
impose a constraining electoral law; maintain capital mobility across borders through free 
trade agreements and enabling currency convertibility, but not before establishing rule of 
law and rebuilding infrastructure; ensure moderate growth in the money supply. Coyne 
(2008) investigated the impact of these processes, as did Enterline and Greig (2008a, 
2008b). However, one variable that these scholars do not approach is the influence of 
interstate threat dynamics. External threat is relevant to democratic consolidation for a 
few reasons. The first is because of the nature of this type of democratization: when so 
much force is brought to bear, and when a military defeat is likely a recent development 
for the target state, one would expect threat levels and mutual suspicion to be unusually 
high. The second derives from the findings of Walt (1996), who sees a correlation 
between conflict escalation and regime change. The third derives from the findings of 
Colaresi and Thompson (2003), that external threats destabilize new democracies by 
justifying authoritarian security measures. The fourth derives from the findings of 
Edelstein (2004, 2008), that the presence of an external threat can actually predict the 
success of foreign occupations. 
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 One of the reasons why Colaresi and Thompson presume that foreign threats can 
destabilize young democracies is that new regimes have not yet developed their own 
capacity to deter or forcibly respond to enemy provocation. But, is this not a role that an 
occupier can play as well? Can the occupation deter threats and respond to provocation in 
ways that preempt calls for authoritarian security measures among the target state’s 
selectorate? Enterline and Greig (2008a) hint at this possibility in a tangential manner by 
confirming an inverse relationship between military strength and political instability. 
Before moving forward with this theory, however, one must resolve a contradiction. 
Colaresi and Thompson find that foreign threats destabilize democracies, while Edelstein 
finds that foreign threats help occupiers satisfy their occupation goals. So, what occurs 
when the threat level is high, and the occupier’s goal is to impose a democratic regime? 
Which theory is correct in this case? The answer is both, but with a qualification 
regarding Edelstein’s theory. 
 It is possible to rectify this contradiction by noting that Edelstein was specifically 
testing occupation outcome against threat perception, and by re-examining his citation of 
the occupations of South Korea and Japan.  Edelstein found that the American occupation 
succeeded in Japan because the occupied population therein perceived a foreign threat 
from the Soviet Union, justifying the occupation. On the other hand, the South Korean 
population did not perceive the same threat, and—considering their desire to achieve 
independence after years of occupation by the Japanese—were unwilling to accept the 
violation of their sovereignty. This is puzzling. From an objective standpoint, the Soviet 
threat to South Korea was far greater than the Soviet threat to Japan. The war that erupted 
months after the American exit is confirmation of the true threat that the Soviets, and a 
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Soviet-sponsored North Korea, posed. North Korea had allied itself with the Soviet 
Union and, later, the People’s Republic of China, and the 38th parallel was an artificial 
boundary with no extraordinary geographical characteristics that could slow down an 
invasion of the South. On the other hand, Japan is separated by water from both the PRC 
and the Russian territories, and, even considering their surrender to American forces, had 
not faced an invasion of the main islands since repelling Kublai Khan in CE 1281 
(Emanuel 2005). 
 So why was the United States unable to justify its occupation of South Korea to 
the domestic political establishment, considering the considerable threat from the North? 
Two reasons: 1) the United States failed to demonstrate the same level of commitment to 
South Korean welfare as it did Japanese; 2) South Korea’s experience with occupation 
indicated that the occupation’s forces—not Stalin’s, Mao’s or Kim Il-Sung’s—were the 
more threatening presence in the region. Approaching the contrasts between South Korea 
and Japan in this manner resolves the contradiction between Edelstein and Colaresi and 
Thompson in two ways: 1) threat is a positive characteristic when the occupier 
demonstrates its capacity to defend against the threat, and a negative characteristic when 
it does not; 2) to demonstrate its value to the occupied state, the occupier must provide 
surplus—or marginal—value, to compensate for the threat, drain on resources and 
abrogation of autonomy that they themselves pose. Every occupation carries with it its 
own value. That value is a function of the threat posed by the occupier, the threat posed 
by foreign competitors, and the goods provided by the occupier. For the occupation to 
succeed—for domestic actors to see the occupation as less of a threat than the external 
actors—the occupier must provide enough value to exceed both the threat posed by 
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foreign competitors and the threat that they themselves create. They need to administer an 
occupation in which the “marginal value of occupation” is positive. In the case of an 
occupation governing a new democratic regime, a positive value margin obviates the 
need for authoritarian security measures by compensating for the new regime’s 
underwhelming defense capacity. 
 
 
Marginal Value of Occupation and Modes of Political Contestation 
Providing marginal value through distributing public security goods or more 
narrowly distributing private economic goods empowers an occupation force to narrow 
the range of acceptable political contestation. Occupation-generated security produces a 
public good that can be passed on by the new regime to the selectorate, allowing the new 
regime to claim credit. Additionally, 
increasing security stems grievances 
that may arise in response to a 
perceived insecurity or threat. This 
in turn reduces domestic affect for 
organizations that may trade on 
such grievances, incentives for 
those who might choose to support 
such organizations (rhetorically, 
economically and/or physically). Moreover, increases in security delegitimize violence as 
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the new regime would yield internal or external security gains. Beyond the realm of 
security goods, the occupying forces find themselves in the unique role of authoritative 
redistributor; they have the capacity to redistribute and produce non-security goods—
such as prosperity and personal security—thereby eliminating grievances and allowing 
the new regime to claim credit for improvements in the standard of living. What’s more, 
the occupying forces, with some finesse, may be able to redistribute said goods in such a 
way that specifically empowers pro-democracy factions and deprives radical groups. 
By pursuing policies that improve the standard of living specifically for pro-
democratic factions, the occupiers narrow the spectrum of political contestation. Imagine 
that the distribution of preferences across the selectorate is two-tailed and bell-shaped: 
pro-democratic centrist, leftist and right-wing elements comprise the bell, while radical 
left- and right-wing elements constitute the long tails. In this metaphor, the first process 
grows the bell while the second process clips the tails. By narrowing the distribution of 
preferences, security provision narrows the range of possible electoral outcomes, 
reducing the probability of polarization, fragmentation, and the costs of political 
redistribution. It also reduces the possibility of political violence by marginalizing radical 
elements who may wish to contest the regime in this manner.  
 A constraining factor here (as in the rest of the democratization canon) is 
uncertainty. Similar to the information premium during democratic transitions, 
information about actual security at any given moment is scarce (except in cases where 
the probability of surviving until the next sunrise equals zero, as in the case of total 
military defeat). This is why Edelstein bases his theory on perceptions of threat. Sub-state 
actors infer security based on prevailing conditions that indicate an increase or decrease 
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in the likelihood that their life, liberty or property will be threatened in the near future, 
whereas state actors calculate security based on the inverse probability of total military 
defeat. Accordingly, occupier behavior that credibly signals future security—such as a 
mutual security pact backed by a major force commitment—will have a positive 
influence on security perception. Conversely, actions that signal future insecurity—such 
as sponsoring external threats or directly engaging the occupied state in renewed 
hostilities—will have a negative effect. These signals cover a wide range of behavior, 
from public statements, to formal alliances, to direct military action. The more costly the 
signal, the more credibility it will hold in the minds of domestic actors (Fearon 1997). 
The same dynamics apply to the production and distribution of non-security goods—
crime and domestic instability indicate future instability, prosperity signals future 
prosperity. In order to improve the marginal value of the occupation, and thus narrow the 
acceptable range of political contestation, occupiers must credibly signal their 
willingness and capacity to produce occupation goods. The remainder of the dissertation 
is dedicated to demonstrating how occupation commitments narrow the range of 
contestation, limit political instability, and improve the survival of new democratic 






Specification of Terms  
Democracy 
This project will employ a minimalist conception of democracy as the important 
phenomenon under discussion. An executive and legislature (with lawmaking authority) 
constrained by popular elections will suffice. There are several measurements of 
democracy, one of the most common being the Polity IV rating system (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2009). For a more rigorous test, this project will employ a +5 Polity threshold to 
separate democracies from non-democracies.  
 
Regime Survival 
 Regime survival is easy enough to pin down based on the criteria established 
above. If at any point during the case the democracy drops below the +5 Polity IV 
threshold the case will count as a failed consolidation. As Coyne (2008) notes, there is no 
consensus on how far out one should study a regime to determine consolidation; he looks 
at intervals of five, ten, fifteen and twenty years. Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom 
(2003) indicate that regimes consolidate their capacity to respond to economic shocks 
after the first three legislative elections. Svolik (2008) finds that the probability of 
collapse declines as early as the seventh year and that survival during the first two 
decades is “crucial.” Enterline and Greig (2008a, 2008b) show that the historical rate for 
regime reversal passes even at about the twenty-year mark. There seems to be a 
consensus that forms around two decades as an outer bound for consolidation studies, so 
this project will examine regime democracy levels up to twenty years beyond the 
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founding of the polity—or when the ceases to be democratic, whichever comes first. 
Huntington’s (1991) emphasis on generational turnover is compatible with an outer 
bound of twenty years, which is a reasonable operationalization of the time span equal to 
a single generation. 
 
Consolidation and Instability 
 Instability is a bit tougher to observe than survival. Instability is essentially 
evidence of behavior (or preparation for behavior) by domestic actors to replace the 
winning coalition in a manner not sanctioned by law or constitutional provision, or an 
effort to achieve electoral success with the goal of dissolving democratic regimes. At the 
extreme this would include civil wars, coups and attempted coups. Less extreme 
examples of stability include political violence directed at state actors, mass protests 
explicitly directed at the replacement of a democratic regime with another type, 
paramilitary violence and the raising of paramilitary organizations. In addition, this study 
will include electoral success of antidemocratic parties as an example of instability due to 
the possibility of so-called “legal coups,” wherein radical forces come to power legally 
and use constitutional means to terminate democratic institutions. Consolidation is the 
most difficult of these terms to specify due to the inability to directly observe this 
process. There is a lack of consensus on what consolidation means, and Schedler (2001b) 
attempts to resolve this dilemma by recommending that we focus on the behavior of 
actors in the regime. Schedler claims that behavior of government actors is the most 
causally adjacent and observable indicator of consolidation. This is why instability is a 
phenomenon of interest—the actions described above are the most causally adjacent 
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conditions to regime collapse and thus the best indicators of the loss condition. 
Ultimately, consolidation is the opposite of instability and the inverse of the probability 
of survival. 
 
Occupation and Regime Imposition 
 Instead of exploring all examples of foreign intervention and their effects on 
democracy, this project will narrow the range of cases under examination to occupations 
initiated by military intervention. This is a small-n project, so it is important to constrain 
the range of variables that might affect observed outcomes, making hypotheses easier to 
test. Occupations, broadly defined, occur when a foreign state abrogates the sovereignty 
of a target state by deploying armed forces on the target’s territory as a means of 
suspending that state’s right to conduct an independent foreign and domestic policy. This 
is a condition that would satisfy most, if not all, of the cases in Edelstein’s studies. 
Likewise, the population of cases in this dissertation derives from a narrower and more 
faithful definition of regime imposition than Enterline and Greig. Only new democratic 
regimes that emerge in occupied states or in anticipation of a future occupation count as 
imposed democratic regimes for the purposes of the dissertation. 
 
Optimal, Semi-optimal and Suboptimal Winning Coalitions 
 If an example of instability is success among antidemocratic parties, then it is 
important to specify which parties meet the conditions of democratic and antidemocratic. 
Democratic parties are those that express a preference for open elections to powerful 
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representative legislative bodies via party platforms or public pronouncements. Together, 
these parties constitute the optimal winning coalition. This does not have to be an 
intentional coalition—it does not matter if these parties actually form a government 
together or not. Rather, a government can remain in the control of democratic parties 
while other democratic parties do not join the government or hold cabinet positions. 
These members of the ODC are the sub-state organizations, typically but not always 
political parties, which, if they did form a government, would represent the friendliest 
possible winning coalition (wherein all pro-democracy elements are in and all non-
democracy elements are out). Furthermore, there are two classes of antidemocratic 
organizations. Organizations that remain publicly ambiguous about their support for 
democratic institutions constitute the semi-optimal coalition. Sub-state organizations that 
are publicly committed to the termination of democratic institutions constitute the 
suboptimal coalition.   
 
Marginal Value of Occupation 
 Occupying forces are more successful in narrowing the spectrum of acceptable 
political contestation when the occupation they impose produces marginal value. This is 
difficult, as any occupation begins with a security deficit. Most of the time, the occupiers 
were recently enemies dedicated to the occupied state’s defeat. Moreover, the reality of 
the occupation produces three bits of information about the relationship between occupier 
and target: 1) the occupying states’ aggregate capabilities are significantly greater than 
those of the target state; 2) the occupying states are necessarily the most geographically 
proximate states; and 3) there is a forward deployment of the occupiers’ troops with the 
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capacity to inflict damage on the target state. These are all components of threat as 
determined by Walt (1987). The likely history of antagonism, the disparity in aggregate 
capabilities, geographical proximity and forward deployment almost guarantee that, at 
outset, the occupying forces are a greater threat to occupied state than any other state in 
the system. In order to overcome this deficit, the occupiers must provide a surplus of 
goods—security and otherwise—enough that it exceeds the costs of the inherent threat of 
the occupation itself. This excess value is the marginal value of occupation. 
 There are three other terms related to the marginal security value of occupation: 
occupation relationship, threat environment and security configuration. The occupation 
relationship is the internal welfare effect of the occupation policy. The occupation 
relationship is positive when the occupying forces improve the welfare, standard of living 
and/or personal security of domestic political actors—what one might refer to as human 
security—and negative when it impairs domestic welfare. The threat environment is the 
degree to which the occupied territory is threatened by foreign states other than those that 
constitute the occupation force. When powerful, geographically proximate competitors 
antagonize the occupied state, the threat environment grows more hostile. The security 
configuration is the relationship between the occupiers and other enemies and allies of 
the occupied state. The security configuration is favorable when the occupiers confront 
enemies of the occupied state, neutral when it does not, and unfavorable when the 
occupiers are supportive of the occupied state’s enemies (historical or contemporary). A 
positive occupation relationship, hostile threat environment and favorable security 
configuration all contribute to the surplus of security provided by the occupation. These 
processes are more explicit in the section below. 
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The Marginal Value Model 
Threat Processes 
The following model outlines the mechanism by which the behavior of occupiers 
and of potential security competitors affects the perception of threat by domestic actors in 
the target state, and by extension how these dynamics affect the range of political 
preferences and contestation. This is determined by three relationships: 1) the occupation 
relationship, or the means by which the occupiers signal the provision of occupation 
goods to domestic political actors; 2) the threat environment, which is an objective 
measurement of the degree of hostility in the system; and 3) the security configuration, 
which is the relationship between the occupying states and states hostile to the occupied 
state.  
The occupation relationship, at its most simplistic, boils down to a single 
question: Does the occupation’s policy seem to be improving or reducing the welfare of 
domestic actors in the target state? The occupying state can improve the internal situation 
in the target state in a number of ways, such as targeting and eliminating violent internal 
threats and helping the state rebuild its police and external security forces. This 
relationship, however, may extend beyond traditional security. The direct provision of 
economic and personal security goods also improve this relationship. The reconstruction 
of infrastructure and industry, direct injections of capital, and policies that improve public 
health also fall under this rubric. Conversely, introducing violence into the territory (by, 
say, sponsoring insurgencies), preventing the new regime from establishing sufficient 
internal security, draining fixed and/or portfolio capital from the state, and any other 
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policies that reduce the personal safety of domestic actors constitute a negative 
occupation relationship. 
The capacity for the occupying state to provide external security goods in the first 
place is dependent on the status of foreign threats to the occupied state. Without a foreign 
threat to defend against, there is no way for the occupiers to provide surplus security, or 
security above the level that they withdraw from the occupied territory by their presence 
and any previous history of antagonism; the greater the threat by non-occupying states, 
the greater the capacity for occupiers to provide security goods. As always, the 
distribution of threat is in part dependent on capabilities and geographical security, but it 
is also dependent on offensive posture and demonstrations of intent towards the occupied 
state (Walt 1987). When geographically proximate states demonstrate hostile intent 
towards the occupied state, either through public pronouncements, conspicuous 
redeployment of forces, or actual military aggression, the threat environment grows more 
hostile. Conversely, if geographically proximate states demonstrate indifference towards 
the occupied state, or if they demonstrate willingness for peace and cooperation, then the 
hostility level decreases and the threat environment becomes less critical. 
Security configuration boils down to the capacity of the occupying states to 
establish themselves as the best possible allies to the occupied regime. The means by 
which the occupation signals the future provision of external security goods is by 
responding to those who pose a threat to the occupied state. By treating the enemies of 
the occupied state in an adversarial manner, the occupation sends a credible signal that it 
is committed to the occupied state’s national security. The costlier the signal the better: 
public pronouncements are marginally credible, formal alliances more credible, and 
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direct military engagement the most convincing (although expensive for obvious 
reasons). The least favorable security configurations are the resultants of A) a direct 
military confrontation between the occupation and the occupied state’s allies, B) an 
active military contribution by the occupation to the occupied state’s enemies, or C) both. 
A favorable security configuration increases the occupation’s potential marginal security. 
 Information, uncertainty and time play important roles in the processes described 
above. At the outset, there is very little information about the political game in the new 
regime: about the payoff structure for political contestation, about the rewards for 
cooperating with new institutional rules and punishments for violating them, about the 
intent of the occupiers, and about how secure and prosperous the future regime will be. 
This uncertainty will not persist for long, however, as domestic and international actors 
begin to assert their interests. On the other hand, there is a wealth of information about 
the power relationship between the occupation and the occupied state, the overwhelming 
majority of which is negative. Both of these realities emphasize the importance of time, 
specifically the importance of producing information that is favorable to the 
consolidation of democracy as soon as possible. The occupiers signal—or produce 
information—about their intent through the occupation relationship and security 
relationship, but this information will be more valuable when this information is at a 
premium. Information is most valuable when uncertainty is highest, and uncertainty 
declines as actors assert their interests over time. Therefore, behavior early will have a 
greater impact on marginal security value than behavior late. 
Moreover, individuals do not respond to losses and gains equally in uncertain 
environments. Instead, cognitive psychology—of the utmost relevance here because the 
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updating of beliefs with new information is a learning process—indicates that individuals 
react more emphatically to losses than to gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Levy 
1996, 1997, 2002, Kahneman 2011). As a result, negative behavior of a certain degree 
harms the occupation’s security value more than positive behavior of an equal degree 
helps it. Additionally, negative behavior later in the occupation may cancel the effect of 
positive behavior early in the occupation, while positive behavior later in the occupation 
will not likely compensate for negative behavior early in the regime. It is impossible to 
know how much more of an impact negative signals convey versus positive signal, and it 
is impossible to know how much more of an impact early behavior will have versus later 
behavior. Nor is it possible to quantify the degree of any actions that may produce or 
reduce marginal security. What this tells us is that positive, early behavior is most likely 
to yield marginal security, that occupations should be more successful in narrowing the 
spectrum of political contestation when they begin producing surplus security in the first 
years of the occupation and in the first years of the new regime, and that democracies 
should be more likely to consolidate and survive when occupations start out this way.  
 
Variables 
 Aside from the variables related to the existing literature on democratic 
consolidation—GDP growth, incomes, inflation, electoral laws and parliamentary-
presidential balance—the independent variable here is the marginal security value of 
occupation. Marginal value cannot be directly observed, but it can be inferred through the 
observation of its constituent parts. Events in the historical record point to positive, 
negative, or stable trends in the occupation relationship, threat environment and security 
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configuration. The occupation produces marginal value when it contributes to the 
domestic wellbeing of the occupied state and convincingly pledges to defend it against 
foreign threats. The occupation fails to produce marginal value when it does not 
contribute to domestic wellbeing or when it aligns with the occupation state’s enemies. 
Everything else in the middle is a question of degree or just uncertain, specifically when 
the occupation relationship is positive, the threat environment lacks hostility, and the 
security configuration is unfavorable. Nevertheless, there are indicators that clarify the 
situation: alliances. Substantive security agreements between occupier and target, when 
entered into voluntarily, indicate that the occupying forces have credibly signaled their 
interest in preserving the security of the occupied state. This is an even more favorable 
indicator when the agreement involves material commitments. Parchment is cheap, but 
material transactions such as force contributions, basing agreements and coordinated 
military action are more expensive, and thus more convincing, indicators that the 
occupation produced marginal security goods. Considering this, informal security 
agreements that involve material compromises (such as training and arms production 
agreements) are better signals than formal alliances that do not (such as mutual security 
pacts that carry no additional requirements except for the joint declaration of war). 
 
Table 2.1: Effect of Component Factors on Marginal Occupation Value 
 












Positive Hostile Favorable Surplus Surplus Very Positive 
Positive Hostile Unfavorable Surplus Large Deficit Negative 
Positive Amiable Favorable Surplus Even Positive 
Positive Amiable Unfavorable Surplus Deficit Uncertain 
Negative Hostile Favorable Large Deficit Surplus Negative 
Negative Hostile Unfavorable Large Deficit Large Deficit Extremely Negative 
Negative Amiable Favorable Large Deficit Even Very Negative 





 Dependent variables include intra-case political instability and case-level survival 
or collapse. Political violence, paramilitary strength, economic support for antidemocratic 
organizations and electoral success by parties outside of the optimal winning coalition are 
all indicators of instability. Survival, as noted above, occurs when the regime in question 
closes out the twenty-year period of observation above +5 on the Polity IV scale. 
 
Hypothesis 
The model described above yields observable implications and testable 
predictions. The marginal value of occupation model yields predictions that operate both 
within each case and across cases. Generally, events indicating regime instability will be 
less common among cases in which the occupiers increase marginal occupation value 
through the provision of security and other goods than they will be among cases in which 
occupiers reduce the value of the occupation (H1). Additionally, events indicating regime 
instability with be less common within cases when the occupiers increase marginal 
occupation value than they will be when the occupiers reduce the value of the occupation 
(H2). Finally, democratic regimes will survive only in cases where the occupiers manage 
to provide economic aid and commit materially to defending the new regime from a 
foreign threat before the occupiers aid an enemy of the occupied state and/or before the 







 This study will combine intra-case analysis with comparative case history in order 
to reveal the mechanisms that link explanatory variables to regime outcomes. The focus 
of the substantive chapters is the elucidation of processes that the hypotheses anticipate, 
as well as the role of those expected by control hypotheses. As McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly (2008) demonstrate, these processes can be uncovered through the methodological 
approach of historical process tracing.4 Process tracing is the method of testing 
hypotheses based on within-case and across-case variation. This approach requires the 
researcher to move above and below the level of analysis within which the key process 
operates (Bennett 2008).  
 The limited sample of cases of imposed democracy demands the employment of 
counterfactual analysis of necessary-condition arguments (Ragin 1989, Hall 2003, Goertz 
and Levy 2007, Box-Steffensemeir, Brady and Collier 2008). This, perhaps in contrast 
with what the title of the method implies, does not mean constructing meticulous histories 
of events that did not occur. In fact, the counterfactual approach does as large-n statistical 
analysis does, attempting to ascertain how conditions would change if the data observed 
provided different values. The counterfactual approach conceptualizes historical 
outcomes as a chain of causal reactions. Each link in the chain is a point in time where, 
under different conditions, history may have taken a different course. Historians refer to 
these links as “turning points,” while social scientists often refer to them as “critical 
junctures” or “windows of opportunity” (Goertz and Levy 2007). These periods establish 
points in the historical record where the researcher may test his theory against real 
4 See also: Pierson (2000), George and Bennett (2001), Falleti (2006), Lichbach (2008), 
Falleti and Lynch (2009), Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu (2009). 
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conditions. They also allow the researcher to break down larger cases into several sub-
cases (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). The working hypothesis and rival hypotheses, 
grounded in theory, provide explanations for what course history should or should not 
take following these junctures. Therefore, we can reject a hypothesis when the prevailing 
conditions during a critical juncture predict a counterfactual, or a history that did not 
occur. 
 Identifying historical process chains is important for reasons other than 
counterfactual reasoning. The existing democratic consolidation literature varies in the 
degree by which the authors choose to undergird their predictions with theoretical claims, 
but a significant amount of the literature surveyed herein contains descriptions of the 
theoretical micro- or macro-processes that support the hypotheses that they test. For 
instance, Boix’s correlative prediction about the relationship between equality and 
democratic consolidation is based on a theoretical narrative in which holders of valuable 
goods employ antidemocratic tactics to impede confiscation. This means that if Boix is 
correct, we should not only observe that egalitarian democracies survive and that unequal 
democracies do not, but we should also find evidence of political actors who behave in 
ways that confirm Boix’s theory. We should see that political actors who are flush with 
immobile assets 1) express opposition to redistributive and confiscatory policies, 2) pool 
resources with similar actors in an effort to build coalitions to defeat the regime in 
response to the election of redistributive parties and the initiation of redistributive 
policies, 3) employ those resources to either take over the legislature or initiate a coup, 4) 
see these groups leading the effort to successfully bring down democratic regimes, 5) 
place themselves or someone who represents them in power, 6) eliminate democratic 
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institutions that may remove them from power, and 7) instituting policies that reverse 
previous episodes of redistribution and prevent future redistribution. Furthermore, the 
process should take place more or less in the same order as presented above, and this 
process should repeat itself in a preponderant ratio of cases of democratic reversal. 
Similarly, if Haggard and Kaufmann (1995) are correct about economic growth enabling 
political winners to buy out antidemocratic opponents, we should observe a causal chain 
in which the winning coalition manually transfers private goods to anti-democratic 
constituencies, followed by observations of those constituencies renouncing their 
preferences for regime displacement and/or a migration of supporters from 
antidemocratic organizations to democratic ones, in this order, in a preponderance of 
cases. If one does not observe these sequences, then one must consider the possibility that 
the hypothesis is A) wrong or B) right for the wrong reasons. 
 The research in the following chapters will present findings in this way. The 
marginal security approach has its own theoretical narrative. Policy that seeks to improve 
the occupation relationship should result in an increase in positive attitudes towards the 
occupation forces, followed by these same constituencies renouncing the use of political 
violence and casting votes in favor of parties that constitute the optimal winning 
coalition. An increasingly hostile threat environment should encourage the constituencies 
most threatened to call for drastic measures to remedy their perceived insecurity, and it 
should encourage antidemocrats that hold legislative seats and cabinet positions to 
propose and support policies that curtail democratic freedoms as implied by Colaresi and 
Thompson’s theoretical narrative. When such threats arise, and if the occupation forces 
credibly commit themselves to deterring these threats, the same constituencies that called 
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for authoritarian solutions should withdraw their proposals, perhaps even migrating to the 
center. In cases of democratic reversal, we should see that the victorious parties had once 
rhetorically employed the perception of insecurity in programs and speeches. We should 
also observe that they blamed the occupation forces specifically for the insecurity they 
purported to experience. Finally, we should observe that antidemocratic political 
entrepreneurs commonly demonized pro-democracy elements in tandem with grievances 
directed toward the occupation, sometimes branding them as conspiring to further reduce 
the security of the state and its people for their own self-interest. We should see that 
politicians, parties, and other political organizations that employed such rhetoric won 
substantial electoral and, perhaps, economic and paramilitary support.  
 The point is that behind every well-developed theory there is a narrative. Every 
narrative is a sequence of events in which one is largely dependent on the prior, and 
largely determines the subsequent, event. The order of these processes should be 
consistent across and throughout cases if the narrative is truly characteristic of the actual 
political process. In each case we should see a variety of processes that fit or do not fit 
the theoretical mold. Each juncture in which the narrative conforms or fails to conform is 
a test of the causal logic inherent in the theory and model. This presents the opportunity 
for rigorous qualitative research to derive a relatively large number of tests from a very 






Case Selection and Justification 
 The total population of cases in which democratic regimes arose or were 
attempted during occupations includes the following country-years: Cuba 1898-1902, the 
Philippines 1898-1946, Haiti 1915-36, Germany 1918-30, Italy 1943-8, Austria 1945-55, 
Germany 1945-55, Japan 1945-52, South Korea 1945-9, Palestine 1967-present, Grenada 
1983, Panama 1989, Timor-Leste 1999-2002, Afghanistan 2001-present and Iraq 2003-
11. This sample excludes cases that presume an attempt to impose democracy based on 
nothing more than the stated intent of policymakers; obvious application of state or 
coalition resources is a necessary precondition. Cases in which the intervening party may 
have considered democratization, but in which neither the occupying nor the occupied 
target state instituted a policy of democratization by writing a constitution, imposing 
elections, or at minimum sanctioning a representative form of government in the target 
polity, do not pass muster. Cases like Guatemala in the late 1950s or Nicaragua in the 
1980s are not included because of this restriction since there was no overt commitment of 
economic, legal or military resources toward democratization. 
This particular project will focus on four cases: Germany 1945-55, Japan 1945-52 
and South Korea 1945-9. These four cases maximize the amount of information available 
for study will minimizing differences in historical era, geography and culture. This case 
selection includes two successes (Germany [Federal Republic] and Japan) and two 
failures, and allows for the pairwise comparison of geographically and culturally similar 











End* Regime Start** Regime End** Observed Here 
Cuba 1898 1902 n.a. n.a. 
 Philippines 1898 1934 n.a. n.a. 
 Haiti 1915 1934 n.a. n.a. 
 Germany 1918 1929 1919 1934 Yes 
Italy 1943 1945 1948 Ongoing 
 Japan 1945 1952 1952 Ongoing Yes 
Austria 1945 1955 1946 Ongoing 
 Germany (West) 1945 1955 1949 Ongoing Yes 
Korea (South) 1945 1950 n.a. n.a. Yes 
Palestine 1967 Ongoing n.a. n.a. 
 Grenada 1983 1983 1983 Ongoing 
 Panama 1989 1989 1989 Ongoing 
 Timor-Leste 1999 2002 2002 Ongoing 
 Afghanistan 2001 Ongoing n.a. n.a. 
 Iraq 2003 2010 n.a. n.a. 
  
*Occupation start and end dates drawn from Edelstein (2008) for cases through 1983. In cases of Panama, 
Afghanistan and Iraq the occupation begins when the state leaves the Polity IV database and ends when it 
re-enters the set (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). In Timor-Leste’s case, the occupation begins when UN 
coalition forces entered the territory and ends when it enters the Polity IV database. 
 
**The start of the regime is determined by the polity reaching +5 on the Polity IV scale, and ends when it 
drops down below that threshold. States that are still above +5 are considered ongoing, whereas cases 
wherein states never reached +5 are labeled “n.a.” The exceptions are the cases of Palestine and Grenada. 
Since the Palestinian territory has not yet acceded to the community of states, it is also labeled “n.a.” 
Grenada is not a large enough territory to qualify for the Polity IV set, so its regime start date occurs when it 
qualifies as “free” in the Freedom House database (Freedom House 2011). 
 
 
Selecting on the Dependent Variable 
Social scientists are often urged to avoid selecting on the dependent variable, lest 
the research introduce bias into (or reduce the generalizability of) one’s findings (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994). This caveat applies to research that seeks to test the average 
effect of interval variables on a population of cases. However, this is not the point of the 
project described here. Because this project uses historical analysis to test a model that 
relies on the logic of necessary conditions, the most appropriate methodological approach 
is qualitative, and the most appropriate method of choosing cases is dependent variable 
selection. This approach is supported by Goertz and Starr (2003), Mahoney and 
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Rueschemeyer (2003), Mahoney and Goertz (2006), Goertz (2008), and Seawright and 
Gerring (2008). The conditional logic approach defines positive outcomes as the 
coincidence of necessary or sufficient conditions. Therefore, representative cases are in 
fact determined by their values on the dependent—not independent—variable; qualitative 
research design based on dependent variable selection is not only acceptable but also 
desirable. Moreover, since historical explanations specifically explain why a particular 




Organization of the Thesis 
 The next four chapters will employ the research design presented above to 
investigate the determinants of survival, instability—and, by extension—consolidation in 
democratic regimes that arise under foreign occupations. Chapter 3 investigates the 
German Federal Republic, or West Germany, from 1945 through 1975. Chapter 4 
investigates Japan from 1945 through 1972. Chapter 5 investigates the Deutsches Reich, 
also known as the Weimar Republic, from 1918 through the end of the democratic polity 
in 1933. Chapter 6 investigates the Republic Korea, or South Korea, from 1945 through 
1950. Chapter 7 tests the inter-case hypotheses on the four cases and concludes by 
discussing the contributions of this research project and by stating plans for a future 
research agenda along these lines. 
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Chapter 3: West Germany, 1945-1975 
 
Introduction 
The successful democratization of the Federal Republic of Germany (henceforth 
referred to as the FRG or West Germany) is among the most remarkable political 
turnarounds of the twentieth century. Emerging from the wreckage of WWII and born out 
of the Cold War, the FRG grew into a democracy as stable as any other. Pro-democracy 
parties that cooperated with the occupation thrived its confines and in sovereign West 
Germany.5 Anti-democratic parties faired poorly, never combining to equal ten percent of 
the popular vote in any federal election or winning a significant number of seats in the 
federal legislature6. There’s no shortage of theories explaining how the fatherland of 
National Socialism and Prussian militarism has grown into a stable federal democracy 
5 The optimal domestic coalition includes the Christian Democratic Union, the most 
cooperative of the parties during this period, and their Bavarian affiliate—the Christian 
Social Union. The Free Democratic Party performed well as a bourgeois democratic party 
on the left of the CDU/CSU. The Zentrum and Bavarian Parties survived the Third Reich 
and emerged as pro-democracy parties whose constituencies were absorbed but the CDU 
and CSU. The Social Democrats (SPD) were pro-democracy as they were in the Weimar 
regime, although their support for the occupation was qualified. (Merkl 2002, Glees 
2003) 
6 Several authoritarian parties competed for seats in the federal legislature during the 
period under examination. On the right, the German Right Party (DRP) picked up the 
scraps of the DNVP while the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) claimed the mantle of the Nazi 
Party. The National Democratic Party was an extremist splinter group of the DRP. Both 
the DRP and NPD associated with the German Party (DP) which was not explicitly 
authoritarian but was not explicitly democratic, either. Other parties in this category 
included the Economic Reconstruction Union (WAV). On the left, the Communist Party 




                                                 
(not to mention a bulwark of liberal capitalism, international cooperation and progressive 
ideology). 
The full allied occupation of Germany, comprised of the United States, United 
Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, commenced on June 5, 1945 with the arrest and 
dissolution of the Nazi government under Admiral Doenitz (Plischke 1953, Glees 1999, 
Haftendorn 2006, MacDonald 2007). The four powers coordinated occupation policy for 
all of Germany through the Allied Control Council, which first met on July 30 of the 
same year and functioned until a Soviet walkout on March 20, 1948 (an incident that 
precipitated the Berlin Blockade; Willis 1962, Dunbabin 2008). Thereafter, the US, UK 
and France coordinated policy for the Trizone—the territory comprised of the three 
western occupation zones and that eventually became the Federal Republic. The three 
western powers presided over a civilian occupation of West Germany as the Allied High 
Commission from September 1949 until sovereignty was handed over to a West German 
government on May 5, 1955 (Plischke 1953, Hitchcock 1998, Haftendorn 2006, 
MacDonald 2007). Thus, the observation period in question stretches from the 
commencement of the occupation through twenty years after the return to sovereignty: 
1949-1975. The following narrative will demonstrate that the US and UK generally acted 
as a cohesive unit, while the French delegates as a rule nominally resisted but eventually 
acceded to the policy goals of the Anglo-American bloc. Interest in democracy promotion 
was strongest among the British and American delegates, while French attitudes ranged 
from unopposed to enthusiastic. 
Here I shall summarize a number of the more prominent theories, test them 
against the history of the case, and assess their validity in light of the evidence. I shall 
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then test the working hypotheses of this project against the same history. The working 
hypotheses generally predict that domestic stability (the absence of riots, assassinations 
and insurgency) and electoral victories among the optimal winning coalition (described 
above) will be more prevalent when there is an obvious external threat, when the 
occupiers successfully demonstrate the capacity to protect the FRG and its people from 
said threat, and when the western occupiers successful distribute public goods such as 
personal security, freedom and prosperity in their zone. If we see this sort of success 
without the western occupiers contributing marginal security or promoting domestic 
welfare, then we should consider the working hypothesis rejected. Moreover, if rival 
explanations—such as economic growth—appear to contribute to democratization 
independent of the contributions of marginal security and welfare variables, then we 
cannot validate the working hypothesis. Therefore, I shall demonstrate that, in this case, 
domestic stability and ideal party success do indeed result from the constructive behavior 
of the occupying powers. Having done so, I will demonstrate that many of the competing 
explanations fail to pass muster when tested against the facts. Ultimately, I shall show 
that those hypotheses which history does not falsify are not incompatible, and in many 
cases complementary, to the theory that undergirds this dissertation: that democratic 
legitimacy in a young, occupied regime is dependent on the capacity of the occupying 
force to protect the new regime against foreign threats to security and domestic threats to 





Rival Hypotheses versus Case History 
Rival Hypothesis: Demilitarization 
One explanation for the durability of democratic institutions in West Germany 
that lends due credence to the role of the Allied occupation is Juan Linz’s (1990) 
“debellicization” thesis, adapted from Stepan’s (1991) “paths toward democratization.” 
In Linz’s terms, “…the total debellicization of the German state gave to the Allied 
Powers full control of political development.” (p.148). The Western Allies (along with 
the Soviet Union) utterly reduced the German war-making apparatus. Having done so, the 
occupiers faced no competition from militarized, reactionary political forces; the Western 
Allies were free to rebuild West Germany as they saw fit, just as the Soviet Union was 
free to reconstruct the East. This picture is in stark contrast to the state of Germany 
following WWI, when the war ceased before enemy boots set foot on German soil. 
Nearly all of the destruction resulting from the European theatre of the war took place in 
France, while Germany proper emerged relatively unscathed. As a result, institutions that 
maintained a monopoly on the use of force managed to survive the termination of the 
conflict and the imposition of the occupation. The Weimar occupation itself was also less 
extensive, exercising territorial control over the Rhineland but nowhere else. 
Demilitarization was part of the Allied plan for reconstructing Germany before 
the United States had formally entered WWII. At Newfoundland in August 1941, 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that, in the event of the Third 
Reich’s defeat, Germany’s military apparatus would be dismantled (MacDonald 2007). 
This sentiment was reiterated at Teheran in 1943 (Willis 1962), at Quebec in 1944 (Ibid, 
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Killick 1997), at Yalta in February 1945 (MacDonald 2007) and at Potsdam in July 1945 
(Dunbabin 2008, Glees 2003). It was implemented by the four-power Military Control 
Council that assumed power in June 1945 (Willis 1962, MacDonald 2007) and reinforced 
by the several Foreign Ministers Councils that shaped Allied policy thereafter (Hitchcock 
1998). To reinforce this policy, the Allies transferred ownership of strategic resources, 
such as coal and steel, first to the French and then to an international body: the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Ibid, Krieger 1983, Glees 2003, Willis 1962, MacDonald 
2007, Plischke 1953, Haftendorn 2006, Gillingham 1995, Adenauer 1984b). At the 
beginning of 1948, as the threat from the Soviet Union grew more apparent, UK Foreign 
Minister Bevin proposed the reconstruction of a German military that would serve under 
the auspices of the (ultimately failed) European Defence Community (Dunbabin 2008, 
Mee, Jr. 1984, Plischke 1953, Windsor 1969, Hitchcock 1998, Hillenbrand 1980, 
Banchoff 2002, Krieger 1983). Later that year, the US, Canada and European powers 
came together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, creating a multilateral mutual defense 
organization that would supervise several German divisions (Willis 1962, Glees 2003, 
MacDonald 2007, Schmidt 1994). The democratic regime that emerged from the 
occupation incorporated these principles. Among the earliest of Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer’s public pronouncements was a call for an end to the Franco-German rivalry 
(Banchoff 2002). The Basic Law itself incorporates the power to transfer sovereign 
authority over the armed forces to multilateral institutions (Parliamentary Council 1984). 
By 1954, the debate over demilitarization was a distant memory, and the US and NATO 
were discussing arming German forces with nuclear weapons (Schmidt 1994). By 1956, 
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NATO was complaining about West Germany’s failure to deliver the divisions it pledged 
to the alliance (Glees 2003). 
The Allies failed to “debellicize” Weimar Germany in the same sense, though not 
for lack of trying. Demilitarization and disarmament were key pillars holding up the 
occupation policy of the US, UK and France following the first war. They were simply 
less thorough, less successful, and starting from a less advantageous position (with a 
smaller occupation zone following a war that caused less damage). But one should not 
pretend that the Great War left the German war apparatus unscathed. A large swath of the 
working-age male population lost their lives. The Allies did maintain a strong enough 
cordon on the production of materiel that the Weimar government had to pursue such 
aims in secret on foreign soil. The question here is not one of absolutes, but one of 
degree. How thoroughly must an occupier reduce its target’s capacity to make war (and 
generally monopolize political violence)? At which point must this process take place, 
and when should it be concluded? Most pressing for the purposes of this project, how—if 
at all—should the occupiers proceed to fill this vacuum? 
The debellicization thesis is compatible with the Marginal Value Model to a 
certain degree. It is important that the regime of the occupied state come to rely on its 
occupiers for security. If remnants of the war-making apparatus from the previous regime 
survive the new one, they could prevent the occupiers from increasing their occupation’s 
marginal security value. Even if the occupiers have succeeded in debellicizing the state, 
they must then rebuild an effective security apparatus that protects the citizenry but 
compromises neither the superiority of the occupation nor the durability of the new 
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democratic institutions. In other words, debellicization is only as important as 
rebellicization. The debellicization thesis, however, ignores this part of the equation. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Political Re-education 
 Two explanations rely on the concept of political education and generational 
turnover to explain the affinity of the postwar German population for democratic 
institutions. The first, put forth by Samuel Huntington (1991) attributes the gradual 
increase in preference for a democratic regime to institutional learning among those who 
were born and came of age under the post-Nazi state. The second, David Conradt (1980), 
attributes said value change to an intense campaign of political re-education led by the 
Allies and the West German government. This re-education took place through 
punishment of Nazi war criminals, banning of antidemocratic organizations, and 
nationalization—as well as moderate secularization—of the school system. As those in 
the new regime reached voting age, their institutional preferences reflected those that 
were inculcated with during youth. Surveys revealing an inverse relationship between age 
and indicators of civic engagement suggest that generational turnover did play a role. 
Those who experienced the Wirtschaftwunder (German economic miracle) during their 
formative responded more favorably than others. Conradt goes on to argue that political 
re-education was aided by the demise of the Wehrmacht and the Junker nobility during 
WWII.7 The paring of the protestant-dominated East, combined with the resettlement of 
millions of refugees, lessened the severity of ethnic, religious and geographic cleavages. 
7 Surveys conducted under the military government indicate that only 15% of the Junker 
class survived World War II (MacDonald 2007). 
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Finally, Conradt offers that there was no “credible alternative” in the earliest, roughest 
days of the Federal Republic to whom the disaffected could throw their support. 
 That the Western Allies embarked on an abortive denazification campaign, 
including the prosecution of Nazis who committed crimes against humanity, is public 
record (Kvistad 2002, Willis 1962, Glees 2003, MacDonald 2007, Markovits and Reich 
2002). Indeed, this policy correlates well with a general upward trend of civic 
engagement indicators and survey responses indicating affect for democratic institutions. 
The percentage of Germans who declared themselves to be interested in politics rose 
from 27% to 46% between 1952 and 1972 (Merkl 1980, Conradt 1980). Between 1951 
and 1972, the ratio of respondents who felt that Germany was “best off” under the 
Federal Republic rose from a dismal 2% to a staggering 81% (Conradt 1980). The 
percentage of Germans who said they discuss politics in their private lives increased from 
50% in 1956 to 70% in 1972 (Ibid). The proportion of Germans who felt that parties 
represent the best interest of the people rose from 35% to 70% between 1959 and 1980 
(Richter 2002). General approval of the Bundestag increased from 35% to 52% between 






See footnote for sources and explanation of survey questions and responses.8 
 
   
Also important is the role of generational turnover. Huntington and Conradt were 
theorized about the impact of re-education and value acquisition over the course of a 
8  (A) Voter turnout figures from Schweitzer, et al. (1984) 
 (B) Percentage of respondents who answered affirmatively to the question “Are you 
interested in politics?” Other responses included “not especially” and “no.” 
(Conradt 1980, Merkl 1980) 
 (C) Percentage of respondents who responded affirmatively to the question “Is 
democracy the best form of government? (Conradt 1980) 
 (D) Percentage of respondents who chose “Federal Republic” as the period when 
Germany was “best off?” Other responses included the Third Reich, the 
Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic and other. (Ibid) 
 (E) Percentage of respondents who claimed to talk politics in social settings. (Ibid) 
 (F) Percentage of respondents who claimed to be members of civic organizations. (Ibid) 
 (G) Percentage of respondents who claimed to be active members of civic 
organizations. (Ibid) 
 (H) Percentage of respondents who answered “Excellent” or “Basically Good” to the 
question “What do you think of the Bundestag in Bonn as our representative 
assembly?” Other responses included “Fair,” “Poor,” “No Opinion” and 



























































Figure 3.1: Various Indicators of Civic Engagement in West Germany
(A) Voter Turnout (B) Interested in Politics (C) Democracy Best System
(D) Germany Best Off (E) Talk Politics (F) Membership
(G) Active Membership (H) Approve of Bundestag
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generation. But many new democracies—including Weimar Germany—simply did not 
have a generation’s worth of time to spare. As noted in the opening chapters, the average 
life expectancy of an imposed democracy is just over twenty years, and that sample 
includes the long-lived democracies of the FRG, Japan, Italy, and others that have 
survived since WWII. In other words, roughly half of imposed democracies did not 
survive long enough to benefit (or, for that matter, suffer) from the effects of political re-
education on the values of a new generation in the new regime. The focus of this project, 
on the other hand, is the success of imposed democracies in their nascent years. Political 
re-education and value change may certainly play a role in the long-term success of 
democracies that emerge from occupations, but the theories operate on a time scale that 
extends beyond the temporal domain of the Marginal Value Model. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Institutional Design 
 Perhaps the most commonly cited contributor to stable democracy in the FRG is 
its constitution, known as the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Given the history of earlier 
democratic regime in Germany, this is a natural starting point for any theory explaining 
the success of democracy in post-WWII Germany—especially if the aim is to compare 
and contrast the two republics. The Basic Law differed from the Weimar covenant in 
several ways, including but not limited to 1) a more federal government delineated 
explicitly by two articles assigning superior and concurrent jurisdictions for the central 
and Laender (state) governments, 2) a requirement for the election of a new majority 
government before dismissing the previous one (in other words, no more minority 
cabinets), 3) a requirement that political parties adhere to democratic principles, 4) a 
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hobbled presidency elected by the Bundestag and Laender governments (rather than by 
referendum), and 5) a federal constitutional court charged with reviewing the 
constitutionality of general legislation as well as the compliance of political parties with 
the democracy requirement. The Basic Law omitted the Weimar constitution’s Article 48, 
which granted the president sweeping, unchecked powers upon the declaration of a state 
of emergency by the Reichstag (Merkl 2002, Parliamentary Council 1984, Kvistad 2002, 
Bernhard 2001)9. In 1956, the FRG set itself further apart from the Weimar Republic by 
establishing a five percent vote threshold to win seats in the Bundestag (Merkl 2002, 
Niclauss 1982). 
Karlheinz Niclauss (1982) credits the federal character of the FRG for 
“maintaining a balance of power in the political system,” particularly in that the 
opposition in the Bundestag was able to counterbalance the power of the presiding 
government by retaining control of the legislatures in the various Laender.10 Moreover, 
the rules on forming new cabinets and the weakened presidency curtailed the possibility 
of cabinet crises and authoritarian opportunism that characterized the Bundestag. The 
vote threshold made the formation of majority cabinets less cumbersome by limiting 
partisan competition to a few mass parties. Peter Merkl (1963) sees the establishment of a 
less direct, more mediated democratic system as contributing to the stability of the FRG 
9 Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution permitted the banning of political parties that 
posed a threat to the state, but made no mention of democratic or anti-democratic 
platforms. Power to invoke and enforce this article was placed in the Reichstag and the 
presidency (and not the courts). During the Weimar regime, the government refused to 
use the power to ban right-wing authoritarian groups (Niclauss 1982). 
10 It is my scholarly opinion, and nothing more, that students of the two regimes tend to 
overstate the federal nature of the Basic Law and understate the federal nature of the 
Weimar Constitution. Both were federal states, one certainly more federal than the other, 
but the degree of difference is questionable. This is a question begging further analysis. 
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(relative to the Weimar Republic). By eliminating plebiscites (that, under NSDAP 
control, had served as rubber stamps for authoritarian government) affording Land 
governments more power in the Bundesrat (council of states), and eliminating the 
directly elected presidency, the Basic Law ensured that the new regime would be run by 
elites, rather than a presumably more capricious mass constituency. Moreover, the voter 
threshold for representation ensured that only moderate parties would participate in 
legislation and execution of the laws, and that these parties would be better suited to 
uniting—rather than dividing—the body politic. Donald Kommers (1989) claims that the 
Basic Law ensured stability and legitimacy by striking a balance between Weimar-style 
majoritarianism and elite government constrained by the rule of law.11 He cites 
specifically the constraints of the Federal Constitutional Court in safeguarding the Basic 
Law and its government from majoritarian whims, but also its responsiveness in 
protecting the basic rights of the citizenry. 
One should not deny the importance of a well-written constitution or of well-
written legislation enacted to protect said constitution. Almost certainly, these changes 
succeeded in accomplishing three key objectives: 1) moderating electoral competition 
under the new regime, 2) ensuring that parliamentary politics and legislative outputs 
remained faithful to republican principles and the rule of law, and 3) delaying the 
translation into policy of swift changes in public opinion. Since the Bundestag first 
convened, majority government has been the undisputed norm (Loewenberg 1967). As 
per the Basic Law, there was no opportunity for a chief executive to appoint a cabinet 
without majority support of the legislature, as President Hindenburg did in March of 1930 




                                                 
(Lindenfeld 1999, Mommsen 1996, Snyder 1998, Kolb 1988). Governments in the 
Bundestag have successfully petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court to ban anti-
democratic interest groups and parties. In 1951, the Court outlawed the neo-Nazi 
Socialist Reich Party (Merkl 2002, Glees 2003, Cromwell 1964). The Court banned the 
KDP (successor party to the Weimar-era KPD) in 1956 (Kvistad 2002, Merkl 2002), the 
student wing of the German Right Party (DRP) in 1960 (Cromwell 1964), and the League 
for Germanic Piety (a student group tied to General Ludendorff, early supporter of the 
Nazi party in the Weimar state) in 1961 (Ibid). In 1972, the government banned members 
of radical student groups from joining the civil service (Kvistad 2002). After the 
imposition of the 5% federal vote threshold for Bundestag inductees, the number of 
parties represented in the legislature dropped from thirteen in 1949 to six in 1953, four in 
1957, and three from 1961-1972 (Schweitzer, et al. 1984, Loewenberg 1967, 
Heidenheimer 1958). From 1961 onward, those represented were exclusively of the 
Optimal Domestic Coalition (Ibid). In fact, from 1953-1972, the share of seats for parties 
in the ODC was 4.7% higher than their share of the vote, while the seat share of semi-






Table 3.1: Translation of Votes to Seats in Federal Elections to the Bundestag 
          Date Vote Share Seat Share Difference 
 Optimal Semi Sub Optimal Semi Sub Optimal Semi Sub 
Sep '53 86.0% 9.1% 3.3% 91.7% 8.3% 0.0% 5.7% -0.8% -3.3% 
Sep '57 90.6% 8.0% 1.0% 96.5% 3.3% 0.0% 6.8% -4.7% -1.0% 
Sep '61 94.3% 4.7% 0.8% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% -4.7% -0.8% 
Sep '65 96.4% 1.3% 2.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% -1.3% -2.0% 
Sep '69 94.6% 0.0% 4.9% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.4% 0.0% -4.9% 
Nov '72 99.1% 0.0% 0.9% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 
 
     Mean 4.7% -1.9% -2.2% 
Source: Schweitzer, et al. 1984. 
 
  
The effects of the Basic Law and electoral law on general electoral and 
parliamentary politics are obvious. What is not obvious is how democracy under the 
Basic Law would have performed if the electorate had been more polarized, or had the 
ideological orientation of the citizens of West Germany been more radical. Had one of 
the many semi-optimal, constitutionally acceptable parties gained a significant 
constituency, the 5% threshold would not have been enough to keep them out of the 
Bundestag. Had one of these parties gained a plurality, building any coalition—let alone 
a purely pro-democratic one—may have proven significantly more difficult.12 Nor is it 
obvious whether the Basic Law had a significant effect on economic or paramilitary 
support for radical regimes. A better constitution could not have prevented financial 
institutions from secretly backing radical groups. The Basic Law could not have 
extinguished the Reichstag fire or kept the Brownshirts at bay. Without cooperation from 
those in the government, legal prohibitions on radical organizations would have been as 
effective as they were against the Stalhelm and the SA under the last democratic regime. 
12 This was, in fact, the case following most elections under the Weimar regime. 
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 The Basic Law explains a lot about democratic stability in Germany after WWII. 
What it does not explain is the relative absence of radical and/or violent political activity 
outside of the electoral realm. That is not to say that it is unimportant. Good regimes 
require good constitutions, and the Basic Law is an example of a constitution that 
successfully reinforced the Optimal Domestic Coalition. It is important to remember that 
this document was based on the input and subject to the approval of the occupiers who 
demanded a West German state constrained by a democratic, federal constitution 
(Plischke 1953, Glees 2003, Haftendorn 2006, Merkl 1963). Should an occupying force 
wish to ensure long-term democracy in its zone, it might endeavor to write, or at least 
encourage the authorship, of a constitution that limits electoral competition to pro-
democratic constituencies. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Delegitimation via Defeat 
 One explanation for the absence of an authoritarian resurgence following the 
Second World War rests on the delegitimation of the Nazi regime following their 
complete defeat at the hands of Allied forces. Anne Sa’Adah (2006) presses this point 
fluently. She notes that “the new regime must delegitimize its competition and construct 
its own legitimacy” (p. 310). In this case, the Nazi regime successfully delegitimized 
itself. An ideology built on conspicuous displays of power and rhetoric rooted in the 
historical inevitability of victory, the defeat of the Thousand Year Reich by armies 
fighting for decadent liberal democracy and treacherous bolshevism was thoroughly 
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invalidating.13 This is notable for two reasons. First, the “culture of despair” (ibid) that 
Nazism thrived on seemed to be replicating itself in the post-WWII famine and economic 
desperation that preceded the Wirtschaftwunder (MacDonald 2007). Second, the victory 
of the Soviet Union brought the threat of international communism within the borders of 
the nation. It is not inconceivable that these two developments would have meant fertile 
soil in which a neo-Nazi movement, or some other authoritarian ideology, could thrive. 
Instead, Sa’Adah claims that the Christian Democratic majority and the Western Allied 
armies were more than able to channel any anti-communist sentiment into legal, pro-
democratic channels. The author goes on to claim that the occupation gained support due 
to the fear of what success communism might enjoy in the absence of the Allied forces. 
 It is more than plausible that defeat delegitimized the NSDAP and its heir 
apparent, the Socialist Reich Party. However, this does not explain the rejection by the 
electorate of the explicitly anti-democratic Communist Party (not outlawed until 1956) 
and West German Communist Party, nor the implicitly monarchist and nationalist, anti-
democratic parties such as the German Right Party, the National Democratic Party, the 
Bund der Heimatlosen und Entrechteten (the Association of Expellees and 
Disenfranchised), the German Party, or the All German Bloc (Schweitzer, et al. 1984). 
Between 1949 and 1972, explicitly authoritarian parties polled no more than 7.5% in any 
Bundestag election. Borderline authoritarian parties totaled no more than 9.1%. Together, 
parties disloyal to democratic institutions never polled higher than the 14.4% in the first 
Bundestag election in 1949 (Ibid, Loewenberg 1967). Nor does this explain the relative 
absence of paramilitary activity in the FRG. There was no serious insurgent, terrorist or 
13 The author cites Ralf Dahrendorf  (1967) as the originator of this argument. 
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paramilitary threat in Germany until the rise of the left-wing student groups in the mid-
1960s through the early 1970s (Kvistad 2002, Merkl 2002, Glees 2003). Even these 
groups, including the Baader-Meinhoff Gang, were small compared to the militias, 





Defeat may have successfully delegitimized the Nazi party, its supporters and its 
ideology. It may also have delegitimized the individuals and institutions that brought the 
14 Hitler began to organize paramilitary groups, called Werewolves, in October 1944. 
Most of these groups dissolved quickly after the surrender. Before V-E Day, one 
Werewolf unit successfully assassinated the American-appointed mayor of Aachen in 
March of 1945. By July, General Clay reported no traces of Werewolf units in the 



















































































Figure 3.2: Performance of the Optimal and Suboptimal Coalitions in 
Federal Elections to the Bundestag, 1949-1972
Optimal Semi-optimal Suboptimal Turnout
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Nazi party to power. There is, however, no explanation as to why delegitimation would 
have quashed the prospects of right-wing, authoritarian parties that emerged following 
WWII and that claimed no connection to the previous regime. Nor should it have had this 
effect on the Communist Party. Indeed, the mechanics of the delegitimation thesis imply 
the opposite. The KPD was the archrival of the NSDAP, was the most viciously repressed 
and thoroughly persecuted political group at the start of the Third Reich. It, or any party 
claiming the mantle of proletarian revolution (such as the postwar KDP) should have 
benefited—rather than suffered—from the delegitimation of the NSDAP. It did not. The 
KDP mustered only 5.7% and 2.2% in the first two federal elections before it was banned 
in 1956 (Schweitzer, et al. 1984, Loewenberg 1967). The party reformed as the DKP in 
1968, but never polled even 1% in a federal election (Kvistad 2002, Loewenberg 1967). 
Sa’Adah explains this away by claiming that “the fear and revulsion the proximity of 
Soviet troops” made the KDP an unpalatable choice (p. 315). This explanation rings 
hollow. If anything, it should have activated communist support as it did in the east. 
Moreover, presence of British, American, or (even) French troops on German soil did not 
automatically harm the electoral performance of likeminded liberal, bourgeois parties. In 
summary, the author’s thesis is a potential explanation for the lack of success among neo-
Nazi organizations in the FRG, but it doesn’t explain the lack of success among generally 
authoritarian political organizations. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Geographic Division 
 Building on Barrington Moore’s (1966) uneven development hypothesis—which 
ties the failure of democracy under the Weimar Constitution to uneven economic 
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development and the survival of reactionary political elites—Michael Bernhard (2001) 
claims that democracy thrived in the Federal Republic because the division of Germany 
had sequestered the nation’s most authoritarian and backward elements. As the argument 
goes, the FRG was established in the most modern part of Germany. The Iron Curtain cut 
off the Junker-dominated, agricultural East, obviating the issue of uneven development 
cited by Moore. The author uses district-level election data from the 1920’s test the 
hypothetical relationship between geography, economic development and attitudes 
towards democracy. In a related argument, Niclauss (1982) looks at the ban on the 
resurrection of a Prussian Land, as decreed by the Allied Control Council (the military 
government that presided in between the Third Reich and the Occupation Statute) in 
February 1947 (MacDonald 2007). The occupiers saw Prussia as the “center of militarism 
and expansionism throughout German history,” and with two-thirds of the area under the 
Reich and three-fifths of the population, Prussia could have served as a major roadblock 
to the type of federalist democracy the Western Allies gradually came to favor (ibid). 
This argument is lacking. What Bernhard actually finds, instead of a relationship 
between economic development and democratization, is a relationship between region 
and partisan preferences. Certainly, the “disloyal right” and “disloyal left” performed 
better in the east in terms of percentage of votes for Reichstag elections—so much so that 
optimal parties continued to win a plurality (nearly a majority) of the national vote 
through 1932. Moreover, in many ways the east was less developed, more agrarian, and 
more “backward.” Perhaps most importantly, the new republic didn’t include East Elbia, 
a region dominated by the Junker nobility. As I argued in the previous chapter, however, 
there are other explanations for the relationship between geography and support for 
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democracy. One such explanation is the conduct of that particular occupation and the 
threats encountered along the borderlands. Bernhard makes no effort to actually measure 
the level of development across German Laender or connect it to support for democratic 
coalitions. Moreover, by simply aggregating the Laender into “East” and “West,” the 
author ignores the antidemocratic tendencies of states that joined the FRG, most notably 
Saxony and Bavaria. While initial support for the Nationalists and National Socialists 
flowed from East Elbia and East Prussia, the NSDAP was founded and based in Bavaria, 
launched their first campaign against the government in Munich, and relied on that region 
for economic and paramilitary support (as did the DNVP). On the left, the Communists 
too launched their first coup in Munich. Moreover, the western regions—especially the 
Saar and Ruhr—were commonly subject to left-wing extremism in the earliest days of the 
Weimar state. These regions were not isolated as a result of the division of Germany 
(with the exception of the Ruhr until 1956). Nor were they breeding grounds for anti-
democratic sentiment in the FRG. Yes, Bavaria voted down the Basic Law (Willis 1962, 
Rohrschneider 1999, Plischke 1953, Haftendorn 2006), but not out of opposition to the 
Bundestag or the generally democratic nature of the new constitution (Merkl 1963). Nor 
did Bavaria attempt to prevent the implementation of the Basic Law—the Bavarian 
Landtag explicitly accepted the new constitution as “binding” upon ratification (Ibid). 
On the contrary, there are indicators that support for democratic and republican 
principles were strong in Bavaria early in the history of the FRG. The American-
sponsored Union for Civil Liberties (Bund fuer Burgerrecht) found its strongest early 
support in Bavaria: in 1950, twenty-six of its forty local chapters were located in that 
particular Land; by 1952 the ratio was 33 of 60 (Rupieper 1997). In the Bundestag 
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election in 1949, the optimal domestic coalition dominated the vote as it did elsewhere in 
the FRG. Together, the SPD, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian Party and 
the Free Democrats (FDP) tallied 81.3% on turnout of 81.1%. In 1953, that same 
coalition tallied 87.4%. The same applies to Prussia. As Niclauss (1982) correctly notes, 
the characterization of Prussia as a hotbed of militarism may have been outmoded even 
before Hitler came to power. Rather, Prussia was the last remaining bulwark of social 
democracy before Chancellor von Papen dissolved its SPD-led government. Pro-
democracy sentiment remained strong in the Laender that once comprised Prussia in the 
new republic: Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Hesse, and Baden-Württemberg (Alvarez-Rivera 2012). 
The history of Bavaria points towards a much deeper reform in German political 
preferences than can be explained simply by removing undesirable, anti-democratic 
elements. While one should not dispute that the division of Germany contributed to the 
development of democracy in the FRG, the evidence does not lend this fact the central 
role that Bernhard seems to believe. The optimal coalition was far more successful in all 
of Western Germany than it had been anywhere in the Weimar Republic, except perhaps 
following the first Reichstag election in 1920. Uneven development, a persistent Junker 
class, and an agrarian political economy might certainly have stood in the way of 
democratic institutions in an alternate reality in which Germany was both undivided and 
democratic, but their absence cannot explain the near absence of an anti-democratic 
nationalist or communist constituency in Bavaria or the rest of the FRG despite the 
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deprivation and starvation15 that reigned in the first years. Therefore, while Bernhard 
makes a compelling case for why a unified Germany (with an intact Junker class) might 
have been less democratic than the FRG, he fails to explain why democracy in the real-
world FRG was stable. 
 
Summation 
 The many hypotheses presented above each contribute something to our 
understanding of the success of democracy in the German Federal Republic, but they do 
not paint the whole picture. The demilitarization/debellicization thesis resonates well 
with a few key facts about the occupation and the subsequent government, specifically 
the absence of a well-armed domestic opposition that could have prevented or weakened 
the new regime. It is nonetheless an incomplete and imperfect explanation. It does not 
delineate the processes by which domestic actors in a less-than-debellicized state would 
undermine democratic process, and thus it does offer observable, falsifiable implications. 
Nor is it entirely compatible with the history of the FRG from 1950 onward, in which the 
debellicized state was thoroughly rebellicized, albeit in a multipartite sense that lacks any 
precedent in the history of international relations.16 The political re-education thesis is a 
compelling one for understanding the long-term consolidation of German democracy. 
15 Giles MacDonald (2007) thoroughly details the substandard quality of life among 
German citizens under the military government, and before the voluminous American 
financial assistance that began to flow later in the decade. The average West Germans 
subsisted on a diet of at most 1000-1500 calories a day. General Clay at one point warned 
of a nutritional disaster, fearing that an impoverished Germany might serve as an 
incubator for communist sentiment. 
16 From a practical standpoint, it is also worth noting that an explanation that relies in part 
on the success of belligerents prior to the cessation of hostilities might be less helpful for 
civilian policymakers in planning the occupation. 
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However, since it relies on the slow process of value change aided by generational 
turnover, it is not a particularly useful hypothesis for explaining the viability of the FRG 
in its earliest years.17 On the other hand, re-education (particularly denazification) and the 
institutional design hypothesis help explain why regular political intercourse in the FRG 
was the near-exclusive domain of pro-democracy forces. The forceful excision of the 
previous authoritarian regime from the new government, laws that excluded anti-
democratic organizations and a constitution that ensured a more efficient parliament 
helped the FRG avoid many of the pitfalls of the Weimar Government. That said, these 
explanations fail to explain the relative absence of polarization in electoral politics or 
authoritarianism outside of the electoral domain. Moreover, the denazification and 
delegitimation theses explain only the success of preventing the resurgence of Nazism, 
not authoritarianism in general. Finally, the division thesis is appealing on the face but, 
for reasons described above, ultimately unsatisfying. Many of the lacunae left behind by 




17 Nor do scholars who lean on denazification as an explanatory variable duly appreciate 
that implementation was uneven across the zones (and almost completely disregarded by 
the French), a source of enmity among otherwise pro-occupation constituencies towards 
the occupation government, and hastily abandoned only four years after WWII 
(MacDonald 2007, Willis 1962, Glees 2003, Kvistad 2002). 
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Test of Working Hypotheses versus Case History 
Threat Environment 
 Every play needs a villain, and in the 
stage play of the democratization of the 
Federal Republic is no different. The United 
States and United Kingdom turned in bravura 
performances as the champions of freedom 
and prosperity. France competently played the 
essential role of erstwhile-enemy-turned-cantankerous-skeptic who, ultimately, proves 
indispensible to the mission. Great as those performances may have been, they would 
have been entirely superfluous absent a villain. The antagonist moves the play forward by 
providing the heroes with a mission. Without the villain, the heroes are merely actors 
taking up space and the play is nothing but a waste of time and money.  With a truly 
threatening villain, however, one that strikes fear into the hearts of the audience—in this 
case, the citizens of what would be West Germany—the mission becomes clear and the 
heroes gain purpose. The presence of a threatening villain is not a sufficient criterion for 
winning the audience’s hearts and minds, but it is a necessary one. The stage play of the 
democratization of the FGR had such a villain, one that justified the presence of the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France and proved the value of their mission. The 
role of villain was ably played by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet 
Union generated the threat that the US, UK and France could deter, thus transforming 
Table 3.2: Influences on the Threat 
Environment in West Germany 
 
More Threatening 
• Soviet “fifth column” 
• Soviets abrogate wartime 
agreements 
• Berlin Blockade 
 
Less Threatening 
• “Peace Note” 




their occupation from a nuisance into a boon and defining the mission that would unite 
the occupiers with the occupied. 
That the play would unfold this way was not a fait accompli. The Soviets started 
out as partners in the occupation of Germany, and it was not clear early on that the 
French would be any more accommodating than the Soviets would prove to be. The 
conduct of the Soviets and the French might have led an occupation that was as 
catastrophic a failure as that which ruled Weimar Germany a generation earlier. There are 
three reasons that France’s initial desire to dismember Germany and the Soviet Union’s 
diktats and demontage did not derail West German democracy. First, the general 
autonomy that each occupier had in its zone ensured that the conduct of the Soviets and 
French would have little impact on Germans in the British and American zones. These 
zones together comprised about more than half of the land area and population 
(MacDonald 2007). Second, the French diplomatic and military positions were the 
weakest of the Four Powers, eventually requiring the delegation to toe the Anglo-
American line. Third, the division of Germany not only relegated Soviet influence solely 
to the Soviet Zone, but also transformed a domestic threat to Germany into a foreign 
threat to a new Federal German Republic. In fact, the USSR demonstrated the threat it 
posed to a secure, autonomous German state before the occupation officially commenced 
 In the waning days of WWII, the Soviet Union embarked upon a “fifth column” 
strategy that pursued the infiltration of Eastern and Central European governments using 
local Communist parties as agents (Mark 2001). Because these parties answered directly 
to Moscow, these organizations posed a permanent threat to the target states’ sovereignty 
and autonomy. This strategy first became apparent in Greece, where a communist 
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insurgency simmered between 1944 and 1948 (Dunbabin 2008, Mee, Jr. 1984). 
Communist parties later made limited gains in Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and, 
eventually, Germany (Ibid). Upon taking control of their occupation zone, the USSR was 
the first in organizing “anti-fascist” parties, initially legalizing both bourgeois (CDU, 
Liberal Party) and Marxist (SPD, KPD) organizations (Glees 2003, Schweitzer, et al. 
1984, Rohrschneider 1999, Windsor 1969). But the era of the independent political party 
in the Soviet zone was short lived. As soon as June 1945, Stalin ordered his military 
government in Germany to press for the merger of all Marxist parties with the KPD 
(Dunbabin 2008). The SPD maintained its independence in the three Western zones, but 
in 1946 the SPD and KPD merged to form the SED, or Socialist Unity Party (Glees 2003, 
Dunbabin 2008, Merkl 2002). This merger took place under duress, as Soviet military 
intelligence had already begun arresting SPD members who opposed unification (Glees 
2003). The experience in the Soviet zone mirrored that of the newly independent states of 
Eastern Europe.18 In August 1947, six hundred Christian Democrats were arrested in the 
Soviet Zone (MacDonald 2007), a prelude to the forcible removal from government of 
the CDU at the end of that year (Glees 2003). The establishment of a German Democratic 
Republic (DDR), answering to the USSR, following the Soviet arming of the Greek 
insurrection and Communist takeovers in Czechoslovakia and Hungary contradicted any 
beliefs that the Soviet Union was interested reinstating German sovereignty in anything 
but the most formal sense. However, it was not until the actual division that this ceased to 
be a threat by an occupation power and transformed into a threat from a foreign state, 
18 Upon the signature of a Bulgarian peace treaty with the Allied forces, which included a 
condition to hold free and fair elections, the Soviet military government responded by 
hanging the Social Democratic opposition leader and proceeding with their takeover of 
the Bulgarian government via the local Communist Party (Dunbabin 2008). 
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thus opening a window for the Western Allies to increase the security value of their 
occupation. 
 The Soviet threat arose not just from the Fifth Column but also from behavior that 
signaled an unwillingness to abide by its past commitments. In September 1945, the 
USSR unilaterally renounced their non-aggression pact with Turkey (Dunbabin 2008). 
Months later, the USSR reneged on its promise to end its wartime occupation of Iran.19 In 
September 1947, the Soviet Union declared the global schism between capitalism and 
communism irreconcilable by peaceful means (Haftendorn 2006).20 Most relevant, 
however, are the fissures that grew out of the joint military command in Germany leading 
to the Soviet abandonment of four-power control, the unification of the three western 
zones, the Berlin Blockade and subsequent airlift and, finally, the division of Germany. 
The quadripartite government of Germany collapsed with the sine die adjournment of the 
London Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947. After pressing for the 
establishment of a unified German government, an Anglo-American gambit that was sure 
to meet stiff resistance from the USSR, the Soviet delegation walked out of the meeting 
without setting a future date for re-adjournment (Dunbabin 2008, Plischke 1953). The 
three Western powers proceeded to unite the US-UK Bizone with the French zone (Glees 
2003, Plischke 1953). The USSR responded by leaving the Allied Control Council 
(Dunbabin 2008, Willis 1962). The introduction of a new currency to the Trizone—
formalizing its economic unity—was the last straw. In an effort to reverse the policy of 
19 They withdrew only after Iran appealed the US, UK and the newly established United 
Nations and offered to form a joint oil company with the Soviet Union (Ibid). 
20 In response to Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech—it is worth noting that Churchill, along 
with several high-ranking government officials in the US and UK, needed no help from 
Moscow in painting the USSR as an implacable, expansionist threat. 
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the Western allies, Stalin pressed his biggest advantage. Authorities in the eastern zone 
first cut off traffic to the western sectors of Berlin in late March 1948 (Willis 1962, 
Mitchell 2005, MacDonald 2007, Dunbabin 2008) and imposed a full-scale blockade on 
June 24 (Glees 2003, Haftendorn 2006). The Berlin Blockade lasted through May 1949, 
took place during one of the coldest winters on record and brought West Berlin to the 
brink of famine (MacDonald 2007, Mitchell 2005). The Blockade itself was a clear signal 
that the Soviet Union was unconcerned with the security and welfare of the German 
citizenry. The Blockade and division of Germany cemented the Soviet role as foreign 
threat, turning the threat environment critical and thereby raising the marginal value of 
the occupation. 
 Following the failure of the Soviet hardline stance to prevent the unification of the 
three western zones, the Soviet Union employed a more peaceful (but perhaps more 
disingenuous) tone. In November 1950, the USSR offered to restart quadripartite talks 
with the Western Allies while the DDR made a similar overture to discuss unification 
with the FRG (Glees 2003, Hitchcock 1998). Adenauer spurned the initial invitation, 
citing a preference for western integration (Dunbabin 2008). Stalin made a broader 
overture on March 10, 1952, in his famous “Peace Note” (Windsor 1969, Hanrieder 
1980, MacDonald 2007). The note offered support for a unified German state with free 
elections on the pretense that the new state builds only a small defensive army, that all 
occupiers withdraw their troops, and that Germany would be prohibited from joining any 
foreign alliances (Hyland 1980, Hitchcock 1998).21 The FRG and Western allies 
remained skeptical of this new offer, and rightly so. When the Four Powers resumed 
21 The FRG was already in the process of joining the European Defence Community and 
was on its way to full partnership in NATO. 
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quadripartite talks at Berlin in January 1954, the USSR’s formal offers were far less 
conciliatory (Haftendorn 2006, Dunbabin 2008, Hitchcock 1998, Schmidt 1994). Stalin 
(who died before the conference) and Khrushchev aimed to prevent the continued 
integration of the FRG into the Western economic and security bloc (Schmidt 1994). 
Had their overtures been credible, they may have succeeded in convincing the 
Federal Republic and its citizenry that the Soviet threat was overblown, thus reducing the 
security value of the western occupation. Instead, the shadow of the Berlin Blockade, the 
history of the military government’s oppression of democratic partisanship in the eastern 
zone, the repression of democratic politics on the east side of the Iron Curtain—including 
the ruthless crushing of a workers’ revolt in East Berlin (Dunbabin 2008, Merkl 1980, 
Rohrschneider 1999, Haftendorn 2006, Glees 2003, Reifenberg 1980)—and the USSR’s 
refusal to concede UN monitoring undermined the credibility of the peace overture. 
Accordingly, a 1952 public opinion poll revealed that 65% of those surveyed in the FRG 
considered the Soviet Union a threat to their security. Following the failed talks in 1954, 
the number remained relatively stationary at 63% (Merkl 1980). 
 And so it was that the Soviet threat remained strong through the end of the 
occupation, providing the Western Allies ample opportunity to demonstrate the positive 
marginal value of the occupation. Had the occupation not ended in 1955, Khrushchev’s 
renewed threat to isolate West Berlin (Government of the USSR 1984, Mitchell 2005, 
Dunbabin 2008, Haftendorn 2006, Hyland 1980, Windsor 1969) would only have 
increased the occupation’s marginal value, as would the erection of the Berlin Wall 
(Catudal 1980, German Democratic Republic 1984, Post, Jr. 1997, North Atlantic 
Council 1984). In the years following, the USSR assumed a policy of détente with the 
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West. This time, their advances were far more successful, helping to usher in the era of 
Ostpolitik. By then, however, the occupation had long since ended. About the same time, 
the government in Bonn marked an important step on the path to consolidation when 
Willy Brandt’s Social Democrats completed Germany’s first peaceful, democratic 
transfer of power since the rise of Adolf Hitler. 
 
Signaling Security Value 
 While the protagonists in our play eventually proved to be true champions of 
freedom, security and prosperity, in the opening act this was less than assured. Germans 
would not have viewed the earliest Allied postwar plans as an enhancement of their 
security. The original position of the United States was to pastoralize Germany, dismantle 
its factories, neutralize its war-making capability and split it into five separate states. 
Through 1946, the UK, USSR and France would all endorse some version of this 
proposal (MacDonald 2007, Killick 1997, Willis 1962, Mitchell 2005, Glees 2003).22 In 
truth, there was never a consensus behind this proposal, known as the Morgenthau Plan23 
and, eventually, the US came around to the British point of view that the best approach 
was one of reform rather than relegation. The French reluctantly followed suit. By the 
time of the Yalta conference (in February 1945) FDR was distancing himself from 
Morgenthau and his Carthaginian peace. Instead, unconditional surrender for Germany 
22 German fears of a Carthaginian peace may have been stoked by ill treatment of 
civilians by Allied forces as they entered Germany and forced Berlin’s surrender. While 
the Soviets were the worst perpetrators of these crimes, the US, UK and French forces 
were not innocent theft, arson, rape and murder in the first months of 1945 through V-E 
day (MacDonald 2007). 
23 After the US Treasury Secretary who originated it. 
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would mean a federal German state and an assuredly temporary occupation dedicated to 
the five D’s: demilitarization, disarmament, democratization, decentralization and factory 
dismantlement or demontage (Willis 1962, MacDonald 2007, Pollock 1944, Mitchell 
2005). The US, UK and USSR formalized this proposal at Potsdam in August 1945 
(Glees 2003). They reiterated the Quebec Conference demand for retrocession of 
territories seized after 1938 and recognition of a Polish frontier along the Oder and 
Neisse rivers. This proposal would restore the Polish state and provide a buffer for the 
Soviet Union, but it also required the forced relocation of millions of German citizens 
(MacDonald 2007). Nevertheless, the occupation plan as implemented carried a far 
higher marginal security value than the one that Morgenthau proposed, that FDR once 
endorsed, and that France would eventually and reluctantly abandon. 
 Still, for want of an external threat there is little security value to enhance. This 
changed once the Soviets took a more aggressive posture. Prime Minister Churchill’s 
Iron Curtain speech of March 1946, which reflected a growing wariness with Soviet 
dominance in Eastern Europe and all but accused the Soviet Union of expansionist 
ambitions (Gaddis 2000), accentuated the 
nascent East-West divide. Truman doubled 
down on this line in March 1947 when he 
pledged $400 million (contemporary) in 
financial assistance to Greece—which was in 
the middle of a heated left-wing insurgency—
and Turkey—where the USSR was pressing 
their influence to obtain free passage to the 
Table 3.3: Indicators of Occupation 
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Black Sea (Mee, Jr. 1984).24 Even though these declarations did not directly involve 
Germany, they clarified the threat environment and signaled that the US would not 
eschew European entanglements as it had after WWI. Instead, the United States was 
going to assume the responsibilities that the British could no longer afford and actively 
balance against the Soviet threat.25 For Germans in the western zones, this raised the 
possibility that the western occupiers might someday be western allies. The security 
value of a plausible alliance served to mitigate the threat posed by the occupying powers, 
increasing the likelihood that the occupation would yield marginal value. 
 The Western powers’ response to the Berlin Blockade transformed a loosely 
beneficial relationship into a de facto alliance. Despite fears that the Berlin crisis could 
lead to all-out war, the Western Allies launched a massive campaign to supply West 
Berlin from the air (Mitchell 2005, MacDonald 2007). The Berlin Airlift—officially 
known as Operation Vittles—delivered two million tons of fuel and an indeterminate 
volume of non-fuel supplies over three hundred thousand flights during the Blockade’s 
eleven months. Thirty-nine British and thirty-one American servicemen would give their 
lives to the operation (Glees 2003). In support of the operation, the US deployed several 
B-29 bombers to the region (Mitchell 2005). The deployment of the same bombers that 
delivered nuclear weapons to Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a clear signal that the United 
States was willing to retaliate with a massive response in the event of a Soviet invasion.  
24 Truman’s proclamation, that “…it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures” (Truman 1947) was the relevant signal to both the USSR and occupied 
Germany. The monetary pledge in and of itself is what defined the pledge as costly and, 
therefore, credible. 
25 Concrete action along these lines reinforced Secretary of State Byrnes’ speech in 
Stuttgart, where he promised that the US would stay so long as the USSR remained 
(Dunbabin 2008).  
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No single act signaled the positive marginal value of occupation better than the massive 
effort by three western occupation powers to save West Berlin from starvation and 
political subjugation. That the operation was costly in terms of resources spent and 
security gambled made the commitment all the more credible. 
Finally, the US, UK and France promoted this de facto alliance to de jure status 
by building an unprecedented network of trans-Atlantic multilateral organizations and, 
eventually, by welcoming the German Federal Republic as a full member. This process 
began in December 1947, when UK Foreign Minister Bevin began to contemplate a 
multilateral security pact among Atlantic democracies (Dunbabin 2008). Bevin then 
invited France and the Benelux states to form a mutual security pact that would 
eventually include the US. This new alliance would comprise the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Willis 1962, Glees 2003, MacDonald 2007, Mitchell 2005, Mee, Jr. 1984, 
Dunbabin 2008, Kennan 1967, Killick 1997, Glees 2003, Hitchcock 1998). The NATO 
signatories later agreed to the construction of a West German army on condition that it 
would be under Allied control, satisfying the French demand for a forward position in 
Central Europe (Schmidt 1994, Plischke 1953, Hitchcock 1998). In October 1954, NATO 
invited the FRG to join as a full member (Dunbabin 2008, Glees 2003, Haftendorn 2006, 
Hitchcock 1998) and agreed to countenance a Bundeswehr (federal army) of up to one 
half million men (Kelleher 1980). Upon the conclusion of the occupation in May 1955, 
the FRG took its place alongside the other member nations (Banchoff 2002). The 
construction of NATO by the occupying states and the offer of a German role within the 
organization represented the strongest of signals that the occupiers are committed to West 
German security and protection against the Soviet threat, thus indicating the value of the 
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occupation. West German assent to these terms confirms their recognition of the threat in 
the East and their belief that salvation lie to the West. 
Alongside NATO, and with US approval, France attempted to organize a purely 
European multilateral force. French Premier Plevin reversed his government’s opposition 
to German rearmament when he invited the FRG to contribute a small contingent under 
French supervision (Dunbabin 2008, Willis 1962, Haftendorn 2006, Hillenbrand 1980, 
Schwartz 1986, Banchoff 2002, Krieger 1983, Glees 2003, Hitchcock 1998). While the 
EDC ultimately failed ratification in the National Assembly, it signifies the reversal of 
Allied attitudes to German militarization. Between 1947 and 1955, Western policy on 
Germany shifted from total demilitarization to the rearmament of a German state under a 
multilateral framework to protect against the common threat of the Soviet Union 
(Schmidt 1994, Schwartz 1986). The narrative serves as both signal and indicator: the 
alliances themselves signaled a lasting commitment by the occupiers on behalf of the 
FRG; the Federal Republic’s willingness to join said alliances indicates that Germany 
now saw its occupiers not as enemies, but as allies. 
Over the course of the military government and legal occupation, the Western 
Allies increased the value of the occupation by halting many of the security-diminishing 
aspects of the military administration. For instance, while the US, UK and France were 
originally required to ship 10% of their dismantlement proceeds to the Soviet zone, the 
US ceased these transfers in May 1946 after it became clear that the Soviets were not 
using their proceeds to ship food and supplies to the West as stipulated (Glees 2003, 
Dunbabin 2008, Hitchcock 1998, Hitchcock 1998, MacDonald 2007). France issued its 
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final demontage orders in October 1947 (Willis 1962).26 In June 1947, the UK began to 
roll back its denazification policy, which was proving to be unpopular with the majority 
of Germans, disproportionately unfair to Germans whose roles in the Nazi party were 
inconsequential and a bureaucratic nightmare (Glees 2003). The US would follow suit in 
May 1948 (MacDonald 2007, Willis 1962).27 
There is one area, however, in which the Western Allies continued to undermine 
the value of their own occupation. Allied designs on the Ruhr sent a clearly negative 
security signal to Germany. The permanent loss of German coal and steel threatened to 
derail Germany’s economic rehabilitation and neuter their capacity to establish even a 
defensive military. In January 1946, France proposed that the Ruhr be placed under 
international control (Willis 1962).28 In February, France proposed the wholesale 
annexation of the Saar (Ibid). Both policies gained early support from the US and UK 
(Dunbabin 2008, MacDonald 2007, Ibid). With support from the Western allies, France 
set about economically isolating the Saar from the rest of Germany. In December 1946, 
France surrounded the region with a customs barrier (Glees 2003, MacDonald 2007). 
Between June and November of the following year, they introduced a new currency to 
the region—the Saar Mark—and declared it legal tender (Willis 1962, Glees 2003). 
During that time, Saarlanders had expressed overwhelming approval (87% in an October 
plebiscite) for economic union with France. They ratified the new arrangement in their 
constitution that December (Willis 1962). 
26 Although actual dismantlement proceeded until the signing of the occupation statute. 
27 The French never fully embraced denazification. In their view, German aggression was 
not a Nazi problem but a German problem (Willis 1962). 
28 That same month, De Gaulle called for a permanent occupation of the Rhineland, and a 
Germany reconstituted as a confederation rather than a unified state (MacDonald 2007). 
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In threatening to rob Germany of strategic resources, the occupiers were 
diminishing the value of their occupation. Allied policy shifted abruptly in April 1948, 
however, when the France agreed not to export Saar coal for profit. They also agreed to 
halt any factory dismantlement in the Saar and to count all production and dismantlement 
towards future reparations payments (Ibid).  The catalyst for this change was the USSR’s 
threat to cut off surface freight to West Berlin, which they did in June (MacDonald 
2007).29 As for the Ruhr, the Allies did not roll back plans for internationalization. 
Instead, in May 1950, the French offered to place the Ruhr under the control of a 
transnational organization with the new German Federal Republic acting as a full partner 
(Glees 2003, Plischke 1953). Said authority would come to be known as the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Hitchcock 1998, Haftendorn 2006, Gillingham 1995).30  
The 1948 shift in German coal and steel policy notwithstanding, France was 
reluctant to yield control of the Saar, continuing to publicly favor economic and political 
fusion (Hitchcock 1998). In one of his first public statements as chancellor, Adenauer 
slammed France’s plans for the region. (Willis 1962, Glees 2003).  In November 1950, 
the Bundestag called on Saarlanders to boycott a plebiscite on integration with France, 
the results of which heavily favored autonomy from both Germany and France under a 
framework of European governance (Hitchcock 1998). In January 1952, France 
converted their High Commissioner in the Saar into a Saarland Ambassador, essentially 
29 Ironically, prior to the Blockade, the USSR was the sole opponent to the cession of the 
Ruhr and Saar (Willis 1962). 
30 Negotiations on the new arrangement began in June (Hitchcock 1998). When 
negotiations stalled, US High Commander John McCloy inserted himself in the process 
to force an agreement (Willis 1962). The treaty was initialed in the spring of 1951 
(Hitchcock 1998, Haftendorn 2006, Glees 2003, Schwartz 1986), ratified by the 




                                                 
declaring the territory sovereign (Haftendorn 2006). As late as January 1954, France held 
firm on their policy when four power talks resumed in Berlin (Hitchcock 1998). It wasn’t 
until January 1957 that the Saar Basin returned to West German control, nearly two years 
after the end of the occupation (Willis 1962). France’s policy on German coal and steel 
was no small grievance among the West German electorate and, in a vacuum, may have 
seriously compromised the security value of the occupation. Politics, of course, do not 
take place in a vacuum; the Saar dispute was but one negative in a sea of positive 
undertakings by the Western Allies that enhanced the security of the German Federal 
Republic.  
 
Facilitating Regime Consolidation 
Just as the Soviet Union became the 
clearest threat to a new German regime in the 
West, and just as the Western Allies were 
ramping up their commitment to protect the 
new regime and its citizens from said threat, 
they also moved to make the occupation more 
palatable and shored up the prospects of the optimal domestic coalition. Early on, they 
licensed partisan political activity but excluded right-wing authoritarian parties. They 
worked directly to remove right-wing authoritarianism from the occupied territory 
through a policy of denazification and trial of war criminals. They embarked on a 
political re-education campaign to safeguard the republican character of the new regime. 
They worked with the government of the FRG to eliminate authoritarian organizations on 
Table 3.4: Evidence of Facilitating 
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the left and right. Finally, the US, UK and France agreed on a new relationship 
committing themselves to the reconstruction of western Germany, the protection of 
democratic political intercourse, and the end to factory dismantlement and unconditional 
demilitarization.  
At a London meeting of the western Foreign Ministers/Secretaries of State, the 
delegations agreed on the fusion of the Trizone and its basis for the formation a new 
German state. Between February and June 1948, the delegates proclaimed that such a 
state must conform to the principles of federal democracy and separation of powers 
(Plischke 1953, Dunbabin 2008, MacDonald 2007). In late June, the three western 
military governors formally invited the ministers-president of the various Laender to 
promulgate a constitution (Plischke 1953). The documents they issued, known later as the 
Frankfurt Documents, ordered that the constitution be federal, democratic and spell out 
specific protections for civil rights (Glees 2003, Kruger 2002, Ibid). Over the next year, 
representatives of the Laender hashed out a charter along these lines, what would be 
known as the Basic Law (MacDonald 2007, Merritt 1976, Ibid, Haftendorn 2006, Merkl 
1963). They ratified the Basic Law in May 1949 (Plischke 1953, Kvistad 2002, Willis 
1962, Glees 2003, Haftendorn 2006, Schweitzer, et al. 1984). In August 1950, the 
western military commandants approved a constitution espousing identical values in 
West Berlin (Schweitzer, et al. 1984, West Berlin Commandants 1984). This is a key 
example of how a foreign occupier can directly intervene in the domestic politics of an 
occupied state to build (or rebuild) institutions that narrow the acceptable range of 
political contestation. The occupiers, as preponderant powers in the territory, are in a 
unique position to decide who benefits from the occupation—and who does not.  
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 Another key example of direct intervention in the domestic politics of the state, 
denazification may have played an important role in excluding National Socialism from 
regular politics in the new regime. It was a two-pronged attack: the occupation would 
remove Nazis from positions of political importance and prosecute the worst perpetrators 
for war crimes. They were also excluded from economic production—coal and steel 
concerns once owned by Nazis or Nazi collaborators were confiscated, the owners 
arrested (Glees 2003). By the conclusion of denazification in 1949, over 53,000 public 
officials were stripped of their position and banned from future participation due to past 
ties to the Nazi Party (Kvistad 2002).31 The wholesale arrest and prosecution of Nazi war 
criminals began in June 1945, when the British military government issued a warrant 
under the jurisdiction of the Nuremburg Code.32 Later, the Four Powers signed the 
London Accords, an agreement on the prosecution of war criminals as well as a new class 
of plaintiff: those who committed “crimes against humanity” (MacDonald 2007). 
Military policy arrested 100,000 Nazis and collaborators through the end of 1945. Ten 
thousand of those arrested were civilians in the financial sector, while 25,000 were linked 
to paramilitary groups (Ibid). Through 1946, the Allies arrested 250,000 former 
collaborators classified as “dangerous” (Glees 2003). Ultimately, they tried only 8,000 
cases. About 10% of these resulted in death sentences, half of which were commuted 
(MacDonald 2007). By June 1947, the British were already drawing down their 
denazification efforts, refusing to arrest any additional war criminals after September 
1948 (Glees 2003). The US had made the same decision in May (Willis 1962, 
31 The FRG would later reinstate about one thousand former Nazis (Ibid). 
32 This itself was a synthesis of the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare and the 




                                                 
MacDonald 2007). Even though the occupiers ultimately abandoned denazification, the 
policy defined the acceptable range of political contestation in the earliest years of the 
occupation and the new republic, marginalizing radicals and empowering moderates. This 
ensured that any the benefits the occupation conferred would be enjoyed most by 
stakeholders in the new regime. 
Even as the official policy of denazification concluded, the Western Allies and 
occupied West Germany continued to prevent the return of authoritarianism. In January 
1949, the US military government sponsored a German civil liberties union, the purpose 
of which was to address citizen concerns of residual authoritarian sentiment in the civil 
service, sponsor conferences discussing equal opportunity and human rights, produce 
educational films and lobby for the creation of the Federal Constitutional Court (Rupieper 
1997). These organizations flourished, growing to forty chapters in September 1950 and 
sixty in April 1952. The majority of local chapters were based in Bavaria, birthplace of 
National Socialism (Ibid). At Petersberg from September through November 1949, the 
High Commissioners of the three occupying states met with Adenauer and pledged to 
cooperate on the eradication of Nazism (Plischke 1953). While still under the legislative 
control of the occupying powers, the ruling coalition of Christian and Free Democrats 
continued the policy of marginalizing (left- and right-wing) antidemocratic groups by 
banning their members from the civil service (Kvistad 2002, Merkl 2002). Invoking 
Articles 21 and 43 of the Basic Law, the government would successfully petition to ban 
the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party in 1952 and the German Communist Party in 1956 
(Merkl 2002, Parliamentary Council 1984, Glees 2003, Cromwell 1964). And despite the 
FRG’s general abandonment of the occupation’s denazification policy, they continued to 
102 
 
hunt, arrest, prosecute and imprison those who participated in the Holocaust (Markovits 
and Reich 2002). 
 The Petersberg Agreements that bound the Federal Republic to the continued 
eradication of authoritarian politics were part of a larger agreement defining the nature of 
the occupation. The joint declaration reaffirmed the Western Allies’ commitment to the 
economic redevelopment of Germany, to the resettlement of WWII expellees, and (in 
ambiguous language) declared security concerns in Eastern Europe a major determinant 
of security in the Federal Republic (Adenauer 1984a). The Agreements included an 
Allied pledge to ease demilitarization restrictions, to invite the FRG into international 
organizations including the International Authority of the Ruhr, to cease dismantlement 
of factories, and to permit the re-establishment of consular relations with foreign powers 
(Hitchcock 1998, Plischke 1953, Haftendorn 2006). Here, we have an example of the 
occupation explicitly tying security commitments to democratic reforms, as well as an 
example of the West German government accepting the bargain.  
 The actions of the Western Allies boosted the political power of the optimal 
domestic coalition through multiple channels. They limited competition from 
antidemocratic challengers on both sides of the political spectrum. They then directly 
empowered the optimal domestic coalition handing the new ruling coalition of Christian 
and Free Democrats a major victory on occupation policy (see below for more on this). 
The shift in policy from a punitive occupation to a reconstructive one shored up support 
for pro-democratic coalitions and safeguarded the democratic nature of the new regime in 
the interim while specific affect towards democratic institutions grew among the West 
German population. In doing so, the occupiers ensured that the regime that benefitted 
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from the goods produced by the occupation would be a democratic regime more or less of 
the occupier’s choosing. The benefits specifically flowed to pro-democratic 
constituencies and away from radicals, making the marginal occupation value positive 
not just for West Germany in aggregate but for the optimal winning coalition in specific. 
 
Domestic Outcomes 
 West Germany was an immediate and prolonged success of imposed 
democratization. At the point it debuts as a sovereign state in the Polity IV data set, it 
rates as a 10/10 (most democratic) and remained there until unification (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2009). The prolonged success of pro-democracy parties in West Germany and the 
general lack of domestic instability reflect the occupation’s positive marginal security 
and its direct efforts to boost moderates and marginalize radicals. In the first elections 
within the three western zones, optimal parties were extremely successful. Citywide 
elections in Berlin prior to the blockade showed strong support for the CDU (~22%) and 
SPD (~40%), together overshadowing the communist Socialist Unity Party (~20%; Glees 
2003, MacDonald 2007, Rohrschneider 1999). That same month (October 1946) the 
CDU won landslides across town and city elections in the UK zone, polling on average 
48.5%. The SPD added 31.3%, the FDP 2.7% and the Zentrum added 5.5% to the total of 
the optimal domestic coalition. The KDP—which would see its membership slowly 
evaporate before its 1956 ban—won only 7.4% (Glees 2003). In Landtag (state 
legislature) elections in the UK zone the following April, it was the SPD who outpolled 
the CDU (36.8% to 32.2%), nevertheless returning a sound majority for the optimal 
coalition (Ibid). Optimal parties likewise dominated the first elections to the Bundestag, 
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with the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Zentrum totaling 79.4% of the vote. The KDP and the 
German Right Party (DRP)—both openly disloyal to the new regime—scraped together 
only 7.5% of the popular vote in the first election (Loewenberg 1967, Schweitzer, et al. 
1984). Marginally disloyal parties such as the Economic Reconstruction Union (WAV) 
and the German Party (DP) managed a similarly paltry 6.9% (Ibid). The Socialist Reich 
Party (SRP), considered the true heir to the Nazi Party, fared poorly in the first federal 
elections, winning only one seat in the Bundestag and adding an independent that 
switched parties after the fact. However, the SRP performed won enough seats in the 
Landtagen in Lower Saxony and Bremen to alarm moderates in the Bundestag (Glees 
2003, Cromwell 1964).33 The results prompted the Bundestag to initiate proceedings to 
have the Federal Constitutional Court ban the SRP (Cromwell 1964).34 
The initial success and positive electoral trends among the optimal winning 
coalition conform to the expectations of the Marginal Value Model—the increasing 
marginal value of occupation yielded increasing electoral and parliamentary victories for 
the optimal winning coalition. The CDP and FDP would go on to form the Bundestag’s 
first government, in a coalition with the CSU, the CDP’s affiliate in Bavaria, and the 
semi-optimal German Party (DP) (Schweitzer, et al. 1984, Loewenberg 1967). This 
33 The SRP won 11% of the vote (16 seats) in Lower Saxony and 7.7% (8 seats) in the 
Bremen Land elections of 1951 (Lee 1997). The SRP was not only disloyal in their 
opposition to democratic institutions (they did publicly deny the legitimacy of the new 
regime and considered Admiral Doenitz the last rightful German leader). But the most 
damning example of their loyalty was fealty to the USSR. Despite their decidedly right-
wing orientation, the Soviet Union sponsored the SRP in an effort to foment anti-Western 
sentiment. Oddly, the USSR refused to sponsor the KDP—which was both communist 
and more successful in electoral politics—labeling them “ineffectual” (Lee 1997). 
34 One member of the FDP, Dr. Werner Naumann, had plans to attract the SRP diaspora 
following their 1952 ban. A former aide to Josef Goebbels, he was arrested by British 
authorities in January 1953 (Glees 2003). 
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partnership would dominate German government through October 1957, and again from 
November 1961 through December 1966, relegating the SPD to the role of loyal 
opposition for seventeen years (Loewenberg 1967). Optimal parties—specifically the 
CDU—consolidated their power in the election of 1953 and in the subsequent elections 
following the return of sovereignty. The optimal domestic coalition increased their share 
of the popular vote to 86% in September 1953 and 90.6% in September 1957. Those 
victories translated into 91.7% and 96.5% of the seats in the Bundestag, respectively 
(Loewenberg 1967, Schweitzer, et al. 1984). The Electoral Law of 1956 succeeded in 
pruning the number of parties with seats from thirteen to three, entirely at the expense of 
semi- and suboptimal parties. From 1961-1972, no party with an explicit or implicit 
aversion to democratic institutions won a single seat in the Bundestag (Ibid). In terms of 
the cabinet, optimal parties almost exclusively held ministerial positions. The few 
exceptions were the semi-optimal Bund der Heimatlosen und Entrechteten (BHE, or the 
Union of Refugees and Expellees) between October 1953 and October 1960 and the DP 
between September 1949 and December 1966 (Ibid). Cabinet positions held by semi-
optimal parties were few and typically inconsequential, however, and the chancellorship 
remained with the CDU through December 1969 (Ibid). With trivial exceptions, optimal 
parties maintained exclusive control over West German parliamentary politics. 
 Support for the occupation was, of course, never unanimous among the West 
German people or even parties closest to the occupation (the CDU, FDP and, to a lesser 
extent, the SPD). Both Adenauer and his counterparts in the SPD hit the Western Allies 
hard for supporting France’s goal to annex the Saar (Glees 2003). The CDU opposed the 
Oder-Neisse frontier that the Four Powers had agreed upon at Potsdam. The SPD, which 
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opposed rearmament and accession to both the EDC and the Council of Europe, was 
relatively more interested in developing positive relations with East Germany and the 
Soviet Union (Glees 2003). They attacked the CDU following the Petersberg 
Agreements, accusing Adenauer of being in the pocket of the Allies (Haftendorn 2006).35 
That said, their opposition to the CDU stemmed more from differences in economic 
policy and not so much from outright opposition to the occupiers or their policies (Glees 
2003). The SPD, already losing members, would abandon the lingering Marxism in their 
platform and take a somewhat more western orientation on security and economic policy 
at their 1959 party conference in Bad Godesberg (Merkl 2002, Kvistad 2002, Ibid). 
Whether or not their moderate opposition towards liberalism and European integration 
was the true cause of their disappointing electoral performance in the 1950s, the changes 
they made to their platform suggest that they believed this to be the case. 
 Moreover, the CDU more than any other party toed the occupation line and was 
never seriously punished for doing so at the ballot box. The CDU-CSU-FDP coalition 
that ruled from the birth of the republic through December 1966 was steadfastly in favor 
of European integration, international economic liberalization, and Franco-German 
cooperation (Glees 2003, Haftendorn 2006, Willis 1962). When the official occupation 
line was one of disarmament, the CDU made the case for disarmament. When the official 
35 This charge borders on the incredible, considering that the Allies and Adenauer shared 
a rather acrimonious relationship from the start. The future Chancellor had once been 
barred from local politics after opposing British economic policy in their zone. Adenauer 
himself had once accused the British of working too closely with the Social Democrats. 
The UK enabled the SPD to broadcast their propaganda efforts, while the SPD 
successfully lobbied for a proportional legislature in contrast to the CDU’s desire for 
single-party districts. Considering their history and the number of concessions Adenauer 
won from the Western Allies, this reads far more like kneejerk partisan reaction than a 
true elucidation of the party’s opinions regarding the relationship between the occupiers 
and the occupied (Glees 2003). 
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line turned to rearmament and military integration with the western powers, the CDU 
made the case for rearmament and integration. In doing so, Adenauer’s government 
managed to secure important concessions from the Western Allies, not the least of which 
was sovereign recognition. In federal elections of September 1953, the CDU mustered 
45.2% of the popular vote—14% more than in 1949—while the SDP vote slipped slightly 
to 28.8% (Schweitzer, et al. 1984, Loewenberg 1967). Four years later, the CDU would 
capture the first-ever outright majority in a free German parliamentary election (Ibid). 
The early relative success of the party that was most compatible with the goals of the 
occupying powers indicates acceptance, if not enthusiasm, for the occupiers’ vision of 
West Germany.  
During the occupation, political extremism was rare but not unheard of. 
Notwithstanding the assassination of the US-appointed mayor of Aachen by a Nazi 
“Werewolf” militiaman prior to Germany’s surrender, there was virtually no residual 
paramilitary presence loyal to the old regime (MacDonald 2007). Most of the extra-
parliamentary activity under the military government consisted of protests and the 
occasional riot in protest of poor living conditions and changes to agricultural policy. In 
March 1948, labor leaders held a daylong general strike to protest the lack of food (Ibid). 
In the more agrarian south, protests against the deflationary monetary policy—which 
suppressed returns for agricultural goods and increased the real cost of mortgages—grew 
into full-scale riots. Unlike agrarian unrest in the Weimar regime, however, the 
government was responsive and eased up on inflation controls (Esposito 1995). 
Arguably, the most telling—and certainly most conspicuous—demonstration of extra-
parliamentary political power was not in protest against the Western Allies, nor did it 
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even take place in the western zones. In September 1948, 300,000 residents of the 
Eastern Zone took to the streets in front of the Reichstag building to protest the blockade. 
This was no trivial act, as the Soviet military police had already been cracking down on 
pro-western political groups. Indeed, approximately two hundred were injured when the 
police fired into the crowd, and seven were sentenced to twenty-five years hard labor in 
the USSR (MacDonald 2007). The protest made quite clear the opinions of the German 
constituency regarding the occupation policies of the Western Allies and the USSR. 
Otherwise, extra-parliamentary politics were generally peaceful until the rise of radical 
student groups in the mid-1960s, several years after the occupation had ended (Cromwell 
1964, Merkl 2002). 
 Election data, political demonstration and party politics aside, the single best 
indicator of the marginal security value of occupation may be the FRG’s foreign policy 
under occupation control. By 1950, Adenauer’s government pledged to support NATO 
and the EDC, and also sought a separate mutual security pact with the United States, 
United Kingdom, and France (Plischke 1953). Not six years after their predecessor state 
unconditionally surrendered, the new government was willing to enter into no fewer than 
three mutual security pacts with their erstwhile mortal enemies. More specifically, the 
new regime asked for and received multiple guarantees of security from the occupiers 
without significant opprobrium from those who freely elected them despite that many 
(most?) of them had sworn in the name of their country and leader to lay waste to those 
same foreign powers barely a decade earlier; to the conquerors that cremated Dresden, 
Hamburg, Pforzheim and nearly 100,000 fellow countrymen; to the first foreign armies to 
wage war on German soil since the Battle of Spicheren in 1870, a battle fought in the 
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opening stages of the war that gave birth to their nation. Is there any better evidence of 
the occupation’s security value that the constituency of the occupied state did not regard 
this arrangement as a betrayal by the new regime? I submit to you that there is not, and 
that the success of the optimal domestic coalition in the years following—as well as the 
democratic institutions that said coalition helped build—is largely the result of this fact. 
 
Summation 
This case meets all the conditions for a successful democratization. The Soviet 
Union presented a clear threat that became a clear foreign threat following the division of 
Germany. The Western Allies credibly committed to protect the FRG from this threat via 
the Airlift, the various security institutions they promulgated, and by the permanent 
commitment of US and UK military to the Continent. The occupying states improved 
their security value to West Germany by minimizing the threat that their more 
detrimental policies may have posed. They also undertook specific policies to protect and 
empower democratic politics in the new regime, including the supervision of a 
constitution that enabled democratic organizations to protect their own interests. The pro-
democratic parties that emerged from the occupation supported occupation policy, and 
these parties grew ever stronger in the Bundestag. In the earliest days of a new 
democracy, the Western Allies conducted an occupation that protected and promoted 
democratic interests and institutions, demonstrating to a new generation of German 





Reconciliation of Competing Hypotheses 
The case seems to support H1: there were fewer events indicating instability when 
occupation policy turned more palatable and when the Western Allies brought West 
Germany into their security perimeter. What little political instability existed seemed to 
occur in the earliest years of the occupation, before the Allies ended their policies of 
demontage and fully renounced the desire to pastoralize Germany. There is no clear-cut 
case in which the Allies aligned with any clear and present foreign threats. 
While the case does lend empirical support to the Marginal Value Model, it also 
resonates with a few of the implications of the rival hypotheses. Thorough defeat and 
demilitarization reduced the likelihood that authoritarian groups could challenge the 
occupation or its preferred domestic coalition via extra-parliamentary channels. Conquest 
and political re-education delegitimized the previous regime and eliminated any appeal 
Nazism would have among future generations. The design of the Basic Law and the 
Electoral Law of 1956 marginalized fringe movements and empowered the ruling 
coalition to take action against threats to the new system. The geography of the 
occupation ensured that political actors who opposed democratization were excluded 
from the new regime. Does this mean that the Marginal Value Model fails to provide 
analytical leverage? No, because many of the more compelling bits and pieces of the rival 
hypotheses can in fact be subsumed and improved upon by the Marginal Value Model.  
Demilitarization contributes to the goal of increasing the marginal security value 
of occupation. What this thesis ignores, however, is the importance of a policy of 
remilitarization that contributes to the territorial integrity of the state and the security of 
the citizens within. Democracies succeed in occupied territories when the occupation 
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increases the security of its citizens and reinforces the political strength of the optimal 
domestic coalition. Therefore, political re-education and institutional design, when 
undertaken with the goal of protecting and reinforcing pro-democratic constituencies and 
coalitions, is a necessary condition for early democratic consolidation. In these cases, it 
critical that the occupation force is active in the institutional redesign, and perhaps even 
takes a more active role in the education system. If better institutional design and political 
re-education improve the likelihood of democratic consolidation, then an occupying force 
interested in building a stable democracy should involve themselves in these questions. 
Finally, an occupation force may, under certain conditions, improve the chances 
of democratization by excising territories that may prove detrimental to its aims. This 
appears to be the case for the Federal Republic, but not for the reasons offered in the 
political geography thesis. The value of the division was less related to the political 
economy of the eastern zone than it was to the exclusion of an occupier that had no 
interest in implementing a democratic state. By forming a separate polity, the western 
powers increased the marginal security value of occupation in two distinct ways. First, 
they removed from the occupation a state whose policies were materially detrimental to 
the domestic constituency. Second, this allowed the US, UK and France to position 
themselves as the primary line of defense against this threat. This is important, as 
excision may not always be the answer in other cases. If the primary concern was less 
about security and more about political culture, the act of division may itself be perceived 
as threatening. In the case of Germany, this means that the exclusion of the East would 
not have been propitious if it had not also been an instrument of Soviet intimidation and a 
threat in its own right to the security of those in the Western zones and, especially, to 
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those in West Berlin. Division is only favorable to democratization if it improves the 
security of the democratic regime. 
 
Economic Drivers 
 As in the case of all studies of democratization, one should not ignore the 
importance of economic development and growth. The Wirtschaftwunder—which 
commenced sometime between 1949 and the early 1950s—put the Federal Republic’s 
new regime in an advantageous position. While the optimal coalition may have benefited 
from a positive marginal security value of occupation, one might also surmise that they 
benefitted substantially from the massive economic growth that the Federal Republic 
enjoyed through the 1950s and 1960s. After all, Germany came out of the war in an 
unusually strong economic position, at least in terms of capital stocks. Estimates indicate 
that the war erased 13% of investment capital in (the eventual territory of) West 
Germany. This exceeded France’s losses (8%) but fell short of the 25% loss suffered by 
the USSR. By some estimates, German productive capacity was as high in 1945 as it was 
in 1940 (Reichlin 1995). Coal production jumped fivefold between the surrender and the 
end of 1945 (Glees 2003). By 1947, German roads had made a full recovery (Willis 
1962). 
 But positive indicators in the commanding heights of industry did not instantly 
translate to a better standard of living or even aggregate growth. War-driven inflation was 
somewhat to blame—the Reichsmark lost 80% of its value against the US dollar between 
1938 and 1945 (Glees 2003). The RM continued to lose value after the war—dropping 
another 50% in 1946 for a total trop of 90% from 1938 levels—largely due to the Soviet 
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Union’s printing of currency to bankroll occupation costs (MacDonald 2007). Cheap 
money did nothing to boost employment, which topped out at 76% that year (Killick 
1997), nor industrial production, which equaled 40% of 1936 levels and 28% of 1938 
levels (Wolf 1995, Ibid). Assuming a liquid global economy and a more productive 
German industry, cheap prices would have boosted demand for German products. That 
notwithstanding, even if Germany was producing at a higher level in 1946-7, the RM was 
hardly convertible and gold reserves across Western Europe were fleeing the continent to 
cover capital account imbalances with the United States (Hitchcock 1998, Lindlar and 
Holtfrerich 2002). Perhaps the most pressing danger was the destruction of Germany’s 
agricultural capacity and the logistical, infrastructural and distributional issues that kept 
food from reaching the kitchen table. As Germany demobilized, grain production 
remained stagnant (Killick 1997). The caloric intake of the average German citizen 
hovered between 1,000 and 1,500 kcal/day during 1946 (MacDonald 2007). The situation 
deteriorated enough for General Clay to warn of a pending “nutritional disaster,” that 
might not only generate a famine but also fuel anti-occupation sentiment and political 
extremism (MacDonald 2007). 
 That famine never arrived. Instead, the years of 1947 and 1948 mark the 
economic turning point for West Germany. Employment in 1947 jumped to 85% and 
caloric intake rose to 1,800 kcal/day (Killick 1997). Employment soared to 95% in 1948, 
indicating that the German labor glut had largely been exhausted. Inflation stabilized 
after 1948, as did Germany’s capital account balance (Ibid). Industrial production 
increased to 51% of 1938 levels—an increase of 82% since 1946 (Wolf 1995). The 
savings rate averaged a stunning 19% during this period (Eichengreen 1995), a fact that’s 
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less surprising when one considers that consumer markets had yet to emerge and that the 
central bank had reigned in inflation.  
The stellar employment statistics of 1948 turned out to be an anomaly, as 
unemployment hovered around 8-10% from 1949 to 1952 (Killick 1997). Nevertheless, 
1949 marked the start of the West German Export boom, and thus the commencement of 
the West German economic miracle. Exports doubled that year, and would grow 23.5% 
year-over-year through 1957 (Mee, Jr. 1984, Lindlar and Holtfrerich 2002). GDP would 
grow at a 4.2% clip through the 1990s. Coal and steel production grew by leaps and 
bounds (Ibid). Industrial production reached 72% of 1938 levels, a 157% increase since 
the end of the war. By 1950, industrial production had essentially returned to prewar 
levels. Five years later, production was at 167% of prewar levels (Wolf 1995). As the 
economy boomed, Germans saved more and more, with the savings rate averaging 27% 
from 1950-1962 (Eichengreen 1995). 
That this recovery took place without the country going into debt, and without the 
high rate of savings putting a damper on aggregate demand, would appear miraculous at 
first glance. But perhaps the “miracle” label is misleading. If one truly considers the 
economic boom a miracle, then one need not ascribe agency to the improvement in 
economic indicators. If one considers economic growth as purely an independent 
variable, them one might assume that the successful democratization of the FRG is 
unrelated to non-economic variables. It is a tempting view to take, as it is a parsimonious 
explanation with empirical and theoretical support. 
This approach is wrong. 
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In reality, the economic welfare of any polity is dependent on good policy, and in 
these cases growth and living standards require substantial inputs just to restore the 
economy to its prewar state. In the case of West Germany, the occupation could have 
short-circuited the Wirtschaftwunder in any number of ways—and it almost did. The 
attitude of the Western Allies (specifically the United States) on German economic 
matters passed through three phases: 1) deindustrialization of the German state; 2) 
reconstruction of the western zones as part of a broader plan to help rebuild Western 
Europe; and 3) integration of the Federal Republic into regional and global trading blocs. 
Had the occupation continued to pursue the first option, there may have been no 
economic miracle. The stage was set when the US forced the UK to abandon the imperial 
preference system as a condition of Lend-Lease. This paved the way for Commonwealth 
states to participate in the bilateral agreements that would form GATT and reduce 
transatlantic tariffs by one half. (Irwin 1995, Frieden 2007). 
Since open borders are trivial without stable, fungible and flexible currency, the 
US and UK organized a fixed-rate monetary regime decoupled from specie and built the 
International Monetary fund to ensure convertibility. Since openness and convertibility 
are trivial without products to buy and sell, they seeded the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The delegates at Bretton Woods intentionally 
reimagined the global economy that was dynamic but not volatile—one less likely to 
swamp fragile democracies like the Weimar Republic (Frieden 2007). As impressive as 
this wave of economic liberalization was, these institutions were of little value to 
occupied Germany pending an increase their production capacity, itself endangered by 
the policy of dismantlement. Reparations aside, by the end of 1946, the US and UK were 
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already convinced of the value of a revived, liberal democratic Germany. In an April 
1947 paper, then-delegate to the UN General Assembly John Foster Dulles (1947) called 
for an end to industrial reparations (already underway), combined with monetary policy 
reform to revalue the German mark and direct transfers of dollar-denominated assets. 
Dulles’ recommendations were indicative of future policy. Foreign assistance ramped up 
substantially in 1947 via the UN Relief and Recovery Agency, government aid and 
grants, foreign loans and credits totaling $10 billion. As for monetary policy, the Western 
Allies reformed the German currency by phasing out the Reichsmark for the new 
Deutschmark, deflating the money supply by 93.6%, and by shepherding the fusion of the 
Land banks into a central “Bank of the German Laender” (Willis 1962, Glees 2003, 
MacDonald 2007, Dunbabin 2008, Merkl 1963, Mee, Jr. 1984, Haftendorn 2006, 
Hillenbrand 1980, Merritt 1976). 
Substantial as these measures were, they simply were not substantial enough to 
balance the region’s capital accounts. Belligerents had exhausted much of their gold and 
dollar reserves financing the war and spent what was left on American goods or wartime 
debt service (Killick 1997). The IMF existed to solve balance of payments issues, but the 
imbalance was simply too large for the Bretton Woods institutions to counter. Between 
1947 and 1953, the IMF loaned $753 million—just over $100 million per year—to 
European borrowers (Eichengreen 1995). Meanwhile, in 1947 alone, Western European 
central banks exhausted $2.5 billion worth of gold reserves amounting to one-third of the 
total supply (Hitchcock 1998). This trend, clearly unsustainable, prompted American 




Fearing that economic destitution could fuel communist sentiment on the free side 
of the Iron Curtain, Secretary of State Marshall proposed what would become a $12-13 
billion package known as the European Recovery Plan, or simply the Marshall Plan 
(Glees 2003, Mee, Jr. 1984, Willis 1962, Haftendorn 2006, Killick 1997, Dunbabin 2008, 
Windsor 1969, Reichlin 1995). The Marshall Plan would flood Western Europe with 
surplus military goods (useful for agricultural and industrial production), credits for 
infrastructural development,36 and debt forgiveness credits. In exchange, signatories 
promised to balance their budgets, rein in inflation and make their currencies convertible 
(Hitchcock 1998).37 Despite the large sum, there were some in the US administration that 
feared it would be too little too late. President Truman successfully requested over $600 
million in aid to France, Italy and Austria before the ERP disbursements came through 
(Hitchcock 1998, Killick 1997, Willis 1962). The UK and US ramped up their 
expenditures in Germany as well, spending $1 billion annually through 1950 (Lindlar and 
Holtfrerich 2002). These credits helped balance the current accounts of the Western 
European economies. Aid to the Trizone/FRG helped transform a $1 billion current 
accounts deficit in 1948 into a $144 million surplus in 1951 (Killick 1997). The aid also 
prevented states from abandoning their recent commitment to lower tariffs and currency 
convertibility as they did after WWI. 
As the Trizone became the German Federal Republic and transitioned from a 
military-controlled territory to an occupied, semi-sovereign state, the Western Allies 
36 Originally the province of the IBRD, the World Bank—like the IMF—lacked the 
resources necessary to make a significant impact. 
37 States behind the Iron Curtain were not excluded, but the Soviet Union rejected the 




                                                 
aimed to make the FRG a full member of the new global economic institutions that they 
themselves had crafted. During a four-week span in October and November 1949, the 
occupation powers invited the FRG to join the GATT, the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (the board which oversaw the distribution of Marshall Aid) and 
the ill-fated International Trade Organization (Glees 2003, Haftendorn 2006, Plischke 
1953). The FRG lowered its average tariff barrier to 15%, down from 48% in 1931 and 
lower than it had been since 1925 (Irwin 1995). In 1950, with Western Europe opening 
up and capital becoming more liquid, West Germany’s trade volume expanded by 75%; it 
doubled the following year. (Mee, Jr. 1984). Not too long after the occupation ended, the 
Federal Republic and France joined Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg in signing 
the Treaty of Rome, the substance of which founded the European Economic 
Community—an idea that grew out of discussions between Adenauer and the French 
Government in 1950 (Glees 2003, Willis 1962, Mitchell 2005, Lindlar and Holtfrerich 
2002, Haftendorn 2006). 
 It is clear: the West German Economic Miracle is less an act of God, and more a 
conscious design by the occupation forces to rebuild the regional economy in a way that 
would specifically protect West German (and Western European) democracy. By doing 
so, the occupiers reduced the possibility that an economic tsunami of the style that 
weakened the Weimar Regime in 1923—and crushed it in 1933—would occur. 
Moreover, these policies did more than boost indicators of growth and standard of living. 
They also signaled a credible commitment by the Western Allies to the welfare of 
occupied West Germany, while directly improving the lot of the most valuable 
constituencies in a fledgling democracy: capitalists and middle class workers. During the 
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Weimar Regime, trade openness had trended in the opposite direction. States worldwide 
were raising tariff barriers for the first time since the mid-nineteenth century, and the 
Allies themselves raised a punitive tariff wall around Germany. Trade barriers, along 
with reparations, hobbled Germany’s capacity to balance its current accounts and forced 
the government to meet its fiscal requirements by taking on debt. This prompted inflation 
and, eventually, the hyperinflation of 1923-1924, which alienated owners of capital from 
the democratic regime, decimated the ranks of the working middle class, and empowered 
the reactionary landed constituencies. In contrast, the post-WWII occupation ensured a 
stable monetary base upon which working households and capital concerns could rebuild. 
New trading regimes ensured that barriers would remain minimal. Capital infusions 
encouraged governments to keep these barriers low. These reforms helped the West 
German economy graduate from surviving to thriving, and in doing so reinforced the 




Summation of Findings and Conclusion 
 This case is confirmatory of the hypothesis. The model expects democracy to 
succeed in occupied territories where and when the occupiers establish a positive 
marginal value of occupation. The conditions for this were favorable. The Soviet Union 
established itself as a threat to the Trizone/FRG in various ways. They communicated 
these threats implicitly, through political oppression of moderate parties in their zone and 
in the Eastern European states they had infiltrated, and explicitly via direct demands to 
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the Western occupiers regarding the economic and political unification of occupied 
zones. They established threat credibility via the yearlong Berlin Blockade. Soviet 
capability to seriously threaten the survival and prosperity of those in the western zones 
was never in question—the Soviets demobilized their war machine at a slower pace than 
the western powers (Dunbabin 2008, Mee, Jr. 1984) and retained motorized and armored 
divisions in the eastern zone and in their Eastern European satellites (Adenauer 1984c, 
Hitchcock 1998), to say nothing of their atomic capability after 1949.38 The Western 
Allies, including the United States, United Kingdom and France, positioned themselves 
as credible allies against a Soviet threat. After rolling back the most threatening aspects 
of the occupation itself (and thus reducing the likelihood that the occupiers would 
continue to be enemies rather than become allies), the Western Allies built a network of 
mutual security agreements to protect Western Europe against the Soviet threat, 
eventually elevating the FRG to full partnership in NATO. During the Berlin Airlift, the 
US and UK proved their resolve. By halting and reversing the demobilization process, 
ramping up the number of American divisions on the Continent and around the world, the 
US and its allies signaled ample capability. The occupiers directly enhanced the political 
position of pro-democracy political elements in the FRG via their suppression of anti-
democratic politics during under the military government, and by their involvement in the 
promulgation of the Basic Law. 
 The correlation is obvious—the optimal domestic coalition has performed 
exceptionally well in every federal election since the ratification of the Basic Law, 
38 In fact, the Soviet Union, despite their first successful nuclear test in 1949 (Haftendorn 
2006, Dunbabin 2008), probably had no deliverable nuclear weapons as late as 1953 
(Merkl 2002). That said, most citizens of the Federal Republic had no way of knowing 
how underdeveloped the Soviet nuclear capability was. 
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winning both popular sentiment and formal power in the Bundestag. Radical, violent anti-
democratic political activity was sporadic throughout the period of the occupation and 
afterward. But there are also signs of a direct causal link between the behavior of the 
occupying forces and support for the optimal domestic coalition. Political parties and 
affiliated organizations that explicitly renounced the occupation and the government that 
supported it faired poorly in elections and never mustered a significant economic or 
extra-parliamentary challenge to the ruling coalition. The Christian Democratic Union 
(along with their Bavarian affiliate, the Christian Social Union) was, for all intents and 
purposes, the preferred party of the occupation powers. Their success during the 
occupation and a full decade thereafter indicates popular support for their relationship 
with the occupiers. The Social Democrats’ opposition to the CDU’s western orientation 
correlated with a decline in their domestic support, and their electoral failures prompted 
an excision of planks from their party platform that were incompatible with the western 
security and economic order. The pro-Western demonstrations in Berlin during the 
Blockade/Airlift indicated a strong sentiment in favor of the Western occupation style 
and its concomitant adhesion to democratic institutions and free association. The 
hundreds of thousands of refugees that fled East Berlin for the west prior to the erection 
of the Berlin Wall voted with their feet for the western system. That the Basic Law 
specifically allowed for the transfer of sovereign powers regarding security to 
international organizations, and that they did transfer those powers to the western 
interstate security system, is itself a confirmation of the perceived link in Germany 
between democracy and the security of their state, both of which depended on the 
enlightened self-interest the occupying powers. 
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 Finally, while there are a handful of theses that explain one or two of the 
differences between the failure of Weimar Germany and the success of the German 
Federal Republic, no single explanation provides as much empirical leverage as the 
Marginal Value Model. The Marginal Value Model explains the relationship between 
threat, commitment, democracy and economics, and subsumes the competing theories 
presented in this chapter. It does so while presenting hypotheses about democratic 
outcomes in occupied territories that rely on a priori and not post hoc observations (and 
nevertheless performs well with object post hoc observations as well). The case of the 
German Federal Republic is a strong test of the model, one that the model passes. 
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Chapter 4: Japan, 1945-1972 
Introduction 
 Japan acquainted itself with democracy in 1947, courtesy of the same country the 
Japanese had “suddenly and deliberately attacked” barely five years prior. The 
occupation itself began on September 2, 1945 and ended on April 28, 1952 (Wells 1948, 
Braibanti 1950, Morley 1965, Williams 1968, Passin 1990, Dower 1999, Tsuzuki 2000, 
Moore and Robinson 2002). The relevant observation period for this case thus extends 
from 1945 to 1972. While technically the Yalta Agreements called for four power (US, 
UK, Nationalist China and the Soviet Union) control of Japan, the United States 
administered the only local occupation authority and thus retained total operational 
control under the essentially unilateral leadership of General Douglas MacArthur 
(Tsuzuki 2000, Dunbabin 2008). Cohesion, therefore, was not an issue. As noted in the 
following sections, democracy promotion in Japan became official—albeit classified—
policy in 1946 and remained the steadfast, public position of the United States from 1947 
through the end of the occupation.  
As with the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan grew into a stable democracy in 
which pro-democracy parties (in this case, one pro-democracy party in particular) 
dominate the political landscape.39 While marginal but non-trivial anti-democratic 
39 The optimal winning coalition in this case includes a cluster of center-right and centrist 
parties, including the Japanese Progressive Party (JPP) that evolved into the Democratic 
Party (DP), and the Japanese Liberal Party (JLP) that, in 1955, merged with the 
Democratic Party to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Each of these parties 
were/are typical center and center-right parties, often with indistinguishable, pro-
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elements competed with the optimal winning coalition throughout the observation period, 
they were never a serious threat to seize the reins of government.40 I will begin by 
summarizing a few of the Japan-specific explanations for the successful democratization 
that this case study documents. He will continue to test their validity against the historical 
record, following this with a test of the marginal security model against the same data. A 
successful test would show that the electoral success of parties in the optimal winning 
coalition and domestic stability follow the provision of security and welfare goods by the 
US occupation government. It would also show that anti-democratic parties perform best 
when the occupier fails to provide such goods, and that this failure should be followed by 
riots, assassinations and other political violence. It should also demonstrate that positive 
democracy platforms lacking a redistribution program or an ideology rooted in class 
terms (Borton 1948b, N. G. Kim 1997, Crespo 1995, Morley 1967, Tsuzuki 2000). A 
left-of-center party, the Cooperative Party (CP), evolved into the Reform Party (RP. The 
RP later merged into the as well LDP (H 1949, Richardson 1997, Morley 1967). One left 
wing party consistently operates within the criteria of the optimal winning coalition: the 
Democratic-Socialist Party (DSP), a right-wing splinter from the Japanese Socialist Party 
(JSP), was the closest thing Japan had to a traditional social democratic faction (Morley 
1967, Destler, et al. 1976). In certain years, when not dominated by its left wing, the JSP 
qualifies as a pro-democracy, loyal party. This is true during the elections of 
1947, ’49, ’58, ’60 and ’63. At other times, the JSP’s line is largely indistinguishable 
from the Japanese Communist Party (Auer 1990, McNelly 1965, Borton 1948b, 
Dionisopoulos 1957, Morley 1967). 
40 The set of semi-optimal parties in Japan during the observation is small, often 
including only the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Unlike other Communist Parties in 
other cases, this party retained a Popular Front strategy that prescribed coalition building 
with other left-wing parties. They were not committed to violent overthrow of the 
government, but they were not committed to the preservation of democracy, either. 
Generally, the JCP opposed occupation policy, contributing to its denunciation and 
purgation by MacArthur in 1950 (Dower 1999; Caprio and Sugita 2007). This study 
treats the JSP as a semi-optimal party during the years in which the extreme left wing is 
dominant—the elections of 1952, ’53, ’55 and ’67 (Auer 1990, McNelly 1965, Borton 
1948b, Dionisopoulos 1957, Morley 1967). The set of sub-optimal political parties is 
null, as is the set of right-wing semi-optimal parties. There are no examples of publicly 
anti-democratic, violently extreme, ultranationalist or racialist parties in Japan between 
1946 and 1966 that are of any consequence in electoral or parliamentary politics. 
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trends among variables relevant to rival hypotheses are causally subsequent—not prior to 
or independent of positive behavior on the part of the occupier. Having done so, I will 
demonstrate that the marginal security model provides the best explanation for the 
consolidation of Japanese democracy.  
 
 
Rival Hypotheses versus Case History 
Rival Hypothesis: Delegitimation and Demilitarization 
 The delegitimation hypothesis is as applicable to the Japanese case as it is to the 
West German. Sonja Grimm (2008) finds that external democratizers are more likely to 
succeed if the target state is not capable of dictating the terms of peace. Clear-cut failure 
makes elites on the ground open to reform. That the Japanese surrendered without 
conditions (Moore and Robinson 2002) indicates that they were indeed unable to dictate 
the terms of peace, and the elites on the ground did very much seem open to reform. And, 
just as in the case of West Germany, Japan’s abject defeat allowed the United States to 
totally demilitarize Japan, a necessary step according to Linz’s (1990) and Stepan’s 
(1991) debellicization hypotheses. Nowhere is this more obvious that in the (in)famous 
Article IX of the imposed Japanese constitution, in which the new regime permanently 
renounces the use of force even in the case of self-defense.41 In fewer than two years, the 
41 The English translation of Article 9, Chapter II of the Constitution of Japan reads, 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never 
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occupiers caused Japan to disband its military, dispersed all paramilitaries,42 and imposed 
upon the country a constitution that renounced the use of force as a means of 
international politics (see more about military dismantlement in the “Threat 
Environment” section). Among conquered territories that would regain their sovereignty, 
there are few if any instances of demilitarization equivalent to this one on the historical 
record. 
 Just as in the case of West Germany, however, this theory ignores the importance 
of succeeding demilitarization with remilitarization. Sometime between late 1947 and 
early 1948, occupation policy reversed course from demilitarization and early withdrawal 
to re-armament and long-term commitment (Eiji 2002, Caprio and Sugita 2007). Japan 
was no longer a belligerent; they became a potential ally in a developing Cold War. 
Along with this new image of Japan came a push for rearmament, which to some 
Japanese was a relief and to others was especially hypocritical (considering that the ink 
on the new constitution had barely dried). Either way, Japan did heed this call, building a 
“self-defense” force that served as both domestic and foreign auxiliary, replete with land, 
air and sea forces (Tsuzuki 2000). This rearmament would continue long after the 
occupation ended (Morley 1967). Aiding Japan’s internal balancing efforts was a long-
term American commitment. The US retained troops on Japanese territory long after the 
occupation formally ended, committed their naval forces to the region, and essentially 
rebuilt Japan’s marine forces (N. G. Kim 1997). The only differences between the 
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” 
(Government Printing Bureau 1946) 
42 A GHQ order in January 1946 to disband all paramilitaries directly targeted one 
organization, the Guard Force, a wing of the WWII-era Imperial Guard charged with 
defending the main islands to the last man. They were not a significant force in postwar 
Japanese politics (Tsuzuki 2000). 
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German and Japanese examples is that Japan’s demilitarization was more thorough and 
its remilitarization more swift. 
 Dismantling Japan’s war-making capability and then leaving it to its own devices 
in the time and place this new regime happened to occupy would have been in no way 
propitious for democracy. Left exposed to the realpolitik of the Soviet Union and China, 
without American military assistance, Japan would have had to choose between diverting 
crucial resources to rebuilding its own self-defense capability at a time when such 
resources were in short supply, or risk subordination to the Soviet Bloc. Either choice 
would have put a serious strain on the new democratic regime. An increase in threat 
without reliable foreign support could have re-invigorated the once-purged militarists and 
ultranationalists.43 Diversion of economic resources may have delayed Japan’s economic 
recovery and tested the people’s patience with the capacity of the new regime to deliver 
goods both public and private. To rebuild Japan as a democracy, the United States had to 
both tear down and rebuild Japan’s defense capability. American assistance in these 
matters constituted a costly and credible commitment to the state’s welfare and 
distributed public security good that the new regime could effectively redistribute. The 
remilitarization of Japan is an example of the occupation’s production of marginal 
security. 
43 As per the findings of Colaresi and Thompson (2003); see Chapter 1. 
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Source: James W Morley. Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific. 1965. Walker and Company, 
New York. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Retention of Institutions 
 Seemingly in direct contradiction to Linz’s demilitarization case is Coyne’s 
(2008) hypothesis regarding the retention of institutions from the previous regime. Unlike 
Germany, Coyne is correct that the United States largely retained Japanese institutions 
during the occupation period. Whenever possible, SCAP governed through existing 
Japanese institutions rather than attempt to build new ones (Caprio and Sugita 2007). The 
United States continued to recognize the government that had prosecuted the war and 
made no attempt to remove it wholesale. The structure of the SCAP constitution 
mimicked that of the Meiji charter, only gutted and reconstituted with American style 
republican-democratic organs (Dower 1999). There were benefits to this approach. 
















































Figure 4.1: Expansion of the Japanese Armed Forces
Maximum Personnel (Left) Spending (Right)
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until it established a monopoly over the use of force in a power vacuum (Barnet 1983). 
Coyne argues that retaining Japanese institutions solved the credible commitment 
problem that imposed regimes typically face by relying on sources of legitimacy that the 
citizenry already respected. 
 In this case, the main problem with Coyne’s claim is not a mischaracterization of 
the occupation experience, but rather a lack of elucidation about the processes upon 
which the hypothesis depends. It is not exactly clear why retention of these institutions 
should solve the credible commitment problem inherent in occupying a foreign state and 
imposing a new regime. Presumably, Japanese people would be more likely to obey 
Japanese orders than they would American orders. This claim is simplistic and 
implausible for two reasons. First, it assumes that the Japanese people would respect 
Japanese institutions with full knowledge that said Japanese institutions were hijacked by 
American power, making American decisions for the benefit of Americans. Second, it 
may explain why it solves the credible commitment dilemma as concerns the general 
population, but it does not explain why it does so for elites. In order for any occupation to 
be successful without resort to all-out repression, the occupying authorities must reign in 
those classes of actors with the greatest power potential. The “people” are one of these 
classes, and securing their assent is indeed helpful. Securing their assent does not 
guarantee that the predominant holders of economic and physical power—colloquially, 
guns and money—will be on the side of the occupiers. Moreover, ruling through 
Japanese institutions does not guarantee their support. By definition, an occupation will 
have supplanted the privilege that the previous wealthy and powerful classes enjoyed. 
Also by definition, imposed democratization cannot leave those previous elites intact; to 
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do so would be to preserve the last regime. This is exactly the folly that USSR feared 
MacArthur was committing, especially in preserving the Chrysanthemum Throne. Soviet 
High Command was so worried about MacArthur’s unwillingness to level utterly the 
institutions of the old regime that they compared his behavior to that of George and 
Clemenceau at Versailles (Barnet 1983). While these fears proved unwarranted, they 
raise an important point: in the case of imposed democratization, retaining old institutions 
may (though not necessarily) entail the retention of autocratic institutions.44 It is obvious 
that retaining institutions of autocratic character would pose a threat to the consolidation 
of the new regime and, depending on the institution and its nature, negate the regime 
change all together. Even if the new institutions solve the credibility dilemma, it matters 
not if they do so by leaving elites with autocratic preferences in place. This is a dilemma 
of its own: if the choice of institution through which the occupation chooses to govern 
has little positive effect on the attitudes and preferences of elites, then one cannot assume 
that it solves any credible commitment dilemma when it comes to them. Since one cannot 
assume that ruling through Japanese institutions solves any credible commitment 
dilemmas among the mass population or among the elite classes, then one should 
question whether this is an aspect of the occupation that had any effect whatsoever. 
 And while I do not find it acceptable to rely on this explanation as a causal feature 
of the success of the Japanese occupation-cum-democratization, there are kernels of truth 
44 MacArthur avoided the mistakes that the Soviets warned against by retaining the 
Emperor’s office only in name, by retaining only institutions that were democratic in 
character—such as the diet, by ensuring that those institutions were made more 
democratic (by expanding suffrage and subordinating the cabinet to it), and by abolishing 
formal and informal institutions that were antithetical to democracy, such as the peerage, 
the Home Ministry State Shinto, and absentee landlordism (Government Printing Bureau 
1946; Ray 1947; H 1949; Ulmer 1957; Dower 1999; Moore and Robinson 2002).  
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within. Had the United States decided to break down and rebuild anew the institutions of 
state, as they had in Germany, the total outlay in terms of money, manpower and time 
might have been much greater. Perhaps the effort required would have been even greater 
than in Germany, where the United States shared the burden with three other states, and 
where a long tradition of federalism meant that the devolution of power to local 
authorities was not an alien concept. If the retention of the Diet did not alleviate 
credibility costs, it certainly reduced coordination costs. In essence, the only 
modifications MacArthur made in this area were the suffrage rules under which 
representatives were elected, the powers the legislature retained, and its power to choose 
the cabinet and head of government.45 The persistence of the Diet meant that it was one 
less institution that SCAP had to build from scratch. That the MacArthur Constitution 
passed as an “amendment” to the Meiji Constitution is indicative of the lower 
coordination costs of retaining Japanese institutions (Dower 1999). Finally, American 
policymakers were convinced that retaining Emperor Hirohito was necessary for ensuring 
the legitimacy of the new regime (Ibid). This is an untestable supposition, but it is not one 
worth ignoring. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Prewar Modernization 
If the retention of Japanese institutions cannot itself explain the success of the 
occupation, perhaps it was the case that the institutions themselves were already 
favorable for a democratic overhaul. Related to Coyne’s hypothesis is the proposition that 




                                                 
Japan had concluded much of its political, societal and economic modernization before 
WWII. Therefore, by the time that the United States imposed a democratic regime, Japan 
was “ready” for the new type of government. Pempel (1992) places the origins of 
Japanese democracy in the Meiji Constitution and the rapid modernization of the 
Tokugawa Era. This claim resonates with Seymour Lipset’s (1959) seminal work, 
crediting rapid consolidation of Japanese democracy to the nation’s unusually high level 
(for its income) of education. Lipset argued that an educated populace is more likely to 
understand the importance of tolerance, eschew extremism, and make rational choices. 
This was the reason, according to the author, that Japanese democracy consolidated 
despite (then) trailing the rest of the free world in economic development. The claim that 
states can be more ready for democracy if they have developed certain formal and 
informal institutions is persistent and fraught, and it dovetails with many of the 
consolidation hypotheses from the first chapter. Economically developed democracies are 
more successful consolidators. Democracies that rule a state with a prior history of 
democratization are more successful consolidators. Socially egalitarian democracies are 
more successful consolidators. Each of these branches of the consolidation literature 
supports the idea that Japan may have been a successful democratizer because it was a 
developed state with a history of constitutional government. 
These explanations, however, cannot stand independently. The rise of the Shōwa 
military government that ruled Japan in the 1930s and took the empire to war seemed in 
no way hampered by either the modernity of the society or the existence of the Meiji 
Constitution. Modernization in and of itself forged paths towards communism and 
fascism just as it did towards bourgeois democracy, as Barrington Moore (1966) has 
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demonstrated. And while making rational decisions is perhaps an important characteristic 
of an informed electorate, it is not clear that individual voters must act rationally in order 
to produce rational electoral outcomes. Two originators of modern democratic theory, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Madison, are very clear that individual rationality is 
not a prerequisite for positive democratic outcomes.46 Nor is rationality always a 
stumbling block for anti-government extremists.47 These indicators of modernity are 
important correlates of democratic consolidation, but they do not alone explain success in 
the case of foreign-imposed democratization. They cannot explain why Japan took the 
same road as West Germany rather than that of Weimar Germany. To understand why, 
one needs to look further and deeper, into the origins and prosecution of the occupation 
that imposed a democratic regime on Japan in the first place. 
 
46 “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man… So strong is this 
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion 
presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle 
their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts… A republic, by which I 
mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different 
prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking.” (Publius 1787); “The citizen 
gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his 
opposition… The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by 
virtue of it they are citizens and free… When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my 
own prevails, this proves neither more nor less that I was mistaken, and that what I 
thought to be the general will was not so…all the qualities of the general will reside in 
the majority: when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no 
longer possible.” (Rousseau 2001, p.277-8). In the quotes above, both authors imply that 
the structure of representative government can reign in the distortions of disparate 
opinions. Liberty and the public interest can survive even when individuals are acting 
passionately instead of rationally so long as majority rule is both preserved and mediated 
by appropriate institutions. 
47 Lichbach (1998) holds that the group dynamics of collective dissent may overcome the 
collective action dilemma that otherwise should prevent the rational actor from rebelling 




                                                 
Test of Working Hypotheses versus Case History 
Threat Environment 
Foreign threats create an opportunity 
for occupiers to produce marginal value by 
distributing security goods, thus making 
consolidated, imposed democracy a 
possibility. But until 1950, neither the USSR 
nor the Nationalist or Communist regimes in China posed an existential threat to Japan. 
Even with the advent of war on the mainland, none of the belligerents communicated any 
malicious intent toward Japan specifically. Besides, Japan had since abandoned its 
imperial ambitions, including its possessions on the Korean Peninsula, now embroiled in 
an internationalized civil war. Furthermore, no foreign power directly targeted Japan in 
the same way that France, Belgium and Poland antagonized Weimar Germany or that the 
Soviet Union pressured the Federal Republic. There is no Japanese counterpart in the 
historical record to the Berlin Blockade. Taken individually and without context, these 
conditions indicate a placid threat environment as compares to the two German cases. 
Context, however, is important. The historical and contemporary background of the 
Japanese case indicates that, while not extreme, the level of threat in this case is non-
trivial. 
Dating back to the mid-1800s, Japan’s primary concern in terms of overseas 
territories was northeast Asia, particularly Manchuria, Siberia and Korea. Japan’s interest 
in this region was unsurprising due to its geographical proximity, inevitable due to the 
Table 4.1: Influences on the Threat 
Environment in Japan 
 
More Threatening 
• Historical relationship with 
Russia 
• Korean War 
 
Less Threatening 




accession of Russia to great power status and the colonization of East Asia by 
Westerners, and irresistible due to the region’s comparative wealth of strategic resources. 
Following wars with China and Imperial Russia, Japan brought Korea into its sphere of 
influence and eventually subjugated the state as a colonial possession (Cha 1999). Japan 
would later do the same to Manchuria. Moreover, Russo-Japanese neutrality during (most 
of) WWII reoriented Japan towards Southeast Asian and Pacific expansion. From the late 
nineteenth century onward, the structure of interstate politics in the region—as well as 
their relationship with the US—significantly impacted Japanese domestic politics. The 
Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the Shōwa regime of the 1930s were, in part, attempts to 
modernize the organs of state to address and exploit the changes in Asian-Pacific affairs. 
Isolationism was no longer a reasonable foreign policy; modern warships and Western 
interest in the Asia-Pacific raised the possibility of a foreign power turning Japan into the 
next Philippines or East Indies. Geography dictates that the gravest, most immediate 
threats to Japanese sovereignty would emanate from the northeast mainland. Naturally 
then, upon Japan’s imperial expansion, this region would also prove to be the most 
enticing target. Just as the security of Britain largely depends on maintaining a balance of 
power on the Continent, the security of Japan largely depends on who controls Korea, 
Manchuria and Siberia, as well as the Chinese and Russian littorals.  
This is the context in which we must infer Japan’s perception of threat during the 
American occupation. Japan neutralized Korea in 1910, Manchuria in 1934, and in 1941 
signed a neutrality agreement with the USSR, but this security buffer collapsed in a 
matter of weeks when the Soviet Union re-entered the Pacific theatre (Tsuzuki 2000). 
The loss of Manchuria (which would return to China as per the Potsdam Agreement), the 
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abrupt end to the USSR’s assurance of non-intervention, and the Soviet occupation of 
Korea north of the 38th Parallel left Japan exposed to northeast Asia once again.48 This 
time, however, Japan lacked the option of either offensive or defensive rearmament, as 
per the American occupation’s disarmament policy (see more below). Perhaps this 
exposure would have been less stark, if only slightly, had the Soviet Union responded 
positively to MacArthur’s calls for an early peace treaty in March 1947 (G. F. Kennan 
1967, Borton 1948b, Kim 1997), but the USSR rejected the proposal (Ibid, Borton 
1948a). The situation would only grow more foreboding thereafter. That Japan, or at least 
the cabinet, perceived the Soviet Union as the primary threat to national security is a 
matter of public record. On September 13, 1947, Foreign Minister Ashida presented a 
memorandum to General Eichelberger, commander of Eighth Army, requesting a long-
term American military presence on Japanese soil. The premise behind the communiqué 
was a fear that the USSR would threaten Japanese interests should US-Soviet relations 
deteriorate coupled with a lack of confidence that the United Nations could effectively 
protect Japan if such were the case (N. G. Kim 1997).49 In other words, despite the lack 
of a formal alliance binding Japan and the US, the absence of any obvious Soviet designs 
on Japan, and the fact that the United States was responsible for most of the losses the 
Japanese sustained during WWII, high-ranking government officials on both sides had 
already presupposed a security partnership. 
48 While Japan was aware that they would have to relinquish their dominions on the 
mainland when they agreed to the terms of surrender put forth at Potsdam, they managed 
to hold onto these territories up until the Soviet Union re-entered the Pacific theatre on 
August 9, 1945 (Spector 2005). 
49 Prime Minister Yoshida adopted this line and repeated Ashida’s position publicly in 
1949 and 1951 (Ibid). 
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Ultimately, the Cold War did come to the Pacific Rim. It is difficult to ascertain 
exactly when this occurred, but odds are this transition occurred sometime between 
August 29, 1949 and June 25, 1950. On August 29, the Soviet Union detonated its first 
atomic bomb, further weakening Japan’s geographic defensive advantage (Haftendorn 
2006, Dunbabin 2008). The US once proved it feasible to incapacitate Japan without 
attempting a treacherous and unprecedented invasion of the Main Islands by bombing 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and now the Soviet Union might press the same advantage. 
Two months later, Mao Zedong and the People’s Liberation Army—who honed their 
skills fighting the Japanese during WWII—expelled Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang 
forces and assumed control over Mainland China (Morley 1967, K.-K. Kim 1995). They 
soon established favorable relations with the Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, which itself had established relations with the USSR in March 1949 
(Morley 1967). In February 1950, the PRC and USSR signed a treaty of military alliance 
(K.-K. Kim 1995). On June 25, 1950, the Cold War in Asia turned hot as the DPRK 
invaded the Republic of Korea (Morley 1967, Tsuzuki 2000, N. G. Kim 1997, Moore and 
Robinson 2002, Guthrie-Shimizu 2007).  
 The Korean War eventually grew into an internationalized civil war with US 
forces fighting for South Korea under the banner of the United Nations, with Soviet 
materiel and training supplementing the efforts of the North (N. G. Kim 1997, Dower 
1999, Moore and Robinson 2002, Morley 1967, Tsuzuki 2000) and, on November 26, 
1950, with thousands of Chinese Communist volunteers launching an offensive across the 
Yalu River (N. G. Kim 1997, Eiji 2002). While geographic circumstance and decades of 
contestation in the region gave reason for wariness in the late 1940s, the sweeping 
138 
 
victories of the People’s Liberation Army in mainland China and the DPRK in the first 
months of the Korean War, and the nuclearization of politics upon the USSR’s successful 
test of a nuclear weapon, made it clear that Japan could no longer rely on the sanctity of 
its island fortress. 
 The war, which endured beyond the conclusion of the American occupation, 
clarified the threat environment in two ways. First, it represented the crystallization of 
security relationships in the region, with an autocratic, communist bloc forming on the 
mainland among the People’s Republic of China and the USSR in support of North 
Korea, directly opposing a democratic, capitalist bloc revolving around the United States 
in support of the South. Second, the introduction of war to a peninsula commonly 
described as a “dagger aimed at the heart of Japan” (Dower 1999) represented the first 
serious external instability in the region since the conclusion of WWII. The intensity of 
this threat is magnified by the American success in demilitarizing Japan early in the 
occupation. It is this situation that allowed the United States occupation force to produce 
marginal security for Japan. While SCAP had abandoned the policy of demilitarizing 
Japan in 1949, five years of enforcing this policy—not to mention the decimation of the 
Imperial military during the War—left Japan with a limited capability for self-defense 
(Morley 1967). Until the new regime could rebuild its self-defense capability, Japan was 
faced with a choice: align with the United States, or go it alone and risk being swamped 
by an increasingly belligerent Sino-Soviet bloc. Japanese demand for an external balancer 
was high, and the United States established itself as the most logical, most willing and 




Signaling Security Value 
While the opportunity to produce 
marginal occupation value by distributing 
security goods presented itself in the form of a 
growing threat on the mainland, the occupiers 
did not take immediate advantage. An early 
mistake by Truman handed territories to the 
Soviet Union that Japan had acquired peacefully. To make matters worse, for two years it 
seemed that the US occupation policy in Japan revolved around its own three Ds: 
democratize, demilitarize, and depart. These early mistakes were not disastrous, 
however; policy during this era was more naïve than injurious, and MacArthur & Co. 
made up for their deficiencies by improving Japanese security in other ways. Most 
importantly, as the threat environment deteriorated, US policymakers signaled credibly 
by completing a policy about-face and enhancing their commitment to Japan. As the 
environment grew more threatening, the US invested more in Japanese security. By the 
time the Korean War broke out, the US had successfully demonstrated their long-term 
commitment to the security of Japan, thus producing marginal value and aiding in the 
consolidation of the new democratic regime. 
The breadth of the US commitment to Japan specifically, and to northeast Asia 
generally, was initially unclear. At Potsdam in July 1945, the US, UK, China and Soviet 
Union signaled that the occupation would be temporary, ending as soon as Japan 
relinquished its empire, reformed domestic politics (this did not necessarily mean 
democratization, though the terms required a government in accordance with the “will of 
Table 4.2: Indicators of Occupation 
Security Value in Japan 
 
Positive 
• Evasion of reparation demands 
• Remilitarization 
• Inclusion in US security 
perimeter 
• US-Japan Security Treaty 
 
Negative 




the people”), liberalized trade and renounced militarism (Borton 1948a, Dower 1999, 
Williams 1968, Wells 1948). The language of the surrender terms makes no mention of 
any long-term commitment to Japanese security, and the conditions for ending the 
occupation specifically imply that the US would not make any such commitment. That 
the four parties to the Potsdam Declaration renounced any intentions for a permanent 
occupation, for placing Japan under vassalage, and made no mention of dividing or 
pastoralizing the country were certainly positive features. But as it stood, Potsdam 
declared that Japan would be stripped of its military and the security buffer provided by 
its inland colonial possessions, and then left to the whims of the powers in the North 
Pacific (perhaps under the nominal protection of the United Nations). Furthermore, 
despite the Potsdam provision requiring Japan to return only territories acquired through 
aggression, Truman agreed to hand over the Kuriles (a chain of islands north of 
Hokkaido) over to the Soviet Union (Gallicchio 1991). Japan did not expect that the US 
would cede the Kuriles, which had been acquired by treaty with Imperial Russia, nor did 
the US officer corps or the Soviet Union (Gallicchio 1991). Nevertheless, the Soviet 
Union would take possession of the Kuriles, and the US refused to correct their mistake 
and support the retrocession of the territory until 1956 (Ibid). 
On the other hand, the US worked hard to prevent other former belligerents, 
including the Soviet Union and China as well as England, the Netherlands, and newly 
sovereign states such as India and the Philippines, from asserting their influence in Japan. 
The Soviet Union pressed for an occupation zone in Hokkaido, while Great Britain and 
her dominions pushed for a multilateral council in Tokyo (Levi 1946). However, 
following the surrender, the United States was the sole belligerent with a military 
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presence in Japan. By virtue of their advantageous strategic position, Washington 
enjoyed de facto veto power over occupation policy. They exercised this veto to keep 
Soviet boots off of Japanese soil (Dunbabin 2008) and to significantly enervate demands 
for multilateral control. Instead of a quadripartite occupation authority in Tokyo—as 
proposed by Molotov and implemented in Germany—Washington countered by creating 
the Far East Advisory Commission (FEAC), a body with no formal authority over policy 
(Borton 1966). When the Soviets refused to join, the US ditched the FEAC proposal and 
secured an agreement on the formation of the Far East Commission (FEC). The function 
of the FEC, comprising of the US, UK, USSR, China, France, Netherlands, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines, was to review and approve (or veto) 
the decisions of the Supreme Commander (Ibid, Borton 1948a, Tsuzuki 2000, Levi 1946, 
Wells 1948). Their actual power to effect policy was limited, however, due to the 
aforementioned American monopoly on military force over the four main islands and 
Okinawa, as well as a formal veto the US enjoyed on FEC decisions (Borton 1966).50 
Moreover, the terms of surrender—which were approved by the Soviet Union and China 
as well as Japan and the US—placed full executive authority in the person of the 
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (Borton 1948a, Moore and Robinson 2002, Wells 
1948).51 US General Douglas MacArthur, who occupied the office between October 1945 
50 In one example, the US employed this veto to block a resolution calling for the 
submission of the SCAP-imposed Japanese constitution for review to the FEC. The FEC 
later adopted a resolution calling for a constitution embodying the same principles that 
SCAP’s constitution had already authored and that the Diet had already agreed to 
consider (Ibid). Clearly an effort to avoid the appearance of irrelevance, this transparent 
move only serves to underline the FEC’s impotence. 
51 Emperor Hirohito reinforced this arrangement in Imperial Ordinance 311. Issued on 
July 15, 1946, the ordinance directed his subjects to regard SCAP directives as equivalent 
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and April 1951 (Tsuzuki 2000), had no intention of relinquishing this authority and was 
generally successful in having his way. Along these lines, the US dragged its heels on 
issuing reparations payments to former belligerents, instead directing its energies to 
rebuilding the Japanese economy (Reday 1949).52 At the very least, this prevented the 
mainland powers from taking a retributive course of action (as the USSR did in Eastern 
Europe) and from subordinating Japan’s wellbeing to their own—a likely outcome, 
considering the decades of antagonism in this security triangle. The value of this strategy 
would become even more obvious as the Cold War developed, especially to the nascent 
democratic elements under the new, imposed, democratic regime.  
It was not until 1948 that the United States signaled a long-term commitment to 
Japanese security. How long the United States would remain in Japan, and continue to 
protect Japanese territorial integrity, remained an open question. In accordance with 
Potsdam, MacArthur called for a peace treaty and subsequent withdrawal once his forces 
had successfully democratized and demilitarized the state (Kennan 1967, Borton 1948a, 
to Japanese law, even when the Emperor or Diet did not formally back the directives with 
their own authority (Braibanti 1948). 
52 Comparative US reparation policy toward German and Japan after WWII presents an 
interesting study. The US officially pursued reparations in both cases, but the US was far 
less committed to reparation deliveries from Japan than from West Germany. This is 
directly related to the contrast between the free hand that the US effectively enjoyed in 
Japan and the necessity of coordinating German occupation policy with France and the 
Soviet Union, stats that were fervently pro-reparation and -dismantlement. The Potsdam 
Declaration, which dictated the terms of surrender, stipulated reparations including 
factory dismantlement, but the US contingent was wary about this policy as they were in 
Germany. The difference in this case was that the members of the Far East Commission, 
the international body in charge of the Japanese occupation (as stipulated in a 12-way 
agreement among former belligerents including the USSR and China), had no mechanism 
for effecting policy on the ground. The FEC was unable to obtain reparations beyond 
machinery and abandoned works; rarely if ever were active factories dismantled (Reday 
1949, H 1949, J. B. Cohen 1948, Passin 1990). Nor could the FEC stop the US from 
unilaterally abandoning reparations deliveries in 1949-50 (Kennan 1967, Reday 1949, 
Morley 1967).  
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Borton 1948b, N. G. Kim 1997). In Washington, attitudes towards the long-term strategic 
value of Japan were beginning to change. George Kennan (1967) cautioned against an 
early exit, as leaving Japan before it was economically rehabilitated and remilitarized 
would leave it susceptible to bullying by the Soviet Union and, perhaps, even a 
communist takeover (Marxist elements were still very active in Japan at this time). In late 
1948, the US reversed the policy of demilitarization and began encouraging Japan to 
rebuild its capacity for self-defense (Caprio and Sugita 2007). Kennan recommended a 
long-term troop presence on the islands (G. F. Kennan 1967), while planners in 
Washington began calling for the reconstruction of a Japanese paramilitary force that 
would maintain order domestically and deter threats internationally (Williams 1968, 
Barnet 1983). 
The strongest American commitments to Japanese security were delivered during 
the Korean War. Indeed, American involvement in the Korean War itself was the 
strongest possible signal that the US considered the region, which includes Japan, a 
strategic priority. This, however, represented a total reversal on American policy towards 
Korea. Prior to the conflict, the priority was extrication from the costly occupation of 
Korea as quickly as possible (N. G. Kim 1997). The US fulfilled this policy goal upon 
their departure from Korea in mid-1949 (N. G. Kim 1997, Morley 1967, Matray 1985, 
McGlothlen 1989, Oh 2002, Oliver 1999). Secretary of State Acheson went so far as to 
declare the Korean peninsula beyond the American security perimeter (Morley 1967, N. 
G. Kim 1997, McGlothlen 1989). This message, while unfavorable to South Korea, was 
favorable to Japan: the US may not be interested in Korean security, but by excluding 
Korea Acheson implicitly included Japan (Morley 1967, N. G. Kim 1997). The UN-
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sponsored, US-led “police action” represented the first material commitment by the 
occupiers to countering the expansion of Japan’s traditional security competitors in the 
region, and the strongest proof of the value of the American occupation at the time. 
The US ramped up its contribution to Japanese security as the Korean War 
dragged on. In September 1951, negotiations concluded regarding the end of the 
occupation of Japan and the status of the post-occupation relationship (Morley 1967, Eiji 
2002). By the terms of the Treaty of San Francisco and the US-Japan Security Treaty, the 
US retained the right to intervene to protect Japan from both external and external threats 
to the new regime. Also in September 1951, the US reinforced its commitment to the 
greater Asia-Pacific region when it concluded the ANZUS mutual security pact with 
Australia and New Zealand (Eiji 2002). Domestic elements in Japan offered only divided 
and conditional support to the treaties. The joint responsibilities of the mutual security 
pact were asymmetrical, requiring Japan to accept American assistance without an iron 
clad commitment to come to Japan’s defense in the event of a crisis. Dulles’ command to 
consult with, rather than dictate to, Japan notwithstanding, the final treaties reflected the 
leverage that the Americans had by virtue of their predominant force and Japan’s desire 
for both independence and protection (Destler, et al. 1976, Aruga 2001). Nevertheless, 
Prime Minister Yoshida’s fear of a quick American departure (once Korean truce talks 
commenced in July 1951) belies the cabinet’s support for a long-term American 
commitment of some type (N. G. Kim 1997).53 
While the earliest signals by the United States and its allies were of ambiguous 
nature, they were not dramatically positive or negative. Without perfect foresight about 
53 Yoshida had publicly called for a post-occupation US presence in Japan as early as 
May 1949 (Ibid). 
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how the Cold War would unfold—or that it would occur at all—the initial absence of a 
long-term security commitment to Japan was more naïve than malicious. The surrender 
of the Kuriles was perplexing and a sore point in US-Japan relations for over a decade. 
That said, since postwar Japan did not lack for warm water ports and had little use for 
them, their cession was probably more beneficial to the Soviets than it was detrimental to 
the Japanese. The US would make up for that by serving as the primary guarantor of 
Japanese maritime security, indicating that the Kurile cession was more of a nuisance to 
the US than to Japan. Most importantly, as the environment grew more threatening, the 
US responded by ramping up its commitment.  By late 1948 it was clear that the United 
States held a significant stake in the survival and independence of Japan, and in mid-1950 
the US resolved to affirm that commitment with money, prestige and blood. By assuming 
these costs, the United States credibly signaled its future commitment to the welfare of 
Japan, thereby producing marginal occupation value. 
  
Facilitating Regime Consolidation 
 In the earliest years, when the American commitment to Japan’s security was 
anything but concrete, MacArthur and General Headquarters directed their efforts to 
improving domestic welfare and marginalizing antidemocratic coalitions. The purge of 
ultranationalists and militarists from government helped narrow the range of acceptable 
political contestation, while the end of controls on political expression and the 
introduction of full adult suffrage helped to grow the center. It also helped to grow the far 
left, necessitating another purge that marginalized another possible challenge to liberal 
democratic government. The United States poured billions of dollars into Japan during 
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the occupation period, although not soon 
enough for the millions of Japanese who 
suffered from malnutrition during the first 
year of the occupation. Supreme Command 
tried the highest-ranking officials in the old 
regime for war crimes, further thinning out the 
ranks of those who might challenge the new 
government. Crucially, one actor left out of 
these proceedings was Emperor Hirohito. It was in this context that MacArthur and 
Supreme Command imposed a representative democratic constitution that survives, un-
amended, as the basic law of Japan to this day. 
Among many parallels that the post-WWII German and Japanese cases share is a 
direct effort on the part of the occupying powers to purge the elements of the previous 
regime. On September 10, 1945, the US military government imposed censorship of all 
Japanese media (Dower 1999, Caprio and Sugita 2007). The purpose of this directive was 
to ensure that disruptive elements—this meant mostly right-wing extremists from the old 
regime but, as the occupation continued, increasingly included left-wing elements—could 
not regenerate domestic support for the previous regime. The next day, the occupation 
authorities issued the first warrants for the arrest of war criminals, which it would follow 
up with the formal establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on 
January 19, 1946 (Dower 1999, Tsuzuki 2000, Morley 1967). These trials ran from May 
1946 through November 1948 and resulted in over 4,000 convictions and 984 executions 
(Ibid, Moore and Robinson 2002, Morley 1967). On October 22, SCAP prohibited the 
Table 4.3: Evidence of Facilitating 
Regime Consolidation in Japan 
 
Constructive 
• Preservation of the Emperor 
• Militarist purge 
• Expansion of suffrage 
• Imposed constitution 
• Land redistribution 
• Direct aid 
 
Destructive 






promotion of militarism and ultra-nationalism in textbooks, and furthermore ordered the 
dismissal of teachers with similar views (Nozaki 2007). On December 15, the occupiers 
banned the elements of the Shinto religion that promoted Japanese racial superiority, 
claims for eventual world domination, and those that proclaimed the emperor’s divinity 
(Nozaki 2007, Moore and Robinson 2002, Dower 1999, Ray 1947). In January 1946, 
President Truman issued the “Purge Directives,” disqualifying over 200,000 officials 
from participation in the cabinet, Diet or civil service due to their views or their 
connections to the previous military government (Dower 1999, Tsuzuki 2000, Moore and 
Robinson 2002, Morley 1967).  
That said, the purge of militarists and ultranationalists in Japan was not quite as 
zealous as the Denazification policy in Germany. In contrast, MacArthur’s men were far 
more meticulous in crafting the institutions that would define the new regime. The 
occupation authorities opened up the realm of political expression and competition with 
the “civil liberties” directive of October 4, 1945, which re-legalized political parties, 
freed 3,000 (mostly left-wing) political prisoners, and repealed all laws restricting 
freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech and criticism of the government (Tsuzuki 
2000, Dower 1999, Moore and Robinson 2002). A week later, MacArthur met with the 
Japanese cabinet to discuss his plans to reform the whole structure of Japanese 
Government. (Auer 1990, Dower 1999, Moore and Robinson 2002). Initially, SCAP left 
it to the Japanese to redesign the Meiji Constitution in according with the Potsdam 
Declaration provision for self-government. However, by February 1946, MacArthur had 
lost faith in the ability of the existing Japanese ministers to promulgate a document that 
would represent a true break with the past (Borton 1966, Dower 1999). Between 
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February 2 and 11, a secret SCAP committee led by General Whitney wrote the 
document that would become the draft of Japan’s postwar constitution (Gibney 1996, 
Dower 1999, Moore and Robinson 2002). The final Japanese version, which was 
promulgated in October and went into effect on May 3, 1947, differed in translation very 
little from the draft authored by the Whitney committee (Ibid, Borton 1948b, Auer 1990, 
Wells 1948, Morley 1967, Williams 1968, Nozaki 2007, Okudaira 1990). Meanwhile, the 
first postwar elections took place in April 1946—with blacklisted politicians purged from 
the ballot and suffrage opened to all adults without regard to gender, class or property 
ownership (Borton 1948b, Dower 1999, Moore and Robinson 2002). By expanding 
suffrage while blacklisting known antidemocratic elements, MacArthur and the 
occupation officials directly manipulated the domestic political environment to privilege 
and empower pro-democratic constituencies.  
While the occupation significantly reformed the terms of acceptable political 
contestation in the new regime, one institution was left intact, if only symbolically. 
Emperor Hirohito retained the Chrysanthemum Throne, his title as head of state, and, not 
least, his life. As early as 1942, there was a faction within the US postwar panning 
community that favored retaining Hirohito in some capacity (Borton 1966). In mid-1944, 
the State Department thought he might be useful as an instrument of the occupation 
authorities (Ibid). The OSS felt that the Emperor would provide a moderate panacea to 
the ultra-nationalism that pervaded the Japanese government at the time (Tsuzuki 2000). 
MacArthur (and his advisors) felt that a forced abdication would result in a violent 
reaction that would complicate American postwar aims (Dower 1999). During the 
diplomatic back-and-forth leading up to surrender, Japan requested that the US agree to 
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the preservation of the Emperor. The American response was either non-committal or 
implicitly affirmative, depending upon one’s interpretation (Moore and Robinson 2002). 
In November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff barred MacArthur from removing Hirohito, 
although MacArthur required very little prodding in this matter (Borton 1966). 
MacArthur and the joint chiefs successfully fended off calls to depose, try, imprison and 
execute the Emperor from actors American and otherwise (Moore and Robinson 2002, 
Caprio and Sugita 2007). When MacArthur’s officers wrote the constitution that Japan 
would later ratify, they ensured that the office of the Emperor would survive under the 
new regime, if in a powerless form (Moore and Robinson 2002, Dower 1999, Borton 
1966, Government Printing Bureau 1946). 
Economic reform under the auspices of the occupation authorities served to root 
out those domestic elements that would be most incompatible with a democratic society. 
In December 1945, SCAP first ordered the reorganization of land ownership on a more 
equal basis (H 1949). These reforms effectively eliminated the landlord class. Between 
1946 and 1956, owner-operators increased from 36% to 70% of the farming population, 
and landless tenants dropped to 4% (Eyre 1956).54 In August 1946, SCAP ordered the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu, the enormous monopolies that dominated Japanese industrial 
production and fueled the war effort (H 1949). Most of these conglomerates (the notable 
exceptions being Mitsui and Mitsubishi) were broken up by January 1947 (Caprio and 
54 These reforms left the previous landlord class in charge of half of the forested acreage, 
however. Since timber was a necessary resource for the rural population, landlords did 
retain some power over the new tenant-owners, if through market channels instead of 
political ones (Ibid). 
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Sugita 2007).55 These reforms helped neutralize potential enemies to Japanese 
democracy—specifically landed interests and monopoly capitalists. In support of these 
reforms was direct aid, which fed the people during the depths of the postwar period, re-
industrialized the economy, legitimated the new regime and built the Japanese middle 
class. Following a year of food shortages and mass starvation, in August 1946 MacArthur 
began pleading with Truman for additional aid to Japan in order to preserve the progress 
they had made thus far (Fuchs 2007). The United States was already shipping half a 
million tons of grain and 142,000 tons of canned goods to Japan to alleviate the food 
crisis (Aruga 2001). That aid, along with military spending, essentially financed Japan’s 
trade imbalance through 1962 (Hunsberger 1997). If dollar infusions from the United 
States were removed from the balance of payments between September 1945 and 
December 1962, Japan would have run a current accounts deficit of $7.5 billion. 
Counting only goods and services, Japan would have run a capital accounts deficit in 
every year excepting 1958 and 1959. Instead, GARIOA (Government Aid and Relief in 
Occupied Areas), Korean War procurement and post-Korea military expenditures 
injected $8.6 billion into the Japanese economy. Specific expenditures in support of 
American efforts in Korea totaled at least $2.2 billion (Dower 1999, Barnet 1983).56 As a 
result, Japan ran a current accounts surplus of greater than $1 billion during the period, 
with the annual balance of payments in the black every year excepting 1945-6, 1953-4, 
1956-7 and 1961 (Hunsberger 1997). The outbreak of war directly benefited the average 
55 Most of the factories themselves were allowed to remain intact; those remaining on the 
dismantlement list were returned to Japan at the end of the occupation (N. G. Kim 1997, 
Reday 1949, Passin 1990, J. B. Cohen 1948, Morley 1967). 
56 This is one reason why Prime Minister Yoshida referred to the outbreak of the Korean 
War as a “Gift of the gods” (N. G. Kim 1997). 
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Japanese worker; the US would employ 290,000 Japanese in clerical and auxiliary 
positions in support of the police action (N. G. Kim 1997). And while the Korean War 
was responsible for a large share of the cash influx, military expenditures largely prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities overcame what would have been a $1.4 billion deficit between 
September 1945 and December 1950 (Hunsberger 1997). GARIOA aid totaled almost $1 
billion through mid-1948 (N. G. Kim 1997, J. B. Cohen 1948) and $2 billion through 
1949 (Dower 1999). To say that the United States financed Japan’s “economic miracle” 
would be an accurate but incomplete statement. One could argue without hyperbole that 
the United States essentially underwrote the Japanese economy during first decades of 
the new regime.  
Even though the occupation’s original ideological concern was right-wing 
extremism, before long Washington and SCAP reoriented policy towards reigning in the 
very active left wing of the Japanese political spectrum. Left-wing political activity began 
soon after MacArthur ordered the release of political prisoners in late 1945, and first 
became disruptive in the “Food May Day” protests of May 1946. MacArthur’s response 
was a ban on certain types of political assembly (Maki 1947). He specifically enjoined 
against a general strike planned for February 1, 1947, which (as a testament to the 
authority which MacArthur had acquired in Japan) subsequently failed to materialize 
(Ibid, Dower 1999, Tsuzuki 2000, Morley 1967, Caprio and Sugita 2007). By the fall of 
1947, the majority of publications under prior censorship by Civil Censorship 
Detachment were leftist at this point, signaling a shift in their concern from extreme 
right-wing elements to the extreme (and sometimes less extreme) left (Dower 1999). In 
the summer of 1948, MacArthur withdrew the right to strike from labor unions and began 
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purging left-wing politicians, civil servants and news professionals (Ibid, Caprio and 
Sugita 2007). Between mid-1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War, SCAP blacklisted 
11,000 union activists, resulting in their dismissal (Dower 1999). They did so despite the 
order New Years Eve 1949, in which the occupation authorities formally (if not factually) 
relinquished their jurisdiction over civilian activities (Park 1949). SCAP’s campaign 
against the far left plateaued just before the Korean War; MacArthur ordered the purge of 
the leadership of the Japanese Communist Party in May, ordered its dissolution in June, 
and purged all JCP members from government, industry and the media on June 6 and 7 
(Caprio and Sugita 2007, Dower 1999, Moore and Robinson 2002, Tsuzuki 2000, Morley 
1967).57 The day after North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, SCAP closed 
hundreds of left-wing newspapers and blacklisted 700 journalists (Dower 1999). The 
ideological reverse course was complete by July 1950, when MacArthur de-purged 
10,900 personnel who were originally banned from public service by the anti-Showa 
purges of the early days of the occupation (Morley 1967, Eiji 2002, Tsuzuki 2000, 
Quigley 1951). 
The politico-economic reverse course began in late 1947, as a growing contingent 
in the Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council and State Department came 
to oppose the anti-Zaibatsu policy, the disarmament doctrine, pro-labor ordinances, and 
57 In fact, Japanese authorities never followed through on MacArthur’s order to 
permanently dissolve the Japanese Communist Party (McNelly 1965). They did not need 
to. The purges drove officials into hiding and censorship prevented the JCP from 
communicating with its constituency or drumming up electoral support. Because the JCP 
had committed to an electoral rather than revolutionary strategy, the party received no 
support from Moscow or Beijing (and in fact resulted in their denunciation by the 
Comintern and Mao Zedong; Dower 1999). Lacking access to electoral channels, 
financial support from abroad, and having eschewed violent revolution as a path to 
power, the party could not have survived even if MacArthur had not specifically 
mandated their dissolution. 
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any other policies that conceivably hindered the reconfiguration of Japan as a powerful 
and prosperous Cold War ally. It in the fall of 1947 that Army Undersecretary Draper and 
special advisor George Kennan launched dual campaigns to effect a “reverse course” in 
occupation policy (Barnet 1983, Tsuzuki 2000, G. F. Kennan 1967). Over the next two 
years, SCAP halted demilitarization and the de-monopolization of Japan (Caprio and 
Sugita 2007, Barnhart 2007, Wilkins 1982, Eiji 2002, G. F. Kennan 1967). By late fall 
1948, official US policy on Japan called for a rebuilding of a dual police/self-defense 
force and drastic anti-inflation, pro-growth measures including a balanced budget 
(Williams 1968, Barnet 1983, Eiji 2002). In April 1949, SCAP imposed the “Dodge 
Line,” named after special advisor and banker Joseph Dodge. The Dodge Line 
established a fixed (and artificially undervalued) yen-to-dollar exchange rate, required a 
balanced budget, and drastically cut payrolls for nationalized industries (Tsuzuki 2000, 
Dower 1999). A month later, the US announced its intention to halt reparations delivery, 
much to the chagrin of FEC members (such as China and the Philippines) set to receive 
them (Reday 1949, Morley 1967). 
Finally, the Korean War provided the strongest impetus for remilitarization and 
the most substantial levels of American economic assistance. In July 1950, MacArthur 
ordered the Japanese to recruit a 75,000-man National Police Reserve, to serve as a 
domestic police force and as a military reserve (Article IX’s ban on militarized self-
defense notwithstanding; Auer 1990, Eiji 2002, Bey and Kataoka 1985, Moore and 
Robinson 2002). One of SCAP’s final acts was to lift the prohibition on arms production 
in Japan, in March 1952 (Morley 1967). The Japanese acceded to American demands for 
remilitarization as a condition for the conclusion of a peace treaty, and would continue to 
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expand their commitment to national defense after the occupation (N. G. Kim 1997, 
Morley 1967). In the course of enforcing the UN mandate, the United States made use of 
1,212 Japanese military installations and injected $2.2 billion into the Japanese economy 
due to “special procurement,” or the purchase of Japanese goods and services in support 
of the war effort (Barnet 1983, Morley 1967). 
On the domestic front, the American forces reinforced the prospects of the 
optimal winning coalition by marginalizing political extremists, shoring up the prospects 
of the center, and economically strengthening the optimal winning coalition’s main 
constituency. By eliminating anti-democratic challengers, and by enriching pro-
democratic constituencies, the occupiers improved the chances that the new regime 
would successfully consolidate. The occupation was successful in narrowing the 
spectrum of acceptable political contestation.  Moreover, this support—economic support 
especially—represented an investment in the future of Japan: yet another costly and 
credible signal that the United States was committed to the long-term future of a 
democratic Japanese state.  
 
Domestic Outcomes 
 As with West Germany, postwar Japan rates a 10/10 on the Polity IV scale in 
every year following the return to sovereignty (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The electoral 
history of the Japanese occupation begins in November 1945, when political parties 
return to the scene following SCAP’s “freedom of expression” ordinance (Tsuzuki 2000, 
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Morley 1967).58 They and their candidates competed in the first postwar elections on 
April 10, 1946, prior to the drafting of a new constitution but after SCAP had purged the 
militarists and ultranationalists from the voter rolls and mandated universal adult suffrage 
(Borton 1948b, Dower 1999, Caprio and Sugita 2007, Moore and Robinson 2002, Wells 
1948). While the victorious parties in this election were the same associations that had 
backed the Emperor in the previous regime, they had sloughed off their anti-democratic 
elements and pledged to support MacArthur’s vision for a more open Japanese political 
system. None was publicly or privately committed to a resurrection of an autocratic 
regime. Among those who appeared on the ballot, 95% had never before held office 
(Dower 1999). Turnover was a staggering 80% (Tsuzuki 2000). With only small gains for 
the far left (if there was one—the JCP is rather moderate as far as Communist parties go) 
one should consider the April 1946 elections a victory for the optimal winning coalition. 
The elections placed Yoshida (Japanese Liberal Party) in the premiership, where he 
helped shepherd through the constitution proposed by SCAP (Morley 1967, Dower 1999, 
Moore and Robinson 2002, Tsuzuki 2000, H 1949). 
 The April 1947 election, the first under the new constitution, was another win for 
the optimal winning coalition. The three most successful parties in the second postwar 
elections were the Democratic Party, the Japanese Liberal Party, and the Japanese 
Socialist Party (Morley 1967, Abe, Shindō and Kawato 1994, Richardson 1997). The 
platforms of the Liberals and Democrats were largely indistinguishable, and would 
eventually merge to form the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. These were right-of-
58 Prior to the April 1946 elections, the Emperor established a caretaker government, 
placing the cabinet under Prince Higashikuni, and later Prince Shidehara (Tsuzuki 2000, 
Morley 1967, Moore and Robinson 2002; Dower 1999; Caprio and Sugita 2007).  
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center, bourgeois democratic parties. (Tsuzuki 2000, H 1949, Borton 1948b). The 
Japanese Socialist Party would vacillate between its radical and moderate leftist phases 
throughout the occupation and thereafter, but at this point was largely a proletarian 
democratic party. They renounced violent revolution and adopted an electoral strategy 
(as, in fact, had the Japanese Communist Party; McNelly 1965, Borton 1948b; Dower 
1999). The left-of-center Cooperative Party, which also drew votes, was a minor left-of-
center party (H 1949). The strong showing of the JSP allowed it to form its first and only 
cabinet (Dower 1999, Borton 1948b, Tsuzuki 2000, Caprio and Sugita 2007). This 
cabinet lasted little over a year, and fell in May 1947 after falling out of favor with GHQ 
(as they became less enchanted with Japan’s left-wing) and the electorate (after failing to 
stem inflation and solve other general economic problems; Morley 1967, Borton 1948b, 
H 1949). Ashida (Democratic Party) formed a new cabinet that would itself fail, replaced 
by Yoshida’s second government (Morley 1967, Moore and Robinson 2002, H 1949, 
Williams 1968). 
 The conservatives consolidated their power over the next two elections. Despite a 
strong showing (9.7%) for the Japanese Communist Party in January 1949, the 
conservatives absorbed a great deal of the constituency that had previously supported the 
JCP and JSP. The Democratic-Liberals took home 43.9% of the vote in that election and 
a full majority (59.5%) in October 1952, the final election before the end of the 
occupation (Morley 1967, Abe, Shindō and Kawato 1994, Richardson 1997). These 
elections ushered in the third, fourth and fifth Yoshida cabinets (Morley 1967). This 
pattern, where the conservative parties would win a combined majority in each election 
and dominated the cabinet, continued nearly unabated through the end of the observation 
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period (Ibid, Tsuzuki 2000, Dionisopoulos 1957). The exception is January 1967, when 
the Liberal Democrats won “only” 49% of the popular vote (Morley 1967, Abe, Shindō 
and Kawato 1994, Richardson 1997). One interesting trend was the continued support the 
Japanese Socialist Party received in each of these elections, even during years when the 
moderate wing split off and the JSP looked rather similar to the JSP.59 Throughout the 
period, the JSP and the LDP essentially split the electorate to establish a two party 
system, but the JSP was always the second party (Mendel 1966, Auer 1990, Crespo 1995, 
Okudaira 1990, McNelly 1965, Dionisopoulos 1957). The electoral history of the 
observation period is one in which semi-optimal parties would sometimes challenge for a 
double-digit share of the electorate, but one in which the optimal winning coalition 
dominated an a truly suboptimal threat was essentially non-existent. 
 
59 The radical wing dominated the JSP during the elections of 1952, 1953, 1955 and 1967 
(Morley 1967, McNelly 1965, Tsuzuki 2000). In these years the study counts the 
Socialists as semi-optimal rather than part of the optimal winning coalition. 
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Sources: James W Morley. Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific. 1965. Walker and 
Company, New York; Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindō and Sadafumi Kawato (translated by James 
W White). The Government and Politics of Japan. 1994. University of Tokyo. Tokyo; Bradley 
Richardson. Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance. 1997. Yale 
University. New Haven, CT, USA. 
 
The occupation was not without its civil unrest. The first year or so was 
characterized by an insufficient food supply and several accounts of starvation. Likewise, 
there were several protests and the occasional violent confrontation stemming from 
grievances along these lines. The first instance of political action against the food 
shortage occurred in October 9, 1945, when fifteen women comprising a group known as 
the “Housewives Association” petitioned for an increase in the rice ration (Dower 1999). 
The demonstrations escalated through May 1946. On May Day, 500,000 gathered in 
Tokyo (and another three quarters million across Japan) in protest of the small food 




















































































Figure 4.2: Performance of the Optimal and Suboptimal Coalitions in 




imperial palace on the 12th to direction petition the Emperor for more rice (Ibid). The 
most remarkable of the protest occurred on May 19, known as the “Food May Day.” A 
quarter million demonstrated in front of the Imperial Palace in protest of the rationing 
system, posing enough of a threat that MacArthur was forced to intervene by force. The 
event was significant enough to convince the Japanese government to reform the rice 
collection system resulting in a significant increase in yield (Ibid). As significant as these 
events were, the food protests abated as the food supply improved. 
 However, the vast majority of disturbances during the occupation arose from 
dissatisfaction from Japan’s newly enfranchised left wing. In December 1945, SCAP 
allowed the formation of trade unions. A side effect of the introduction of workplace 
democracy was an increase in leftist radicalism (Dower 1999). On April 7, 1945, the first 
clash between leftists and the authorities occurred in Tokyo. Fifty thousand 
demonstrators attempted to gain access to Prime Minister Shidehara’s residence in order 
to issue a list of demands. Local police fired into the crowd hoping to disperse them, 
resulting in several injuries and only pushing the crowd further toward the residence. 
American troops intervened, settled the disturbance, and let a delegation of thirteen issue 
their demands to the premier (Ibid). Just over a month later, a peaceful demonstration 
among students and university professors called for the removal of “war criminals” from 
higher education and offered their assistance for doing so (Ibid). These demonstrations 
were but a prelude to what was supposed to be the mother of all demonstrations on 
February 1, 1947. Throughout January, union after union pledged to join part in a general 
strike on the First of February in response to both food shortages and high 
unemployment. By the end of the month, unions comprising three million workers were 
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set to strike throughout Japan. It was only MacArthur’s intervention on January 31 that 
prevented the strike from occurring (Ibid, Maki 1947, Tsuzuki 2000, Morley 1967, 
Caprio and Sugita 2007). 
 The failed general strike would not be the last confrontation between the 
occupation authorities and the Japanese left. The more violent confrontation took longer 
to develop, and was an indirect result of the Dodge Line economic reforms. Dodge’s call 
for liberalization resulted in a balanced budget and massive public sector layoffs, 
including 126,000 workers of the national railway in July 1949 (Tsuzuki 2000). The 
ensuing dispute between the railway workers, the Japanese government and the American 
occupation authorities resulted in episodes of sabotage resulting in several deaths by 
runaway train accidents. The president of the railway disappeared for a time, his body 
eventually found mangled and beaten. While the deaths were originally attributed to 
agitation by Communists, there is some evidence that the sabotage was actually the result 
of American agents looking to discredit both the JCP and the workers (Ibid). This 
intrigue foreshadowed a more violent turn in anti-government activity and government 
response. A confrontation between JCP partisans and American GIs on May 30, 1950 left 
four Americans injured and eight Communists arrested (Dower 1999). On May Day 
1952, police repelled protesters demonstrating in protest of rearmament in Tokyo with 
tear gas and pistols. Twenty-two protesters sustained injuries, two died. Eight hundred 
policemen and four American GIs sustained injuries (Ibid, Tsuzuki 2000). 
 It was not until the near-end of the occupation, with the end of the purge and the 
beginning of the de-purge, that right-wing extremism became a problem (Morley 1967). 
The late 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a rise in right-wing extremism, including 
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the advent of right-wing youth organizations and terrorist groups responsible for the 
occasional assassination attempt (Ibid, Tsuzuki 2000). This is not unexpected when one 
takes the de-purge into account. MacArthur essentially lifts the constraints on political 
contestation as concerns the right wing, and the Marginal Value Model expects that this 
would produce characteristics of an imperfectly consolidated regime. This type of anti-
democratic activity was not a common characteristic of the occupation or the years 
immediately following, nor did the far right ever seem to pose a serious threat to the 
stability of democratic politics in the new Japan either during the occupation or after. 
This may, however, explain why Japan’s consolidated democracy was exceptionally 
conservative (compared to Germany’s) and why there was so little party turnover (an 
indicator of an unstable democracy according to Huntington 1991).60  
 
60 There are some who offer that Japan’s centralized, conservative style of government 
does not qualify as a democracy at all. Bradley Richardson (1997) is among them. That 
the Liberal Democrats held the government between 1955 and 1993 (Crespo 1995) 
supports those who claim that Japan was more a single-party state than a competitive 
democracy.  This conflicts with Japan’s polity score (+10) from the year the state 
regained sovereignty through the present day (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The data 
indicate that Marshall and Jaggers are in fact correct on this matter, though there are 
irregularities. The LDP’s ratification strategy for the 1960 US-Japan security treaty 
employed tactics that were constitutionally questionable (Destler, et al. 1976; Barnet 
1983), while the 1950 electoral law allowed the LDP to gerrymader ridiculously 
disproportionate and favorable electoral districts (Hata 1990). Others, like S. Sidney 
Ulmer (1957) may cite the lack of democratization at the local level as evidence that 
Japanese democracy is not “deep” and, therefore, unconsolidated. Regardless, these 
irregularities do not indicate that Japan was not a democracy by modern standards; in 
even the most advanced and consolidated democracies there is broad distribution of states 
across proportionality, legislative behavior and centralization variables. Moreover, the 
fact that there was no party turnover in postwar Japan is not in and of itself proof that 
party turnover is restricted due to the actions of the ruling party or non-democratic 
institutions; one must consider the possibility that the LDP secretariat was exceptionally 
adept at identifying and wooing the median voter. By the Polity standard that this thesis 
relies on, executive and legislative recruitment remain open, indicating that Japan is 
indeed a democracy. 
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Summation 
 The Polity IV data hold that Japan emerged from the occupation a democratic 
state, a status it holds at the present (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Along with (West) 
Germany, Japan is among the most successful examples of democratization and 
liberalization (but not, in this case, social progressivism) of our day. Also like West 
Germany, the Japan case meets the marginal security model’s conditions for successful 
democratization. The advent of the Cold War in Asia and the very “hot” war in Korea re-
established the threat environment that had driven Japan to modernization, militarization 
and empire at the turn of the century. The United States, essentially the sole occupying 
force, convincingly established itself as Japan’s closest ally despite the mutual hostility 
they shared during WWII. A threat arose, and the United States rose to face it. The 
Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and General Headquarters imposed a 
democratic constitution, then took many of the necessary steps to neutralize the new 
regimes enemies, both real and potential. The winning coalition that emerged was 
ultimately supportive of the occupation policy and the conditions of the peace. 
 
 
Reconciliation of Competing Hypotheses 
 The events of the case support H1, although perhaps the relationship is not as 
strong as it is in the case of West Germany. Civil unrest is more common prior to the 
Korean War and in the earliest days of the occupation when the nation was on the brink 
of famine. The food protests subside once the US intervenes to increase food production 
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and when Washington increases economic aid, and the left-wing unrest subsided after the 
US aligned against Japan’s traditional enemies (Russia, China) in Korea. The model itself 
has trouble explaining the rise of left-wing challenges in the late 1940s, other than the 
fact that the occupation authorities were initially less concerned about addressing anti-
government activity from that side of the political spectrum. Moreover, the electoral 
indicators do not conform as well as the extra-parliamentary indicators. While the strong 
performance of the Socialists in 1947 indicates a negative reaction against the 
occupation’s shortcomings vis-à-vis food economics, unemployment and its continued 
presence in the absence of a strong, explicit foreign threat, the Japanese Socialist Party 
still counts as a pro-democracy faction at that point in time, if only barely. The 
Communist Party’s unique success in the 1949 election directly contradicts H1, as the US 
occupation seemed to be producing marginal security by that point. Perhaps it took the 
very real threat of the Korean War, rather than the vague threat of historic tensions 
between Japan and the mainland Asian states, in order for the Japanese to perceive the 
marginal security value that the occupation was producing. Perhaps also, the persistence 
of the semi-optimal coalition (sometimes the JCP alone, sometimes the JCP and JSP) 
results from the fact that the threat from the mainland was implicit, based on historical 
memory, rather than explicit, based on direct threats and signals of hostile intent.  
 As noted above, the case does resonate with some competing hypotheses. 
However, the marginal security model remains stronger in tests against the historical 
record while subsuming some competing explanations. As in the case of West Germany, 
the demilitarization and delegitimation hypotheses explain part of the case but not all of 
it. The occupation remilitarized Japan almost as quickly as it demilitarized Japan, and in 
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self-help, anarchic world, it is necessary to take both sides of the coin into account. This 
is as far as I will discuss this thesis, as its shortcomings are identical to those in the 
previous chapter. Coyne’s hypothesis on the retention of Japanese institutions is difficult 
to test due to a lack of explicit observable implications that derive from a well-wrought 
model. However, one should allow that the retention of certain institutions did solve a 
coordination dilemma, if not necessarily the credibility dilemma. Furthermore, it is 
implausible that retaining institutions can solve the credible commitment dilemma if the 
occupation does not responsibly employ these institutions to improve the perceived 
welfare of the state. As is always the case in democratic politics, the existence and 
persistence of institutions matter less than the way in which powerful actors utilize and 
operate within said institutions to realize their preferences. The prewar modernization 
hypothesis is a far more convincing explanation about how Japan became a developed 
state than about how Japan became a democratic state. The path of modernization can 
lead to either democracy or autocracy, though in most cases we must accept that the path 
towards democracy begins with modernization. Other variables must intervene to decide 
the fate of modernized states, and the marginal security model olds that threat 




 An analysis of the case of Japanese democratization is not complete without an 
analysis of the economic situation. Compared to both German cases, however, the 
situation is far more clear-cut. Democracy arose before Japan’s “economic miracle” and 
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appears to have stabilized quickly. What’s more, said “miracle” is even more obviously a 
result of American policy in the region than in the other cases. The first years of the 
occupation were plagued with inflation, unemployment and underwhelming growth. The 
tide turned with an influx in aid, with the Korean War, and with the eventual success of 
organic economic reconstruction. 
 Inflation was a persistent dilemma through 1949. During the course of the war, 
the yen-to-dollar exchange rate increased from ¥3.4 to ¥13.6, an annualized rate of just 
over 30%—high but not nearly as high as what was to come. The rate more than doubled 
by the end of the year, doubled again by September 1946, once again by June 1947, and 
once more by September 1948 until the Dodge Line set the exchange rate at ¥360 to $1 in 
June 1949 (T. Cohen 1987). In an attempt to contain inflation, the American authorities 
established a command economy with controlled prices, production quotas and rationing. 
However, SCAP increased these prices over time in order to keep pace with the black 
market that inevitably developed alongside the official economy. Official prices doubled 
between the onset of the occupation and the conclusion of 1945, increased a whopping 
539% in 1946, 256% in 1947 and 127% in 1948 (Dower 1999). Official prices were so 
artificially low at first that, despite an inflation rate that exceeded that of the yen-to-dollar 
exchange rate, they still remained one half as high as market prices by 1949 (Ibid). 
Understandably, underground trade flourished throughout Japan during this period, and 
landowners were at first slow to fulfill the mandated rice quotas which supplied the 





Source: Theodore Cohen. Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal. 1987. The 
Free Press. New York 
 
 SCAP employed a stick-and-carrot approach to prevent the diversion of staples to 
the black market. Sensing that market prices were too quickly outpacing the official 
prices, the military government doubled the payment to farmers for rice and other staples 
in November 1946 (Dower 1999). Regardless, collections fulfilled only 60-85% of the 
quota, depending on the prefecture. In addition to wartime devastation, unusually 
inclement weather, and the lures of the black market, suspicion of the military 
authorities’ rationing program encouraged hoarding (Fuchs 2007). The official adult 
staple ration in the 1946 harvest year equaled 1,000-1,100 kcal/day, half the 





















































Figure 4.3: Inflation in Occupied Japan: Yen to Dollar Exchange Rate, 1945-
1950
$1 buys (left) Annualized Inflation Rate (Right)
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(Ibid, Dower 1999). In reality, there were months that the true ration was well below 
these levels due to problems in the distribution system (Ibid). Food imports from abroad, 
many of which had come from Japan’s mainland holdings in Asia—especially Korea—
had dwindled to barely a third of their wartime peak (Fuchs 2007). MacArthur in January 
1946 warned Washington that Japan was on the edge of famine, and that such a disaster 
would decimate the lower and middle classes, engender political subversion, and perhaps 
even spark an uprising (Ibid). 
 Aware that the carrot was not producing the intended effect, SCAP turned to the 
stick. In February 1946, SCAP announced that they would seize undelivered rice, with 
the farmers compensated at the official price. That same year, SCAP ordered the 
Japanese government to pass the land reform law, making arable land that had been the 
property of absentee landlords available to production (Tsuzuki 2000, H 1949, Fuchs 
2007). These reforms, and a bumper crop (Fuchs 2007), improved the situation in 1947. 
The government, at the behest of GHQ, introduced incentives for delivering quotas early 
(Ibid). Meanwhile, GHQ threatened that, without a production increased, there would be 
no additional aid from the US forthcoming (Ibid). In the 1947 harvest year, collections 
equaled 107% of the quota (Fuchs 2007). The situation would improve in 1948 and 
thereafter (Braibanti 1948, Dower 1999). By 1948, Japan was emerging from the shadow 
of impending famine, but by no means was it a kernel of the economic powerhouse it 
would eventually become. 
 The imposition of the Dodge Line was harsh medicine. While it did contain 
inflation and the government spending that was partly driving it, it did so at a substantial 
cost. In 1947, the government employed fully 25% of the work force (Barnet 1983). Over 
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400,000 workers lost their jobs when the government cut public sector employment in 
1949 (Tsuzuki 2000). And despite Dodge’s professed goal of driving exports to the 
United States, Japan’s dollar reserves actually declined through 1950 (Barnhart 2007). A 
global recession prevented Japanese producers from taking advantage of its artificially 
high exchange rate, and as a result bankruptcies increased and inventories went unsold 
(Barnet 1983). The situation was such that US News and World Report predicted Japan to 
be on the verge of economic collapse as late as April 1950 (Dower 1999), and local 
mainstream publications considered the Dodge Line an unmitigated disaster (Barnet 
1983). Finally, inflation in the yen-to-dollar exchange rate was trending steadily 
downward over the course of the occupation (T. Cohen 1987), so one wonders whether 
the new policy was necessary for reigning in inflation in the first place. 
 Regardless of the virtues of the Dodge Line, Japan’s recovery began in 1950 due 
to the increase in demand resulting from the onset of war on the Korean Peninsula. It the 
war that helped drive the 80% rise in the Japanese stock market between June 1950 and 
December 1951 (Dower 1999), that boosted steel production by 38% and tripled exports 
(Ibid), that returned industrial production to prewar levels (N. G. Kim 1997, Eiji 2002, 
Morley 1967) and that turned Japan’s balance of payments positive for the first time 
under the occupation (N. G. Kim 1997). American dollars flowed into Japan through 
traditional market channels as well as through special procurement and direct assistance. 
In May 1950, the Japanese government passed the Law Concerning Foreign Investments, 
allowing US foreign direct investment into the country so long as American firms pair 
with Japanese concerns (Wilkins 1982). US FDI was a small contributor during the 
period of observation, however, barely totaling $100 million (Ibid). 
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In conclusion, one cannot rely purely on economic hypotheses to explain the 
consolidation of democracy in Japan. For starters, one should not get carried away with 
these numbers. Despite the war boom, real per-capita income remained below prewar 
levels through the end of the occupation, and total trade remained about 50% of 1934 
levels in 1952 (Morley 1967). As noted above, Japan would have run a near-perennial 
trade deficit for over a decade post-occupation were it not for the influx of American 
money. It was not until 1955, the first year that GNP surpassed prewar levels, when the 
boom would truly begin (Tsuzuki 2000).61 Additionally, the optimal winning coalition 
received strong domestic support even during the poorest years of postwar Japan. Finally, 
Japan’s growth largely depended upon pragmatic expenditures and purchases by the 
occupying forces. Economic drivers simply do not correlate well enough with outcomes 
to serve as a viable explanation, let alone an independent one, while it is impossible to 
separate Japan’s postwar boom from the reality of Japan’s postwar occupation. The 
marginal security model, on the other hand, fits better from a correlative as well as 
causative perspective.  
 
Summation of Findings and Conclusion 
 This case is confirmatory of the hypothesis, although not as convincingly as the 
case of the Federal Republic of Germany. The historical record indicates that the United 
States, during the occupation of Japan, was able to produce marginal security. The threat 
environment was primarily implicit rather than explicit—no powers in the region directly 
attacked Japan or signaled a desire to compromise Japan’s already compromised 
61 And it was not until 1965 that real incomes caught up with the trajectory implied by the 
prewar growth rate (Passin 1990). 
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territorial integrity. Rather, the biggest threats to Japan were the same threats that 
preoccupied Japan prior to WWII and for the last three generations: the sleeping giants of 
China and Russia. What changed following WWII was Japan’s vulnerable position—
without an army, a navy, or an empire—the names of the People’s Republic and the 
Soviet Union, and the alliance they forged at the dawn of the 1950s. When Soviet-backed 
North Korea, and later the People’s Republic of China, invaded the Korean peninsula, the 
implied threat became that much greater. 
After half a century of imposing its will on the Korean Peninsula in an attempt to 
expand its influence onto the mainland, Japan’s mainland security competitors were on 
the verge of controlling the “dagger” aimed at its heart. The United States, initially 
reluctant to commit to Japan’s future (or to take on any of the responsibilities of a global 
superpower), transformed from enemy to ally by rebuilding Japan’s self-defense 
capability and deploying its own forces to the Pacific Rim, long term. These actions, in 
addition to economic assistance and military procurement, credibly signaled their 
commitment, thus producing marginal security. The production of marginal security, plus 
the state-building work of General MacArthur and the office of the Supreme 
Commander, served to narrow the acceptable range of political contestation. It was under 
these circumstances that the new Japanese regime appeared to consolidate. 
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Chapter 5: Weimar Germany, 1919-1933 
Introduction 
The case of the Weimar Germany is an unfortunate one, a failure. The military 
occupations of the German Rhineland under the United States, United Kingdom and 
France began in November and December 1918 (Wright 1919, Dawson 1933, Cornebise 
1982, Williamson 1991). The military governments remained in place until the Inter-
allied Rhineland High Commission (IARHC)—with delegates from the US, UK, France 
and Belgium—took control on January 10, 1920 (Williams 1991, Pawley 2007). In 
addition to the direct occupation of the Rhineland, the occupying powers retained control 
of foreign policy for the whole of Germany and reserved the right to post troops in 
initially unoccupied areas should Germany fail to meet the conditions of the Treaty of 
Versailles (Ibid). France and Belgium expanded their occupation to the Ruhr on January 
11, 1923, prompting the exit of the US delegation and marking the end of the US 
occupation of the Rhineland (Ibid, Lauterbach 1944, Nelson 1970, Cornebise 1981, 
Mommsen 1996, O’Riordan 2005). The UK, France and Belgium continued to exercise 
legal control over the German armed forces (Reichswehr) through January 31, 1927 and 
direct control over the Rhenish territories through June 30, 1930, when the occupation 
came to a close (Kolb 1988, Williamson 1991, Mommsen 1996, Webster 2006, Pawley 
2007). The period of observation thus begins in 1918, but ends in 1933 when the 




Cohesion was weak among the occupying forces. As the historical record will 
show, the occupying powers generally retained broad authority in their zones (as 
compared to the way in which the allies coordinated policy in Germany following 
WWII). Moreover, the IARHC split into two blocs: the Franco-Belgian bloc, which 
favored a more punitive approach to the occupation, and the Anglo-American bloc, which 
was less interested in wringing concessions out of Germany at Versailles and was 
generally reluctant to cite Germany for treaty violations and follow through on 
punishments. Of the four occupiers, the US was keener on democracy promotion than the 
other states, followed by the UK. France and Belgium appear generally uninterested in 
the type of German regime so long as it was weak and incapable of expansion. 
The pair of economic crises that brought serious hardship to the German people 
heavily dominates the Weimar case. Therefore, to support the hypothesis, the historical 
record must indicate that the behavior of the occupiers significantly contributed to 
domestic unrest, the dwindling share of the optimal winning coalition and the success of 
extreme, anti-democratic parties in a way that is independent or causally prior to 
economic variables. 62 
62 The winning coalition includes the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German 
Democratic Party (DDP), and the Zentrum for most of its existence in this case. 
Parliamentary government had been a longstanding part of the SPD program, while the 
DDP was formed specifically by pro-democracy elements of both the wartime 
Progressives and DVP. The Zentrum’s platform emphasized the importance of 
democratic politics as a basic criterion of Christian government. The Communists (KPD), 
Independent Socialists (USPD), Social Democrats (SPD), Democrats (DDP), Catholic 
Center (Zentrum), and Liberals (DVP) were all opposed to the Kaiser’s regime by the 
time the war ended, but the sub-optimal KPD and semi-optimal USPD and the (post-
WWI iteration of the) DVP all rejected representative democracy and so fall outside the 
optimal winning coalition. The sub-optimal Nationalists (DNVP) vehemently opposed 
democracy and suffered greatly from the loss of the abolition of special privileges for the 
Junker nobility, a key demographic of Nationalist support. The Nazis (NSDAP, and the 
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True, the Great Depression ultimately brought down the Weimar Republic, but by 
1933, democracy in Germany was a collapsing edifice, mortally weakened but still 
standing; the global economic crisis yielded only the final push that brought down a 
once-promising structure. Below, I shall test the working hypotheses against the case 
history, as well as test the competing hypothesis. I will then demonstrate how the 
marginal welfare model is a superior approach to understanding the case by 
demonstrating how the competing hypotheses are unsupported or are subsumed by the 
Marginal Value Model. This case will reinforce the premise that nascent democracies in 
occupied territories require an occupation that protects the new regime from foreign 
threats and reinforces the optimal winning coalition. 
 
 
Rival Hypotheses versus Case History 
Rival Hypothesis: Institutional Design 
 It would be overly comprehensive to summarize the exhaustive body of literature 
blaming the Weimar Republic’s institutional design for the fall of the regime, so I will 
produce a sample of that literature here. Three pillars of the Weimar regime sustain the 
lion’s share of criticism: the astonishingly open Weimar party system, which established 
a very low barrier to entry for political parties in the Reichstag; direct democracy, in the 
form of the direct election of the reichpresident and in the referendum system; and 
Article 48, which conferred emergency powers on the reichpresident in the event of 
precursor DAP) were not a major force in German politics at the time, winning their first 
Reichstag delegates in 1924 (Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg 1994). 
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extreme civil strife (German National Assembly 1919, Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg 1994). 
Put together, these institutions amplified each other’s failures. The indecisiveness of 
parliamentary government in Weimar Germany in moments of crisis is what prompted 
the votes for emergency government in the first place. The direct election, and lengthy 
term, for the reichpresident resulted in the translation of an overactive populism into a 
presidency controlled by a leader without acceptable democratic credentials. 
The most obvious flaw of the Weimar Constitution was the provision granting 
emergency powers, which is the legal construct Adolf Hitler eventually used to prosecute 
his “legal coup.” While the clause was supposed to apply only to widespread civil strife, 
the Reichstag expanded the operational definition of civil strife with each invocation 
(Lindseth 2004). While it is self-evident that a clause granting broad executive powers 
can lead to a constitutional crisis and the collapse of a democratic regime, it is by no 
means certain that it will. The Weimar Constitution was not the first republican 
constitution with an emergency clause, and it will not be the last. Moreover, democratic 
regimes without emergency clauses often force leaders to assume powers not granted, 
precipitating a constitutional crisis of another color (see Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas 
Corpus in the American Civil War). Emergency authority leads to a regime collapse only 
once the regime is captured by anti-democratic forces, at which point we could already 
assume the regime is in trouble. 
 Elements of direct democracy in the Weimar Constitution are a common target for 
criticism of the founding document. Combined with the seven-year presidential term, and 
the emergency powers the reichpresident may come to enjoy, the directly elected 
presidency can result in severe political instability. As Linz (1990) notes, the direct 
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election of presidents crystalizes winning coalitions an extended period of time (again, in 
this case, seven years) with no hope of realignment or reconfiguration. This can lead to a 
crisis of legitimacy, should a crisis lead to a shift in the preferences of the electorate, 
especially if the president unwilling to seek a domestic consensus. While this is not 
exactly the story of the Weimar, the presidential system did elevate Paul von 
Hindenburg—a popular figure with clear disdain for the constitution under which he 
ruled—to a position in which he used his emergency authorities to pave the way for 
Adolf Hitler. As luck would have it, the second presidential election under the Weimar 
Constitution occurred in 1932, during the depths of the Great Depression, translating the 
full force of populist furor into the most powerful office in the land. It is impossible to 
ignore the role that this institution played in Weimar Germany’s failure to consolidate. 
 Finally, the ease at which political parties could gain access to the Reichstag, and 
the resultant parliamentary fractionalization and gridlock, receives a fair amount of blame 
for the ineffectiveness of the legislative body (Grumm 1958, Kuechler 1992). Gridlock in 
the Reichstag led to minority (unelected) governments in 1922, 1926 and then from 1930 
through Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 (Kolb 1988). In one notable instance, the 
Reichstag’s indecisiveness in dealing with the Great Inflation and the Great Depression 
drove contemporary thinker Carl Schmitt’s (1988) criticism of the regime and later 
influenced his allegiance to the National Socialists. As the theory goes, the Reichstag’s 
ineffectiveness led to a sense of disenfranchisement among the German populace—
especially among the lower-class agrarian population and the professional middle class 
(Childers 1976, Bendix 1953, Lipset 1963). Without an outlet, these constituencies 
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instead channeled their frustration into the populist movements that swept Adolf Hitler 
into power (Berman 1997). 
  
Rival Hypothesis: Demilitarization 
 The demilitarization hypothesis (J. J. Linz 1990, Stepan 1991, Grimm 2008) 
presented in the previous chapters applies to the Weimar case as much as it applies to the 
post-WWI Japan and German cases. Whereas the occupying dismantled the war making 
capabilities of both Japan and Germany after WWII, the Allied and Associated Forces 
(AAF, including the US, UK, France and Belgium) failed to do so in Germany after 
WWI—and not for lack of trying. Disarmament was a major component of occupation 
policy. Britain’s Prime Minister Lloyd George initially suggested disarmament at 
Versailles as an alternative to the occupation of the Rhineland, but diplomatic 
maneuvering on the part of French Prime Minister Clemenceau led to a peace that 
included both disarmament and occupation. The disarmament clauses required Germany 
to destroy offensive weaponry and maintain an army of no greater than 100,000, a ban on 
conscription, with soldiers serving twelve-year contracts. (Willamson 1991, Diehl 1977). 
The occupiers would monitor Germany’s progress on disarmament, which was 
perpetually satisfactory to the UK and unsatisfactory to France (Willamson 1991). 
Ultimately, the demand for unilateral disarmament encouraged Germany to seek 
cooperation with the only external security partner willing to help rearm the Weimar 
Republic: Russia (Gatzke 1958, Kolb, The Weimar Republic 1988, Nicholls 1991, 
Mommsen 1996). In 1927, the Inter-Allied Military Control Council (or IAMCC, the 
organization in charge of disarmament and monitoring) transferred monitoring 
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responsibilities to the equally clueless League of Nations and subsequently dissolved 
(Kolb 1988, Webster 2006). Germany had already been secretly rearming for years. 
 In addition to the AAF’s failure to disarm Germany, they also turned a blind eye 
to the composition of the Weimar Republic’s military establishment. When domestic 
security began to collapse at the end of the Kaiserreich and the beginning of the 
Republic, the new republican government turned to the military establishment of the old 
regime in order to maintain order (Diehl 1977, Mommsen 1996). There was no Weimar 
equivalent to denazification. Instead, AAF implicitly sanctioned the inclusion of the old 
regime’s military apparatus in the new government. This is the flip side of the process 
that Linz, Stepan and Grimm claim played such an important role in the consolidation of 
Japanese and German democracy after 1945. 
 
Rival Hypothesis: Prewar Modernization (or lack thereof) 
 Among the most cited explanations for the failure of democratization in Weimar 
Germany is Barrington Moore’s (1966) thesis on uneven development and agrarian 
interests. When industrial interests must compromise with agricultural interests in 
building a modern, industrial state, they marginalize the banking and trading classes that 
typically push for democratic institutions. This leaves two possibilities: fascism and 
communism. When the peasantry is not substantially organized and mobilized, the result 
is a fascist state. Moore specifically cites this process as that which undermined pro-
democracy forces in the Weimar Republic, and employs Nazi Germany as one of the 
three archetypes resulting from the processes he describes. 
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There is some evidence to support this hypothesis. As noted in the chapter on the 
post-WWII Federal Republic, parties outside the optimal winning coalition performed 
substantially better in rural regions than in urban ones (Bernhard 2001, Childers 1976). 
However, as I also noted, this ignores antidemocratic tendencies in the more 
industrialized laender of Saxony and Bavaria, and in the Saar and Ruhr. Uneven 
development, a persistent Junker class, and an agrarian political economy might certainly 
have stood in the way of democratic institutions in an alternate reality in which Germany 
was both undivided and democratic. But they explain only one instance of anti-
democratic tendencies in one region of Germany, and not the persistent anti-democratic 
challenges the Weimar regime faced among eastern and western—as well as urban and 
rural—constituencies. This does not mean we can reject the hypothesis outright. Moore’s 
theory explains very well why Germany transitioned to Fascism in 1933. The problem is 
that it fails to explain the several other indicators that the Weimar regime had failed to 
consolidate dating back as early as 1922. 
 
Summation 
 The hypotheses above are all plausible, despite shortcomings here and there. 
Individually, however, they leave major gaps in our understanding of the collapse of 
Weimar democracy. The failure to demilitarize Germany does seem to explain why the 
optimal winning coalition was unable to monopolize political violence, but it does not 
explain the rise and fall of the electoral and parliamentary fortunes of the optimal 
winning coalition. It also fails to account for the fact that Hitler was able to seize power 
in a legal rather than extra-parliamentary manner. Conversely, Moore’s hypothesis does a 
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very good job in explaining why Hitler was able to seize power, but does a very poor job 
of explaining the near-success of left wing and other less extreme, yet anti-democratic 
political movements in the early years of the Republic. The institutional design 
hypotheses all present coherent explanations for why perceived disenfranchisement of the 
German population resulted in a constitutional crisis that the government was unprepared 
to handle. In other words, it explains why a failure to narrow the spectrum of acceptable 
political contestation resulted in the collapse of parliamentary democracy. However, it is 
not particularly convincing in explaining the widespread political violence and the rise of 
paramilitary politics before the Great Inflation and Great Depression. Immoderate 
political forces were rampant in Germany before the ineptitude of the Reichstag became 
obvious, weakening the hypothesis that parliamentary gridlock was the primary cause of 
political extremism and virulent populism. I shall demonstrate that there is a conspicuous 
relationship between the threat dynamics and occupation management techniques of the 
Weimar case and the subsequent domestic outcomes. The Marginal Value Model 




Test of Working Hypotheses versus Case History 
Threat Environment 
In the case of Weimar Germany, it is difficult to find a player who sufficiently fits 
the role of villain. There is nothing on the order of the threat that the USSR posed to 
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Germany and Japan after WWII, no powerful state threatening to destabilize the region in 
the way that the PRC threatened the Pacific Rim. However, there was still good reason 
for the first German democracy to fear its neighbors. First, the Treaty of Versailles re-
established the Polish state (that was absorbed by its neighbors in 1795) on the German 
border. The rebirth of Poland was not threatening in and of itself. That said, the 
insurgency on the German-Polish border that 
raged through the early years of the 
occupation, their push to acquire territories 
that were majority German, and the support 
and/or sponsorship that Poland and the 
insurgents received from other states was a 
threat to the personal and territorial security of the Weimar Republic, not to mention a 
source of grievance to a society that (rightfully or no) was exceptionally aggrieved. While 
the potential to establish marginal value by providing security to Weimar Germany was 
not as clear-cut as in other cases, the opportunity was there.  
In November 1919, hoping to gain territory before proceedings at Versailles 
cemented Poland’s new borders, Polish republican Wojciech Korfanty organized an 
abortive coup aimed at separating Upper Silesia from Germany by force (Willamson 
1991). Polish-German violence characterized the threat dynamic through 1921. The most 
violent of these uprisings, the Third Korfanty Revolt/Silesian Uprising, began on May 2, 
1920, during which Polish irregulars overran the eastern two-thirds of Upper Silesia and 
insurgents killed three hundred Germans and wounded 1,500. The German Freikorps 
paramilitary to regrouped during a ceasefire and launch a successful and decisive attack 
Table 5.1: Influences on the Threat 
Environment in Weimar Germany 
 
More Threatening 
• Silesian Uprisings 









at Annaberg on May 23. Only after German forces gained the upper hand did the conflict 
cease. Polish forces retreated between June 10 and July 21, ending the rash of violence in 
the German-Polish hinterlands (Ibid, Dawson 1933). 
As the uprising receded, so did the AAF’s best opportunity to produce security 
goods and thereby produce marginal occupation value. However, this does not mean 
Germany was finally secure. Internal threats in the form of separatist movements in the 
Rhine grew in the early 1920s (see next section), raising the possibility additional 
territorial cessions. Germany still shared a relatively indefensible border with an 
unfriendly neighbor, and they still had limited means to defend themselves. Since the 
supply of goods for internal balancing had dwindled under the disarmament regime, but 
demand for security had not declined (or at least not as swiftly), Germany looked for a 
partner who would help them externally balance against foreign threats. These constraints 
encouraged Germany to reach out to Russia in secret and in violation of the Versailles 
prohibitions on offensive weapon production and foreign security pacts. 
Evidence of Russo-German security cooperation dates back as early as August 
1920, when Defense Minister Seeckt and Foreign Minister (and future Prime Minister) 
Gustav Stresemann authorized the issuance of low-level communiqués to the Soviet 
armed forces. In May 1921, the Berlin and Moscow signed a commercial treaty, joining 
forces out of mutual need to alleviate their economic deprivation (Gatzke 1958). The 
nations also shared a mutual interest in constraining and suppressing Poland. The Russo-
German answer to the Polish question was the Treaty of Rapallo, signed on April 16, 
1922. The public version of the treaty established most favored nation status, secured 
Germany from Soviet claims under Versailles, and secured the Soviet Union from 
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German claims over property seized by the Communist regime. Privately, Rapallo 
contained the first agreements pertaining to military assistance (Nicholls 1991, Kolb 
1988, Mommsen 1996).63 Following Rapallo, German pilots and tank commanders began 
secret training in Russian tanks and planes—an unequivocal violation of the Versailles 
Treaty (Gatzke 1958, Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Mommsen 1996).  
From the middle-1920s onward, a tacit agreement between Seekct and 
Stresemann enabled the falsification military budgets to prevent discovery of their 
violations by Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IAMCC) officials. While it 
appeared smaller on paper, the actual Reichswehr budget increased by 75% during the 
period 1924-1928. Once the responsibility for weapons monitoring was transferred to the 
League of Nations, German rearmament continued without direct administration by the 
allies. Towards the end of the decade, Germany entered into industrial arms production 
agreements with the Soviet Union, in which Germany would foot the bill for factory 
construction, while the two states would share the fruits of its production. The 1930 
Rheinmetall agreement, a plan to fund construction of a munitions factory in the Soviet 
Union, was the last of these (Nicholls 1991, Webster 2006, Gatzke 1958). Germany’s 
partnership with Russia is evidence of Germany’s desire to remilitarize despite the threat 
of punishment by the AAF—punishments that might include expansion or extension of 
the Rhineland occupation—indicate a sense of insecurity. Germany’s actions tell us that 
63 Notably, these secret proceedings—including the decision to announce the treaty while 
a German delegation was seeking concessions in London on disarmament—was made by 
the Reichswehr leadership without cabinet approval; even the Reichswehr operated as a 
free agent in this regime. Later in this thesis I indicate the dominance of pre-Weimar 
officers in the armed forces, illustrating the theories espoused by Huntington (1991), Linz 
(1990), Stepan (1991) and Sa’Adah (2006) about the fragility of regimes in which the 
pre-republican military apparatus remains in place. 
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there was demand for security goods were the AAF to produce some. Their alliance with 
Russia indicates one of the following: 1) the AAF refused to produce these goods; 2) the 
AAF failed to produce these goods in the quantities that Moscow offered; 3) the AAF 
pursued policies that were themselves threatening, thereby undermining the credibility of 
any security commitment from the occupiers. 
 The outside threat environment over the entire observation period is perhaps the 
least critical of the four cases in the dissertation. And yet, it is clear that the environment 
was threatening enough for Germany to seek outside assistance. Part of this demand for 
external balancing was surely manufactured by the occupation and Versailles: the 
territorial cessions, the reconstruction of Poland and the neutering of Germany’s security 
apparatus that drove this demand were the work of the same states that occupied the 
Rhineland. However, the demand for outside security assurances was there, and the 
Allied and Associated Forces were in the best position to fulfill that demand. Would the 
AAF be security providers or security deniers? 
 
Signaling Security Value 
 Instead of satisfying Germany’s desire 
to balance externally and, in doing so, 
producing marginal occupation value, the 
AAF focused on permanently weakening the 
Weimar Republic so that it could never again 
project its power. While Poland nipped at 
Table 5.2: Indicators of Occupation 
Security Value in Weimar Germany 
 
Positive 
• Locarno Pact 
 
Negative 
• Closed-door negotiations at 
Versailles 
• French support for Polish 
insurgents 
• French support for annexations 
of predominantly German 
territory 




Germany’s borders, France—which retained administrative authority in Upper Silesia—
stood by and allowed it to happen (Williamson 1991). While Rhenish separatists 
threatened to pull away from the Fatherland, France not so quietly urged them on. The 
occupiers attempted to dismantle the German war machine, but they did so in a way that 
left elements of the old regime in control of the means of violence, that did not include a 
path to remilitarization (as the Allies offered to the FGR via NATO, or as the US would 
present to Japan in the form of a large defensive reserve) and that only temporarily 
hampered Germany’s power projection capability. When the AAF eventually offered a 
mutual security pact at Locarno, France had already proved themselves a better enemy 
than a friend and Germany had found help elsewhere. The rational starting position of 
any occupied state is that the greatest of all threats are the occupiers themselves. This 
remains the case until the occupiers prove otherwise. They did not. 
This is not how the occupation had to proceed. Early on, there was reason for 
Germany to expect an equitable peace. Between late 1917 and early 1918, the US and the 
UK began to express their support for a postwar peace along the lines of Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points. In response to these signals, Chancellor Prince Max of Baden initiated 
truce negotiations with Wilson and led the Reichstag in a vote to begin Germany’s 
transition to democracy.  (Wright 1919, Willamson 1991, Mommsen 1996, Kolb 1988, 
Dawson 1933, Pawley 2007, Nicholls 1991, Snyder 1998).64 Germany hoped to conclude 
a peace based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, despite a lack of demonstrated commitment 
64 Nominally, the new regime was a constitutional monarchy, but with the imminent 
abdication of the Kaiser and the absence of any formal role for the monarch, these 
reforms established a de facto parliamentary republic (Mommsen 1996). 
185 
 
                                                 
to the American plan from the UK and France. (Dawson 1933, Nelson 1975, Pawley 
2007, Willamson 1991). 
When peace talks opened at Versailles on January 18, 1919, closed-door 
negotiations excluding the German delegation directly contradicted Wilson’s plea for 
“open covenants openly arrived at” (Wilson 1918). The negotiations followed a very 
familiar pattern throughout: the French delegation would press harsh demands that the 
UK and US could not abide, receiving Belgian support. The French would then offer a 
counterproposal that was still beyond what the Anglo-American bloc was willing to 
implement. However, President Wilson, anxious to write his plan for a League of Nations 
into the Treaty of Versailles, would trade support for Clemenceau’s demands in exchange 
for his League. Wilson’s capitulation isolated Lloyd George, leaving no choice but to 
support the French position (Schiff 1930, Dawson 1933, Kolb 1988, Willamson 1991, 
Pawley 2007). This pattern first manifested itself in several key negotiations: French 
territorial claims that stemmed from secret prewar treaties, a temporary occupation, 
disarmament, reparations, et cetera… (Dawson 1933, Nelson 1975, Willamson 1991, 
O'Riordan 2005, Pawley 2007). 
Many of these negotiations resulted in clear negative security consequences for 
Germany, especially considering the issue of territorial cessions. In the wake of the 
Armistice, the victors began to draw a new map of Europe, ostensibly based on 
recognition of national self-determination. The Germans would soon discover that the 
Allies did not intend that this principle apply to them. The Versailles Treaty established a 
Plebiscite Commission that selected the regions for possible redistribution to existing 
states or the formation of new polities. The agreement also mandated the use of 
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plebiscites to determine the relevant ethno-geographic distributions, but the AAF’s 
interpretation of self-determination was more than a bit disingenuous. The AAF 
prevented German-speaking individuals from registering for the plebiscites and ignored 
others.65 In Upper Silesia, French administrators granted local Poles premature access to 
German funds in local banks on the assumption that the vote would favor Poland. Despite 
the imposition of eligibility requirements by Polish and French Commissioners that 
excluded the 70,000 Germans who had settled in Upper Silesia since 1904, 59.6% of 
eligible voters elected to remain part of Germany. (Willamson 1991, Dawson 1933). The 
plebiscite in Allenstein would declare 98% for Germany, while plebiscites in what would 
become the Polish Maritime Corridor declared between 60-80% for Germany. It did not 
matter: the Commission handed the territories over to Belgium and Poland anyway. It had 
become very clear that the postwar peace would not be governed by the Fourteen Points, 
but rather by realpolitik and Clemenceau’s (historically understandable yet ultimately 
misguided) efforts to permanently incapacitate Germany (Ibid). 
The AAF—specifically France—succeeded in making itself into Germany’s 
enemy vis-à-vis Poland. On March 12, 1919, the Commission on Polish Affairs 
recommended that Upper Silesia and the port city of Danzig be transferred to Poland.66 
Instead, France and the UK decided that Danzig would be a League of Nations–
administered free city within the Polish customs union, and that that the fate of Upper 
Silesia be decided by plebiscite (Willamson 1991). During the Silesian Uprisings, France 
pledged its support to Poland via a treaty of mutual assistance. While the pact ostensibly 
65 In Eupen-Malmedy, a territory that was 80% German in 1910, only 271 voters 
registered as Germans (Dawson 1933). 
66 Clemenceau supported this, but Lloyd George threatened to pull out of the peace talks 
if the French president pursued this course (Williamson 1991). 
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united the two states against Russia, it also created a bloc that flanked and largely isolated 
Germany. On September 15, 1922, France further aided Poland by recognizing the Polish 
Navy’s navigation rights to the Baltic Sea and at Danzig, essentially transforming the 
“Free City” into a Polish port-of-call. The two parties amended this agreement on May 
12, 1923, with France sending advisers to build a Polish air force, along with aircraft, 
automatic weapons, a loan of 300 million Francs to build their military capability, and 
finally by training Polish officers in French war colleges (Dawson 1933, Kolb 1988). 
Ultimately, Poland’s qualified legal jurisdiction and geographic dominance in the region 
turned Danzig into a de facto ward of Poland. France very clearly aligned itself with 
German’s strongest contemporary foe—an unquestionable example of an unfavorable 
security configuration. 
 France pushed for the erosion of German borders in the west as well as east. As 
early as November 17, 1918, Marshal Foch was authoring plans to turn the Rhineland 
into a buffer state (or states). On December 12, Plebiscite Commissioner Tirard suggested 
to Paris that they incorporate the Rhineland into their economic sphere, thereby gaining 
economic and political leverage over the territory (Willamson 1991, Pawley 2007). 
Beginning in 1919, despite officially resigning their initial demand to annex the 
Rhineland, the French embarked on a campaign to sponsor Rhenish separatist groups in 
their occupation zone. Commissioner Rault, who controlled the Saar Coal Basin, tried to 
coax the region into independence and into French hands by commissioning a Saar flag 
and coat of arms, introducing the franc as legal tender, financially supporting the 
construction of French-language schools, Gallicizing the existing German ones, and by 
openly requesting a post-occupation plebiscite that might favor separation from the Reich 
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(O'Riordan 2005). France later attempted to introduce a new currency to the region, the 
Rhenish Notenbank, in order to isolate the region economically and ensure its 
dependence on French demand for raw materials (Willamson 1991, Pawley 2007).67 
The French redoubled their efforts to separate the Rhineland in June 1923, as 
General Mangin conspired with separatists in Guelph to form an independent Lower 
Saxony. The movements turned violent when, in Dusseldorf on September 30, 10,000-
15,000 separatist demonstrators clashed with German police. Twelve separatists and five 
police died, while 400 were wounded. Three weeks later, separatists declared an 
independent Rhenish government in Aachen, occupying municipal buildings with the 
implicit cooperation of the French. Following this declaration, separatists launched coups 
in Bonn, Mainz, and Trier (O'Riordan 2005). The French turned their attention to 
separatist movements in the Palatinate in early November. France gave up on their goal 
to separate the Rhineland only after the British intervened in 1923 (Willamson 1991, 
Pawley 2007). Between 1920 and 1924 the French and Belgian contingents made very 
clear that they were not interested in producing security for Germany. 
The security relationship turned more favorable for Germany in mid-1925. In 
June, the AAF and Germany renegotiated the terms of disarmament and reparations, 
leading to the Locarno Conference and resultant Locarno Pact (Willamson 1991, Pawley 
2007). At Locarno, the Germans scored their greatest diplomatic victory since the 
conclusion of the Great War. In exchange for recognition of the Franco-German and 
Belgian-German borders (including Alsace-Lorraine) a permanent DMZ along the Rhine, 
a non-aggression pact with France and the United Kingdom, and peaceful arbitration 




                                                 
agreements between Germany and France, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the 
Allies agreed to pave the way for Germany’s induction into the League of Nations and 
evacuate the northern zone by the beginning of 1926. By January 30, 1926, the Allies 
evacuated Koln and the northern zone, returning the first section of occupied territory to 
German control (Kolb 1988, Snyder 1998). 
On July 29, 1926, Chancellor Stresemann was able to convince Britain’s 
Chamberlain to appeal to French Prime Minister Briand for a reduction in force levels in 
Germany. The French were only willing to concede small reductions at first, but when the 
chancellery transferred to Marx in the following months, he jumped on an opportunity to 
negotiate for the early withdrawal of all Allied forces. Efforts in February 1927 to 
achieve a one-third to one-half reduction in forces, and a play for a full withdrawal 
submitted in July 1928 were unsuccessful (Willamson 1991), but future governments 
continued to push for withdrawal. British public opinion, perhaps swayed by the German 
experience during the Ruhr and inflationary crises, played a key role in precipitating 
these changes. Even though French fears regarding a rearmed Germany remained 
typically strong, the British were facing domestic pressure to further reduce their 
commitment to the enforce Versailles (Willamson 1991, Snyder 1998). For the first time 
it was the Franco-Belgians—not the Brits—who were diplomatically isolated. 
The change in occupation policy, especially the security pact that resulted from 
Locarno, represented a shift in the marginal security value of the occupation. Finally, the 
occupying powers recognized Germany’s need for external security and took steps to 
provide it. However, the Locarno Pact did not take place until after the simmering of 
tensions between Germany and Poland, and after Germany had found a way to rearm in 
190 
 
secret. In other words, the demand for external security had largely subsided, while 
Germany had already found its supply (from Russia). This is not to say the offer was not 
welcome; Stresemann pushed hard for this arrangement. But the degree to which this 
agreement could produce marginal value is questionable, considering that the deficit the 
AAF had created during the first six years of the occupation drove the Weimar Republic 
to look for help elsewhere. 
 
Facilitating Regime Consolidation 
Occupation policy in the Rhineland 
and other AAF administered territories ranged 
from the inconsistent to the outright 
retaliatory. The inconsistency stems partially 
from the fact that the AAF had no postwar 
plan until September 1918, and the largely 
improvised occupation policy resulted in cooperation and coordination issues (Mommsen 
1996). The occupation relationship in the case of Weimar Germany was probably the 
most destructive of the four cases in this dissertation. The “War Guilt” clause of the 
Treaty of Versailles, which required Germany to accept full responsibility for the Great 
War, humiliated Germany and discredited the coalition that took Germany out of the war. 
Reparations sucked reserve capital out of the new republic while a punitive trade regime 
and regional autarky prevented capital from flowing back in, bankrupting the bourgeois 
and white-collar base of the optimal winning coalition. The AAF frequently, if 
unintentionally, empowered those outside the winning coalition while punishing those 
Table 5.3: Evidence of Facilitating 
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within. While putting Germany in a weaker position internationally, the AAF crafted a 
domestic occupation policy that directly weakened the optimal winning coalition, 
reducing the value of the occupation to key democratic constituencies. 
The AAF rarely intervened to quell insurgencies on either the left or right that 
threatened the future of the Weimar regime, but they readily punished the new 
democratic regime when it attempted to preserve itself. The year 1920 saw both a radical 
leftist uprising in the Ruhr and the right-wing Kapp Putsch. The AAF ignored Kapp 
regime, leaving the German government to handle the situation itself. The occupation 
forces similarly twiddled their thumbs during the Ruhr uprising, although they considered 
occupying the demilitarized zone to quell violence. The AAF nevertheless remained 
inactive, and the uprising continued until Germany deployed Reichswehr regulars to 
pacify the region. This, however, was a direct violation of the Versailles Treaty, one that 
French forces punished by expanding the occupation to include Frankfurt, Homburg and 
three other cities while the British arrested Reichswehr troops that entered their zone 
(Willamson 1991, O'Riordan 2005, Pawley 2007). This was nothing if not a signal to 
those in charge that they lacked a mandate to protect the regime, and nothing if not a 
signal to anti-democratic constituencies that the occupation would stand aside while 
insurgents endeavored to destroy it. 
 The more infamous occupation of the Ruhr occurred years later, on the pretense 
of Germany’s failure to pay reparations. Reparations ran counter to Wilson’s overtures, 
Prime Minister Lloyd George’s better judgment, and the advice of American economic 
advisors. Nevertheless, Wilson was willing to trade reparations for the League, especially 
if reparations would help the UK and France pay their war debt. The UK and US agreed 
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to reparations in April 1919 (Nelson 1975, Kolb 1988). The reparations issue was a thorn 
in the sides of the first Weimar governments. The AAF threatened sanctions against 
Germany if it did not accede to the reparations demands. Failing to heed these threats, on 
March 7, 1922, the Allies occupied Dusseldorf and two other German cities and imposed 
a 50% levy on German exports. On March 19, Germany nominally acceded to AAF 
demands (Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Lauterbach 1944, O'Riordan 2005, Pawley 2007) 
but this did not modify their financial situation. On January 10, 1923, following several 
failed attempts to reach a compromise, the Reparations Commission declared Germany in 
default. The next day Franco-Belgian forces seized the Ruhr. Outraged, American forces 
in Germany withdrew in protest by the end of the month (unfortunately relieving the 
Weimar Republic of one its more amiable occupiers). While disapproving of the venture, 
the British felt the need to preserve what unity and credibility the AAF retained (Kolb 
1988, Nicholls 1991, Willamson 1991, Mommsen 1996, Pawley 2007, Cornebise 1983). 
Eventually, Germany and the AAF were able to reach an agreement on 
reparations, and on other occupation issues, at Locarno and by way of the Dawes Plan. 
The Dawes plan restructured the German banking system to stabilize the Reichsmark and 
rescheduled reparations debt. On the heels of success at Locarno, Germany called for a 
more favorable revision of the Dawes plan. In February of 1929, as Germany was already 
beginning its slide into the Great Depression, the Allies reopened the issue of reparations 
at the Paris Conference. Germany caught a huge break on May 31, 1929, when the Labor 
Party took back the House of Commons on a pledge to end the occupation. Germany took 
advantage of the situation by linking reparations talks to disarmament discussions as they 
continued at The Hague on August 5-31. The product of these conferences, the first draft 
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of the Young Plan, was accepted in late August of that year. As per the Young Plan, all 
parties agreed to modify the reparations schedule to slowly increase the per annum 
payment from 1.7 billion to 2.5 billion gold marks through 1966, and thereafter reducing 
the payment rate until reparations were fulfilled in 1988 (Nicholls 1991). 
The occupation relationship was undeniably negative between Versailles and the 
end of the Ruhr occupation, but it took a term for the better at Locarno. The War Guilt 
clause did nothing but empower those who wanted to cast the pro-democratic government 
as traitors. Uneven treatment by the AAF further aided extremists against the optimal 
winning coalition. Reparations and the Ruhr Occupation further radicalized the 
population. The occupation relationship did not remain permanently negative—it 
improved significantly after Locarno and continued to do so until the departure of foreign 
troops in 1930—but early damage is lasting damage. As the numbers show, the optimal 
domestic coalition never entirely recovered from the poor relations of the occupation’s 





The history of the optimal winning coalition in Weimar German breaks down 
conveniently into four different periods. The first period, preceding the signature of the 
Treaty of Versailles, is characterized by electoral successes for the optimal winning 
coalition but tainted by escalating political violence and the rise of paramilitaries on both 
sides of the spectrum. The second period, between Versailles and the Locarno agreement, 
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indicates a severe retrenchment where paramilitaries multiply, domestic security 
markedly deteriorates and the optimal winning coalition suffers at the polls. The third 
period, between Locarno and ending just before the Great Depression, witnessed a partial 
resurgence by the optimal winning coalition, a dramatic decline in political violence but a 
substantial increase in paramilitary enlistment. The fourth and final period, beginning just 
before the Great Depression and ending in Hitler’s seizure of power, saw the defeat of the 
optimal winning coalition, renewed political violence and the sustained dominance of 
paramilitary politics. Many of these trends confirm to what we would expect based on the 
hypotheses of the Marginal Value Model. 
The period immediately preceding the November 11, 1918 Armistice, leading up 
to the elections of January 19, 1919, characterized a phase of great promise for 
democracy in Germany. A republican coalition almost entirely comprised of 
enthusiastically democratic parties brought an end to four years of deprivation and, in so 
doing, won widespread electoral support. These early victories, however, were tainted by 
the onset of domestic strife. Moreover, anti-democratic factions maintained control over 
the domestic and foreign security apparatuses. In the first elections in Weimar Germany, 
the optimal winning coalition of Social Democrats (SPD), Democrats (DDP), and the 
Catholic Center (or Zentrum) won 76.1% of the popular vote and 78.3% of mandates to 






    




Sources: Eberhard Kolb (translated by P.S. Falla). The Weimar Republic. London. Unwin 





























































Figure 5.1: Performance of the Optimal and Suboptimal Coalitions in 
Federal Elections to the Reichstag, 1918-1933
Optimal Semi-optimal Suboptimal Turnout
196 
 
The success of the optimal winning coalition is largely the result of a favorable 
shift in threat dynamics and an absence of information regarding the strategic setting. 
Leading up to this point, the German people had little knowledge of what effect regime 
change and occupation would have on their personal security. The only information they 
have about the occupation-constituent relationship is that they were no longer at war with 
the AAF. As far as the any political actor in the new republic was aware, Germany and 
the AAF had entered into negotiations on presumably equal terms to establish a lasting, 
Wilsonian peace. 
 The greatest threat to the average German during this period was domestic unrest 
emanating from the left and the right, as communist revolutionaries faced off against the 
right-wing Freikorps and associated paramilitaries. Temporarily, however, the Freikorps 
were allied with the government against the radical socialists. German domestic 
instability was so obvious even outside of the Reich that Lloyd George, along with then 
Munitions Minister Winston Churchill, considered arming German forces against the 
radical left. Their concern only grew as economic deprivation spread throughout the 
Reich. Radical USPD partisans and Communists (KPD) were the primary source of 
political violence early on, spurring a Christmas revolt that exposed the SPD’s tenuous 
hold on power. The SPD attempted to employ soldiers returning from the Western Front 
to maintain order, but many of these war-weary individuals disobeyed commands and/or 
broke rank (Willamson 1991). 
Into this security vacuum stepped private or semi-private paramilitaries, including 
the Freikorps volunteers, civil guards (Einwohnerwehr), militarized veterans associations 
such as the Stalhelm, and volunteer auxiliaries (Zeitfreiwilligenverbande; Diehl 1977, 
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Snyder 1998). These forces grew quickly, fed by a glut of demobilized servicemen. 
Volunteer auxiliary forces numbered 15,000 by February 1920, while the Freikorps grew 
into a 200,000-strong corps by that summer. Many paramilitaries honed their skills 
during the revolts of late December 1919 and early January 1920 (Diehl 1977). Since the 
Freikorps were loosely aligned with the optimal winning coalition, a vote for the SPD, 
DDP or Zentrum represented a vote for stability, anti-Bolshevism, and peace. As a result, 
the optimal coalition enjoyed a great deal of support from an historically anti-republican, 
anti-Communist, but also pro-peace peasantry who had borne the brunt of costs of the 
Great War.68 But the strength of the optimal coalition was not distributed evenly across 
political economic institutions. The constituencies that supported the German People’s 
Party (DVP) and the German Nationalists (DNVP) controlled a disproportionate share of 
landed wealth and capital (Heberle 1943, Van Riel and Schram 1993). Moreover, just as 
with the military under the Kaiserreich, the paramilitaries were by-and-large nationalist 
and anti-republican. Regardless, these forces were the first short-term policing options for 
a newly empowered winning coalition of Socialist, Nationalist and Catholic Democrats. 
Ideological considerations were not paramount during this period of widespread 
instability (Nicholls 1991), but this measure of expediency placed the legitimate use of 
force in the hands of a suboptimal coalition. 
 Support for the SPD evaporated following the signature of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Only the SPD favored signature of the Versailles Treaty outright, while the 
Zentrum and DDP favored a signature with reservations (a symbolic distinction at best).  
 
68 For instance, Bavaria suffered a relatively high number of casualties due to the fact that 
a majority (65%) of the population was peasantry, generally less educated and far more 
likely to produce infantrymen than officers (Heberle 1943). 
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(Schiff 1930, Dawson 1933, Third Army 1943, Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Willamson 
1991, Diehl 1977, Pawley 2007).69 The first elections following the Treaty of Versailles 
are notable for the string of political defeats for the optimal winning coalition in general, 
and the SPD in particular. Support for the SPD-DDP-Zentrum coalition plummeted from 
a sizeable majority to 43.6% of the popular vote (44.7% of Reichstag mandates; Kolb 
1988). For the first time since the abdication of the Kaiser, the SPD was excluded from 
the cabinet, replaced by the semi-optimal German People’s Party, or DVP (Eyck 1970). 
Left-wing insurgency and right-wing assassinations (of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl 
Liebnicht and Kurt Eisner, leader of the November 1918 Bavarian independence 
movement) characterized the extra-parliamentary political climate. In early March 1919, 
a failed leftist coup precipitated the clash of 15,000 demonstrators and 42,000 Freikorps 
and Civil Guard units. A month later Communists seized München, initiating a standoff 
during which KPT forces executed hostages. The Freikrops response on May 2 resulted 
in the slaying of 600 suspected agitators. Early the next year, a left-wing demonstration 
on the steps of the Reichstag devolves into a riot, leaving 42 dead. In July 1919 Chief 
Papst, leader of the Einwohnerwehr (civil guards) launched an aborted putsch against 
Berlin. On March 12, 1920, journalist Wolfgang Kapp was more successful, seizing 
control of Berlin and forcing the government to retreat to Stuttgart. The coup would cost 
Defense Minister Noske and Reichswehr Chief Reinhardt their positions. Inauspiciously, 
both positions were filled by right wing anti-republicans Gessler and Seeckt. This marked 
the consolidation of control over the official security apparatus by actors outside of the 
69 The United States, due to opposition from unilateralist forces in the Senate, ratified a 
separate peace with the Germans on October 19, officially concluding hostilities between 




                                                 
optimal domestic coalition, where it would remain until the collapse of the republic 
(Diehl 1977, Cornebise 1983, Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Willamson 1991, Mommsen 
1996, Snyder 1998, Halbrook 2000, O'Riordan 2005, Pawley 2007). 
Domestic unrest tracked the growth of paramilitary forces. The Freikorps 
numbered 200,000-400,000 by the end of 1919, and as its power increased began acting 
more as a free agent than an instrument of the state. In March-April 1919 the Prussian 
Interior Ministry ordered the formation of class-agnostic, non-partisan “republican” civil 
guards in an attempt to head off a right-wing monopoly over the use of force. The March 
6, 1919 Reichswehr Law failed to spur the assimilation of paramilitary units. Now illegal, 
the Freikorps and other paramilitaries went underground, while the Stalhelm, a private 
military force disguised as a veterans association, exploited its particular loophole. In 
fact, the reputation of Versailles was very profitable to veterans groups: the Stalhelm 
openly recruited those who blamed the Treaty—and those who concluded its terms—for 
their hardships. Openly defiant, they declared rearmament and Lebensraum as their main 
aspirations. Similarly, the Bayerische (Bavarian) Einwohnerwehr grew from 100,000 
before Versailles to a quarter million thereafter (Willamson 1991). At a strategy session 
of Bavarian Guard leadership, delegates characterized their organization as the “vanguard 
of the Fatherland” whose goal was to protect young Germans against capitalist 
decadence, communist immorality, and democratic corruption. Such rhetoric presaged 
future Nationalist Socialist (NSDAP) propaganda. Coincidentally, the SA (the Nazi 
Party’s paramilitary wing) began recruiting members in May 1921. (Diehl 1977, Nicholls 
1991, Mommsen 1996, Berman 1997). Overall, the disarmament mandate did not 
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significantly reduce German militarism; rather it shifted control over the use of violence 
from the central government to private actors. 
By September 1923, unrest in Saxony and rumblings of a right-wing coup 
originating from Bavaria prompted Chancellor Stresemann and Reichswehr Chief Müller 
to declare a state of emergency and grant absolute authority to Seeckt. Saxony’s President 
Zeigner, a leftist leader of a leftist state, called for the formation of left-wing working 
class volunteer auxiliaries as a defense against the increasingly strong anti-republican, 
anti-socialist paramilitaries. While the KPD responded to Zeigner’s call and set about 
forming paramilitaries that they called “Proletarian Hundreds,” the SPD refused to 
cooperate in this measure out of fear that Zeigner was attempting to initiate a left-wing 
coup. Without the support of the moderate Social Democrats, the call to arms only 
succeeded in empowering extreme left-wing anti-government forces in Saxony. The KPD 
took advantage of their newfound strength to launch statewide communist revolt. Seekct 
quickly deposed the Saxon cabinet and appointed a minister from the DVP to establish a 
new government in the state. Simultaneously, Seeckt faced pressure from his allies in the 
business community and the former Junker nobility to lead his own anti-labor, anti-
socialist, authoritarian coup. While Seeckt continued to profess loyalty to the 
constitution, privately he referred to the Weimar Constitution as “contrary to [his] 
political thinking” (Hunt 1964, Nelson 1975, Mommsen 1996). 
The passionate but fractious nature of Bavarian ultra-nationalism precipitated one 
of the more peculiar episodes in the history of the Weimar Republic. As Seeckt carefully 
weighed his options, Munich witnessed the rise of the Nationalist Socialists (NSDAP) 
and its SA paramilitary. NSDAP leader Adolf Hitler, with the cooperation of war hero 
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Erich von Ludendorff, outflanked the DNVP and Seeckt with a plan to seize Munich and 
then march to Berlin, determined to take control of what they believed was an impending 
revolution. Nationalists close to Seeckt assumed total political control over the Bavarian 
division of the Reichswehr, presumably in preparation for the final Putsch, but Hitler 
moved first (Diehl 1977, Mommsen 1996). On November 8, Hitler, Ludendorff, and 600 
SA troops launched a putsch in a Munich Beer Hall, surrounding the hall during an event 
hosted by Munich public officials. The attempted coup quickly and dramatically 
collapsed when Seeckt, more disdainful of Hitler than the Constitution, ordered his troops 
to decisively end the Nazi demonstration. After the resulting clash, 16 NSDAP and 3 
police laid dead. Hitler escaped, but was later found and sentenced to five years in prison 
for treason. He used his trial as a platform for his ideals, and was released within months 
(Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Mommsen 1996). 
Justifiably worried that the security forces were becoming overrun by middle- and 
upper-class anti-republican elements, the SPD urged working-class members to join the 
Civil Guards. The few who tried were typically turned away. The problem was not a lack 
of interest, but the consolidation of right-wing nationalist influence in the institutional 
structure of security (Diehl 1977). After 1923, moderate republican parties reversed their 
position on the use of paramilitaries. While strategically this was an appropriate and 
belated move on behalf of the parties that constituted the optimal domestic coalition, it 
also serves as an indication that the German state had conceded its monopoly over 
political violence, which itself is an indicator that the range of acceptable political 
contestation had not been narrowed.  
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The failure of one extra-parliamentary movement was a serious one for the 
optimal domestic coalition. In September 1923, the end of passive resistance against the 
Ruhr occupation spelled the end for Chancellor Stresemann, a member of the republican 
wing of the DVP. The perceived failure of passive resistance, coupled with the dire threat 
of violent political competition from the right and extreme left, led to the collapse of the 
first Stresemann cabinet and the continued shift of the cabinet towards the anti-
democratic right-wing side of the ideological scale (A. Cornebise 1982, Kolb 1988, 
Willamson 1991, Mommsen 1996, O'Riordan 2005, Pawley 2007). 
The optimal winning coalition would not go down without a fight, however. In 
February 1924, the SPD, DDP and Zentrum caught on to the benefits of organizing a 
loyal paramilitary force. The ideal parties united to form the Reichsbanner, a paramilitary 
force pledged to defend the republic against radical elements. Membership grew to over 3 
million by early 1925, but the Reichsbanner never became the broad-based pro-
republican coalition the SPD hoped it would be. The private corps never enjoyed strong 
support within the Zentrum, where right-wing Catholics opposed the idea of a police 
force under the control of left-wing elements. Moreover, the paramilitary suffered a 
major public relations blow on July 23, 1927 when its most visible member, Chancellor 
Marx, resigned in order to placate the far-right DNVP members of his ruling coalition 
(Diehl 1977, Nicholls 1991). Meanwhile, the years 1925-1927 were relatively calm in 
terms of anti-government violence. 
During this period, the death of President Ebert on February 28, 1925 triggered 
the first-ever German presidential election. The parties of the optimal coalition nominated 
former Chancellor Marx of the Zentrum. The right and far-right nominated Paul von 
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Hindenburg, noted anti-republican and originator of the “Stab in the Back” myth that 
blamed socialist agitation for Germany’s military collapse (Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg 
1994). In two rounds of elections, Hindenburg defeated Marx (Diehl 1977, Mommsen 
1996). The Hindenburg victory funneled the frustration of the whole German 
constituency into a single powerful office, one with broad emergency power that would 
have a very important role to play when the economy collapsed years later. In the 
meantime, however, center and center-left groups were very successful in the May 1928 
election: the optimal coalition improved their popular share of the Reichstag vote to 
46.8% and the SPD returned to the ruling coalition for the first time since 1923 (Eyck 
1970, Kolb, The Weimar Republic 1988). At the same time, the optimal coalition finally 
began to compete with the right and far right in terms of paramilitary politics, building by 
far the largest semi-private army during the course of the Weimar Republic. Still, 
between the end of the war and the beginning of the Great Depression, 4-5 million white-
collar workers became blue-collar workers. These “déclassés,” politically disillusioned 
and economically disenfranchised, seriously weakened the constituency of the optimal 
winning coalition in economic and numerical terms (Lauterbach 1944, O'Riordan 2005). 
The 1928 elections marked the last hurrah for the optimal winning coalition, as 
the Republic suffered two blows on the individual level in December 1928 and October 
1929. First, former Chancellor Marx retired from the Zentrum, leaving the seat to a 
Catholic priest who was more concerned about forwarding Catholic interests and less 
about republicanism. Second, Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, once a staunch 
defender of republicanism in a moderate authoritarian party, died (Nicholls 1991). After 
this point, the Zentrum essentially ceased to exist as a member of the optimal winning 
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coalition. These events, combined with the decline of the DDP, and the radicalization of 
the electorate at the beginning of the Great Depression, left the SPD as the lone protector 
of the republic. The coalition cabinet that saw the return of the SPD to government and 
the chancellery would not survive the next election cycle. Resulting from a split over the 
Young Plan (the US-led deal on reparations), plans to rebuild the German navy, and 
agrarian aid to eastern Germany, the SPD resigned from the cabinet for the last time. A 
minority parliament under Chancellor Brüning, appointed by President Hindenburg, 
marked the first of several minority governments that would govern until Hitler’s 
ascension to power.  
The first Depression-era election in 1930 set the stage for the debut of the 
revamped NSDAP, the party that Hitler had transformed in the wake of the failed Munich 
Putsch. In what can only be considered one of the most unfortunate political comeback 
stories of all time, the NSDAP’s share of seats in the Reichstag grew from 2.4% in May 
1928, to 18.5% in September 1930, to 37.8% in July 1932, trailing only the SPD and 
outgaining every other radical nationalist party (those to the right of the DVP) combined 
(Stachura 1993, Mommsen 1996, Snyder 1998, Kolb 1988). Hitler attempted to parlay his 
recent success into a victory in the president. The second presidential elections of the 
Weimar Republic took place over two rounds in March and April in the depths of the 
Great Depression. In contrast to the 1925 poll, the SPD, Zentrum, BVP and DVP all 
supported Hindenburg, fearful of the possibility of a Hitler presidency. The far right split 
their vote between the DNVP’s Düsterberg and the NSDAP’s Hitler, with Hitler finishing 
second. Indicative of how much even the far-right feared the Nazi candidate, Düsterberg 
threw his support to Hindenburg instead of Hitler. Hindenburg won, a small victory for 
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the only ideal parties remaining. Of course, Hindenburg certainly was no friend of the 
republic, and at 84 had very little fight left in him for a political system he disdained in 
the first place. Despite the fear-based vote that elected Hindenburg, his reelection as 
president on April 10, 1932 did nothing to stem the rising tide of ultra-nationalism. 
The NSDAP now had the support of, or control of, the largest agrarian and 
corporate civic associations, including the Reichslandbund (German Farmers’ 
Association) and various German industrial firms (Nicholls 1991, Berman 1997, Snyder 
1998). At this point, landslide victories on the state and local level had become so 
commonplace that in the special election on November 6, the loss of four percentage 
points encouraged Hitler that continuing with a purely electoral policy was too risky. 
Early in 1933, banking magnate and NSDAP financial contributor Baron von Schroeder 
arranged a meeting between the recently deposed Chancellor Papen and Hitler, with the 
goal of gaining political support for a Hitler Chancellery. Papen subsequently met with 
President Hindenburg, who was unsatisfied with the performance of then-Chancellor 
Scheicher, the man who had previously convinced Hindenburg to appoint Papen as the 
head of a minority Reichstag, as well as the man who subsequently convinced 
Hindenburg to depose him. Papen and Hindenburg were wrongly operating under the 
assumption that bringing Hitler into a minority government in coalition with the DNVP 
would allow the Nationalists to control the Nazi party and moderate their leader’s 
influence (Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich 1998). 
Hindenburg appointed Hitler to the chancellery on January 30, 1933. The events 
that followed, including the Reichstag Fire and the March 5 election, in which the 
NSDAP won 44.5% of all seats, provided Hitler with the legitimacy he required to 
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complete his revolution. The election presented an opportunity for the NSDAP and 
DNVP to form the first majority government coalition since the fall of the Great 
Coalition. Instead, Hitler persuaded the Reichstag to pass the Enabling Law, making 
permanent the various states of emergency that previous chancellors had declared in 
order to govern without a majority cabinet, and thus allowing Hitler to rule permanently 
by decree. By the time he made his move, Hitler had the Reichstag delegates of the KPD 
arrested as part of the investigation of the Reichstag Fire, while the Catholics Center was 
too busy protecting their own to challenge the SA, the center and moderate right had 
ceased to exist, and the SPD only held 18.5% of the seats in the Reichstag—enough for 
second best, but not enough to unilaterally block the two-thirds quorum or the two-thirds 
vote required to pass an extra-constitutional measure. On March 23, 1933, as the SPD 
casted the only dissenting votes against the Enabling Law, the passage of which 
completed Hitler’s “legal coup” (Nicholls 1991, Snyder 1998, D. F. Lindenfeld 1999, 
Halbrook 2000). 
In the three elections following the advent of the Great Depression, the optimal 
coalition saw its share decline from 28.3% in 1930 to 19.2% in 1933. Not a single 
majority formed a cabinet during the period, with the appointed chancellery passing from 
the right-centrist Brüning to anti-republicans Papen, Schleicher and Hitler. Even though 
the SPD enjoyed a massive advantage in manpower with the Reichsbanner, the SPD 
never did mobilize this force to prevent Hitler’s victory (Nicholls 1991). Moreover, the 
Presidential elections of 1932 indicated how far to the right the individual parties had 
shifted. In 1926, the republicans supported Marx against Hindenburg, the latter of whom 
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was sponsored by the BVP, DVP and DNVP. In 1932, the SPD, Zentrum, BVP and DVP 
all supported Hindenburg (Kolb 1988). 
The radicalization of the once-moderate Weimar Republic was primarily due to 
the decline of the once-strong optimal domestic coalition, now weak electorally, 
financially and militarily.  So weakened, pro-republican coalitions were less prepared to 
repel radical threats as they had during the Great Inflation, or as their counterparts in the 
US, UK or France were able to during the Great Depression. Ultimately, the 
ultranationalist forces that tried to take the government by force in 1923 seized power 
through perfectly legal means one decade hence.  They were empowered largely by the 
actions of the occupying forces. The AAF weakened Germany without offering a credible 
security guarantee. By doing so, they undermined the position of the parties that brought 
an end to the war and allowed the occupation to occur. The optimal winning coalition 
was further discredited by the punitive peace they signed at Versailles. All the while, 
occupation policy impoverished the white collar and bourgeois elements that could have 
bolstered the winning coalition, and the occupiers looked the other way as radical 
elements outflanked the government on the left and right. The damage was complete by 
the time the occupation reversed course. The winning coalition recovered, though never 
to the levels they enjoyed before Versailles, and not to such a point where they could 
reinforce democratic institutions to weather the oncoming tsunami of a global economic 
collapse. The Great Depression was the final wave that eradicated the rotting structure of 
the Weimar Constitution, but the structure collapsed primarily due to the rot that set in 
soon after the edifice was dedicated—in the early days of uncertainty that followed 





 The case of Weimar Germany is a very clear example of a failed democratic 
consolidation under an occupied regime. The first Federal Republic of Germany was a 
marginal democracy following the end of the Kaiserreich and until the rise of Hitler, 
scoring a 6 on the Polity IV scale between 1919 and 1932. With the rise of Adolf Hitler, 
however, Germany slides into autocracy (score: -9) and never recovers until the 
resurrection of a unified, democratic German state in 1990 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). 
Moreover, frequent instances of domestic political violence and the dominance of 
domestic security by paramilitary organizations paint a picture of a regime that failed to 
establish a monopoly over the use of force. The early plunge of the prospects of the 
optimal winning coalition in the first elections following the Treaty of Versailles, and 
their slow decline thereafter, reinforce the fact that the regime never successfully 
consolidated. Beginning with the Treaty of Versailles, continuing during the separatist 
violence in the west, the insurgency in the east, during the battle over reparations, and 
concluding in the occupation of the Ruhr, the occupation forces established themselves as 
enemies—not allies—of the occupied state. Under such conditions, it was not possible for 
an optimal winning coalition—responsible for concluding the Armistice and originally in 





Reconciliation of Competing Hypotheses 
As in the previous cases, the findings support H1. At Locarno, the AAF pledged a 
mutual security pact with Germany. More importantly, Locarno marked the end of the 
most punitive aspects of the Versailles peace, including French sponsorship of Rhenish 
separatists and Polish insurgents, unreasonable demands on reparations, and the 
occupation of the Ruhr. During this period, we do see some decline in events indicating 
regime instability. The period between Versailles and Locarno was witness to some of the 
worst paramilitary violence and major losses for the optimal winning coalition at the 
polls. On the other hand, the pre-Versailles period saw the biggest win by the optimal 
winning coalition: the SPD, DDP and Zentrum comprised a 76% majority. There is still 
significant political violence during this period, and the regime lost its hold on power 
after the onset of the Great Depression. But the Great Depression, the return of domestic 
political violence and the swift collapse of the optimal winning coalition all occurred 
after the occupation had ended. Following Locarno, the optimal winning coalition saw a 
small boost in its electoral fortunes and won significant victories in the Reichstag—
taking back the chancellery from the DVP and holding onto it through March of 1930. 
There was in fact a home for regime consolidation following the improvements in the 
occupation relationship and alliance configurations following Locarno through the end of 
the occupation. Therefore, this case fails to reject the null hypothesis and lends support 
for H1.  
Furthermore, events indicating regime instability were indeed more common 
while the powers detracted from the domestic wellbeing of occupied Germany. The 
optimal winning coalition absorbed its harshest electoral blow between Versailles and the 
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end of the Ruhr occupation. The 76% majority collapsed into a 44% plurality in 1920 and 
briefly fell behind the suboptimal coalition in the pre-Locarno 1924 election. The semi-
optimal DVP took its first seats in the cabinet during this time, and the chancellery fell to 
Stresemann (himself a moderate, but the representative of the immoderate DVP). This 
period also witnessed the worst domestic insecurity, including several putsch attempts 
and an explosive increase in the rate of paramilitary recruitment. Finally, events 
indicating regime instability—paramilitary expansion, coup attempts, assassinations and 
poor showings at the polls by the OWC—were most common when the AAF aligned 
itself with the enemies of the Weimar state, including Rhenish separatists and Polish 
insurgents. 
The case study does not directly reject any of the competing hypotheses, but they 
do not explain anything the Marginal Value Model cannot. The Reichstag was indeed 
deadlocked and incapable of responding to either the Great Depression or its precursor, 
the Great Inflation—until the AAF stepped in. This, however, highlights the importance 
of positive moves by the occupying forces to resolve domestic crises that threaten 
democratic regimes. While the Dawes plan may have been politically infeasible before 
1924, it was not technically infeasible. Far from it, in fact—the US, UK and France 
would have been far more capable of monitoring the Reichsbank than it was in 
monitoring disarmament (if only because markets are very bad at keeping secrets). 
Moreover, while Article 48 was the instrument by which Hitler conquered German 
democracy, it was wielded by a reichpresident who rose to power directly as a result of 
his rhetorical attacks on the occupying forces and the treaty they presented to a 
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government comprised solely of parties from the optimal winning coalition.70 While the 
Germans did rearm in secret, indicating a failure of disarmament policy, that they did so 
indicates a demand for external security that the allies themselves could have fulfilled. 
Instead, the young Union of Soviet Socialist Republics supplied these goods. There is no 
better indicator that the AAF failed to establish itself as an ally than the fact that 
Germany—whose fear of a Bolshevik revolution within its borders persisted long enough 
for Hitler to exploit it—had to look to Soviet Russia for help. Finally, the new regime 
may have ultimately failed due to the residual Junker class, but it was on weak footing 
long before the unholy alliance of farmers associations and urban industrialists succeeded 
in putting Hitler in charge. The Marginal Value Model subsumes these competing 
political hypotheses, and it is also compatible with competing economic explanations. 
 
Economic Drivers 
The dire ideological and security threats to German Democracy provided a 
backdrop to the collapse of the German monetary system and the subsequent Great 
Inflation. From January 1919 through November 1923, the exchange rate of the 
Reichsmark shrunk by a factor of 500 billion. Germany officially entered into a period of 
hyperinflation (a minimum 50% devaluation per month; Cagan 1956) in January 1922 
and did not emerge from it until late 1923. While Reichsbank’s purely nominal 
independence from the central government was the primary cause, it occurred in the 
context of the cession of Germany’s most productive territories, a global decrease in trade 
70 To paraphrase Dr. Moore, “no ‘stab-in-the-back,’ no fascism.” 
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openness (and thus the ability of the state to balance its capital accounts by means other 
than domestic production) and the imposition of reparations. 
 The Great Inflation eradicated the value of deposits and debt owned, hobbling the 
financial sector. Millions in the managerial class, petit bourgeoisie and civil service were 
cast down into the ranks of the working class and the unemployed. While unemployment 
among trade unionists had plunged from 6.6% to 1% during moderate inflation that 
followed the war, trade union unemployment shot up to 28.2% during the period of 
hyperinflation as incentives for investment collapsed. While currency speculators and 
mortgage holders profited, inflation crippled most of the economy (Lauterbach 1944, 
Hill, Butler and Lorenzen 1977, Berman 1997, Voth 1995, Voth 2003). 
 It was not until August 1923 that the central bank took significant steps to 
ameliorate the currency crisis, freezing the government’s line of credit. On October 15, 
the government founded a new central independent bank, the Rentenbank, which would 
issue new currency to replace the Reichsmark. On November 15, the Rentenmark 
officially supplanted the Reichsmark and began trading at a rate of one trillion to the US 
dollar. The Rentenbank established its independence immediately, refusing to issue a loan 
to the German government the following month. Other difficult but necessary decisions, 
such as the dismissal of large numbers of public employees, helped Germany balance its 
budget by March 1924 (Webb 1986, Willamson 1991, Mommsen 1996, O'Riordan 2005). 
Unfortunately, the process of currency stabilization both exacerbated and 
crystallized the political consequences of the Great Inflation. The new exchange rate 
locked in the losses of the middle class and most former members of the bourgeoisie. 
This weakened the economic strength of the optimal coalition (Hill, Butler and Lorenzen 
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1977) and gave credence to nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-democratic rhetoric 
blaming a cabal of republicans and bankers for bankrupting Germany. In summary, the 
Great Inflation weakened the economic strength of pro-democracy forces and improved 
the rhetorical appeal of nationalism, all of which informed the broader constituency of the 
negative security value of the occupation and those who had caused it to occur. 
During the Ruhr occupation, the US and UK agreed to restructure wartime debt, 
fixing UK liabilities at $4.6 billion.71 Chancellor Stresemann and Konrad Adenauer, then 
senior mayor of Koln, successfully appealed (on national security grounds) for talks that 
would eventually lead to the Dawes Plan. US Treasury Secretary Dawes devised a plan to 
balance the budget, cut payments to 50% the initial rate, issued a loan to cover German 
currency, balanced fiscal and monetary policy through austerity measures and bank 
independence, to discount occupation costs from reparation liabilities, and ensured that 
the Ruhr occupation would wind down as soon as Germany passed the legislation 
implementing the agreements. The Dawes Plan took effect on September 1, 1924 (Kolb 
1988, Nicholls 1991, Willamson 1991, Snyder 1998, Pawley 2007). 
The positive effects of currency stabilization and fiscal sanity were quickly 
apparent. A balanced budget, stable exchange and real interest rates drove a stock market 
boom in Germany and a decline in unemployment. It would not be too much of a stretch 
for the casual observer to believe the German republic had finally turned the corner. On 
the contrary, improvements in basic economic indicators masked fundamental weakness 
in the German economy. The number of people on unemployment insurance through 
1928 hovered between 9-18%—an improvement but still a far cry from post-WWI levels. 
71 The US and France would not reach a similar agreement until April 29, 1926, when the 
two parties agreed to fix liabilities at $4 billion (Kolb 1988).  
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Assets backing the currency declined from 85% to 65% through 1927 as the central bank 
vacillated between policies meant to bolster securities and those meant to prevent capital 
flight (ultimately fulfilling neither goal). The illusive nature of the recovery revealed 
itself in 1928. While economic growth among most industrial democracies peaked around 
the time of the Wall Street Crash in October 1929, Germany’s slide into the Great 
Depression began in late 1928 (Voth 1995, Voth 2003). Persistent unemployment, asset 
liquidation and durable declines in the standard of living meant that the middle class was 
unable to recover before the Great Depression set in. 
The advent of the Great Depression multiplied the gains that the NSDAP began to 
register in 1928. In the last years of the republic (1928-1932), unemployment rose from 
9% to 33%, agricultural prices collapsed by 50%, and DANAT Bank, a preeminent 
banking institution in Germany and Austria, collapsed. At the same time, gridlock in the 
Reichstag and the rapid rise in unemployment led Berlin to severely cut unemployment 
insurance, the percentage of unemployed receiving benefits plummeting from 83.2% to 
37.8%. The rising unemployment that drove so many disenfranchised voters to the 
NSDAP rolls began to subside just after the Nazi seizure of power in January 1933, 
further legitimizing the authoritarian regime (Kolb 1988, Stachura 1993, Van Riel and 
Schram 1993, Nicholls 1991, Stachura 1993, Nicholls 1991, Stogbauer, 2001, Voth, 
Hans-Joachim 2003, Stogbauer and Komlos 2004). 
The Great Inflation may have permanently weakened the economic strength of the 
optimal coalition’s prime middle-class constituency. We cannot, however, blame this 
effect solely on exogenous economic trends; the AAF was not entirely innocent in this 
disaster. The occupying coalition seized territories responsible for a disproportionately 
215 
 
large share of Germany’s industrial capacity, and also a small share of the Reich’s labor 
force (Lauterbach 1944, Dawson 1933). In an open economy, this might have been 
remedied through trade flows and internationalized production, but international trade 
was shrinking rather than growing as industrialized European states transitioned to an 
autarkic political economy (Frieden 2007). During the lowest point of the inflationary 
crisis, France and Belgium seized the Ruhr, another major source of German industrial 
production. All the while, the occupying coalition refused to restructure their debt 
obligations and thus their reparation demands, providing assistance to Germany only after 
the domestic security environment became so dire that American interests (who 
themselves had withdrawn from the occupying coalition) intervened, primarily to ensure 
payment of Anglo-French war debt. Finally, while the Dawes Plan stabilized the 
situation, the incumbent reflationary policy locked in the losses of the German middle 
class along with the gains of the more radical Junker landowners. 
There is no doubt that the Great Inflation was an economic disaster. However, it 
was a man-made disaster that largely stemmed from the policies imposed by the 
occupying forces, notably reparations, punitive tariffs and the seizure of productive lands. 
This did not go unnoticed among the electorate—nationalists and ultranationalists 
considered the occupation, the Great Inflation and the “stab in the back” as intimately 
related issues (von Hindenburg 1994, Mommsen 1996, Nicholls 1991), and used the 
strife as artillery against moderate pro-democracy parties. Perhaps if the occupying 
coalition was unwilling to produce national security, they could at least have won support 
for the optimal winning coalition by producing economic and human security. The life 
raft arrived, but only after a large segment of the pro-democracy constituency drowned. 
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In this environment it would have been impossible for a foreign occupier to successfully 
narrow the spectrum of acceptable political contestation. Just the opposite, in fact: the 
AAF essentially lopped the top off of the bell curve. 
 
 
Summation of Findings and Conclusion 
The advent of democracy in Germany was far from hopeless. In the first two 
windows discussed here, the optimal coalition was strong electorally, albeit weak 
financially and disorganized militarily. From 1918 through 1925, the devastation of war, 
the decline of German territorial and military resources, and the Polish threat created the 
political space in which the occupying coalition could have consolidated the strength of 
the pro-fulfillment, and thus pro-democracy, elements. Unfortunately for German 
democrats, France and Belgium used their position of strength to further reduce the 
security of the German people, attempting to gain additional territorial cessions while 
aiding the Poles in their insurgency in Silesia and East Prussia. The other members of the 
occupying coalition, the United States and United Kingdom, were accommodating, both 
towards Germany but also towards France and Belgium. By the time relations between 
the Allies and Germany began to improve, the opportunity of the Polish threat had 
subsided, and the information produced by the Allied forces and their treatment of 
Germany had established detrimental beliefs among German constituencies regarding the 
value of supporting pro-fulfillment, pro-democratic coalitions. 
 With the decline in the Polish threat, and with the assistance of the Soviet Union 
in secretly re-arming Germany, the Allies forfeited their chance to serve as allies to a 
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democratic Reich. Instead, the negative reputation of the AAF and the uneven economic 
recovery ensured that while improving relations would yield some support for the optimal 
domestic coalition, this support was insufficient to help democratic interests regroup 
before the next disaster, far greater in magnitude. Aided by these politico-economic 
factors, along with serendipitous historical coincidences (such as the postponing of 
presidential elections from 1930-1932), anti-democratic factions leveraged the 
radicalization of German politics into a takeover of her democratic institutions. The 
lesson to take from this history is that no single event is solely responsible for the rise of 
Hitler and the fall of the Weimar Republic. Rather, the confluence of the Great 
Depression, the failure of the Ruhr Occupation, the Great Inflation, the harsh and 
inconsistent enforcement and promulgation of the Versailles peace, and the institutional 
choices made early on in the German revolution brought Hitler to power. In other words, 
while the Great Depression was the straw that broke the camel’s back, it was the conduct 
of the AAF that conferred the majority of the burden. 
The security configuration during the occupation period neither helped nor 
hindered the occupiers and the democratic coalition from an objective standpoint. What it 
did was create an opportunity for the AAF to serve as an ally to Germany against rising 
powers in Eastern Europe. By exploiting these opportunities, the AAF could have 
consolidated enduring political power within the optimal domestic coalition. Instead, by 
disregarding them the AAF permanently established itself as an enemy to the optimal 
coalition. The elimination of military employment exacerbated the labor economy and 
fueled the rise of extra-parliamentary violence emanating from paramilitary politics. The 
218 
 
resultant decline in security led Germany to seek a protector. Ideally, this would have 
been the AAF. Instead, the Allies pushed Germany into the arms of the Soviet Union. 
In other words, weakening Germany was not poor strategy in and of itself. Indeed, 
by heeding Churchill’s advice, the AAF could have built a weak and willing Germany 
that was dependent outside military assistance (like post-WWII Germany and Japan). 
However, instead of aiding the Germans against a Polish-sponsored insurgency that 
disproportionately harmed Bavarian and Silesian agrarian interests, the French and 
Belgians often intervened on behalf of the insurgents while American and English forces 
stood mute. Germany found it had two enemies, the original French rival and now 
Poland. The Bavarians found they had three: the French, the Poles, and the left-center 
government that continued to cooperate with them. As a result, the Germans turned to the 
Soviet Union for security, while the Bavarians threw their lot in with the Freikorps, the 
Stalhelm and, later, the SA. 
The AAF could have taken leadership over the German economic system early in 
the process. Conversely, they could have completely avoided any interference in German 
economic affairs. Instead, the AAF dictated its economic demands to the new 
government—the military and diplomatic officials overriding their own economic 
advisors—and left the new government to find a way to meet those demands on their 
own, with no assistance and hardly any guidance until the situation had reached the level 
of political, economic and humanitarian crisis. The result was constant fluctuation in 
interest and exchange rates, reducing the informational content of market transactions and 
thus the supply of information about returns on future investment. By failing to clarify 
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the strategic setting for investment, the AAF failed to establish a favorable environment 
for the economic betterment of the optimal domestic coalition. 
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Chapter 6: South Korea, 1945-1950 
Introduction 
The case of the attempted democratization of the American occupation zone in 
Korea is the most unqualified failure depicted in this dissertation. While the Weimar 
Republic may have collapsed more dramatically and with the worst of repercussions, the 
first German republic at least enjoyed a full decade of democracy. The US and USSR 
jointly occupied the Korea following WWII, with the US military government taking 
control on September 8, 1945 (Liem 1949, Park 2002). Despite half-hearted talks on 
establishing a uniform policy with an aim to restoring a sovereign, united Korea, neither 
the Soviets nor the Americans successfully exercised authority on each other’s side of the 
38th Parallel. Thus, in the case of South Korea, the US military government remained the 
only relevant occupying power until the occupation ended on August 15, 1948 (Croissant 
2001). During the occupation, the official policy of the United States was to establish a 
democratic government in Seoul, regardless of whether or not said government would 
attain control over the entirety of the peninsula. Regardless, the military government 
often seemed to subordinate democracy promotion to repressing left-wing radicals (often 
at the expense of the center-left) and expediting the process of withdrawal.   
The first Republic of Korea was stillborn—a republic in name only. South 
Korea’s first government was replete with the trappings of democracy but lacking in 
some of the most basic democratic characteristics, including open recruitment, respect for 
civil rights and adherence to the rule of law. Thus, the period of observation extends from 
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1945 only through 1950—the first year that data sets such as Polity IV consider South 
Korea a sovereign state. I shall present evidence demonstrating that, during this period, 
the case of the occupation of South Korea confirms the intra-case working hypotheses put 
forward in Chapter 2. I shall also explain how competing hypotheses and endogenous 
economic variables fail to explain the whole of the case. 
 
 
Rival Hypotheses versus Case History 
Rival Hypothesis: Leadership Failure 
 Channing Liem (1949) predicted the failure of the American occupation of Korea 
before it actually concluded. Citing a combination of negligence and inconsistency on the 
part of the occupation authorities and Washington, Liem anticipated the monopolization 
of South Korean politics by Syngman Rhee and the deterioration of the democratic 
institutions that the AMG imposed on the territory. Liem correctly cites the lack of 
planning that went into the Korean occupation before the end of WWII. Unlike the 
substantial attention that the US paid to postwar planning in Germany and Japan, Korea 
was an afterthought at best. This lack of planning left US policymakers woefully 
undereducated about the preferences, politics and complex socioeconomic situation of the 
society that they were about to engage. Truman, the Departments of War (later Defense) 
and State, MacArthur and Hodge all consistently underestimated the amount of time and 
energy required to stabilize the zone economically and politically. Despite American 
claims that the Koreans would get to choose their own leader, Liem accuses Hodge of 
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foisting Syngman Rhee—an expatriate who rode out the Japanese occupation in 
Washington, DC, and who had been disavowed by the Korean government-in-exile 
(Cumings 1981)—on the Korean people. In doing so, Hodge failed to lend his support to 
moderates that would have acted as better custodians of nascent democratic institutions. 
Bruce Cumings (1981) makes a related claim, blaming Hodge’s single-minded 
campaign to eliminate the threat of Soviet communist infiltration in the American 
occupation zone. The fear of communist interference in AMG occupation party drove the 
military government to isolate, marginalize and eliminate left-leaning radicals. However, 
it also led Hodge and the occupation authorities were seemingly incapable of separating 
the radicals from the left-leaning moderates—members of the optimal winning coalition 
who associated with Communists during WWII or supported causes as innocuous as 
labor unionization and the redistribution of former Japanese colonial possessions. This 
led Hodge to back nationalists Rhee and Kim Ku—a radical nationalist who was 
implicated in more than one assassination attempt and embarked upon a rather hopeless 
coup against the AMG. According to Cumings, Hodge allowed Rhee and Kim free reign 
over the most powerful organs of state, including the police. They used the police to 
further marginalize the liberal left while permitting right-wing extremists free reign. 
According to both Liem and Cumings, Hodge realized his mistake only too late. By the 
time it was clear that Rhee was not the right choice, he had already gained control of the 
police and strong-armed the moderate forces that might challenge him. Even then, Hodge 
refused to cut his losses and retract his support. Essentially, Liem and Cumings accuse 




The weakness in this line of argument is the assumption that there was no 
overwhelming preference for Rhee and other nationalists in Korea. This is a weakness 
only because we lack hard data on electoral preferences in pre-sovereign South Korea, 
and the available data do not provide as much insight as they do in other cases. In 
occupied South Korea, partisan politics revolved around personalities rather than 
platforms and programs (Croissant 2001). Moreover, independent candidates with 
ambiguous ideological positions won large shares of the vote (Ibid). Finally, the vast 
majority of this data is for elections to the National Assembly, only the final of a series of 
attempts at a South Korean government that formed long after the nationalists allegedly 
began to employ the organs of political violence to skew electoral outcomes. Cumings 
does cite the apparent popularity of the Korean People’s Republic, a left-leaning coalition 
of communists and liberals that formed between the end of WWII and the arrival of the 
AMG, as evidence that the nationalists lacked popular support. However, Cumings 
himself provides the best study on the KPR, and his research agenda precludes the 
prudent researcher from relying solely on his findings. Moreover, since the outgoing 
Japanese colonial regime was responsible for organizing the precursor to the KPR (the 
Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence, or CPKI), there is some question as 
to the degree of voluntary support for the KPR as well. 
The hypothesis that the US was unprepared for their experience in Korea does 
find some support in the historical record. The AMG did in fact frequently underestimate 
the amount of time and energy it would take to build a stable government in their 
occupation zone, making no fewer than four attempts to build a provisional government. 
Moreover, Hodge and the AMG frequently overestimated the support of the Korean right 
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for occupation policy as well as the disloyalty of the Korean left (Park 2002, Oh 2002a). 
Most damningly, Hodge admittedly overestimated Syngman Rhee’s interest in a 
democratic Korean government and assumed a confluence of interests when none existed 
(Cumings 1981). When Hodge realized this mistake, he refused to withdraw his support 
(Ibid). Such miscalculations belie an information asymmetry that implies an absence of 
forethought. However, we should not place so much emphasis on the importance of pre-
occupation planning. Neither of the initial plans for the American occupations of 
Germany and Japan closely resembled ultimate occupation policy.  
 
Rival Hypothesis: Prewar Modernization (or lack thereof) 
 In addition to supporting the wrong people, Cumings charges the AMG with 
failing to implement socioeconomic reforms that would have put South Korea on a more 
favorable course to democracy. The AMG in Korea never attempted a comprehensive 
reform of the political economy in its occupation zone. Contrast this to Japan, where 
MacArthur & Co. implemented land reform and stabilized the Japanese yen, or to 
Germany, where the US and UK directly injected capital in to the region while curbing 
inflation. In Korea, there were no direct capital injections for reconstruction efforts, no 
currency stabilization schemes and no land reform until the occupation was nearly over 
(Farley 1950; only Japanese colonial holdings, not land owned by absentee landlords, fell 
under the aegis of the plan). There was an attempt to open the market for agricultural 
goods, but this succeeded only in fueling inflation without a subsequent increase in 
production. That inflation, especially in the price of rice, allowed landed interests to shore 
up their own positions in the new regime. Combined with the favoritism the AMG 
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demonstrated towards right-moderates and right-wing extremists, elections for the 
various provisional governments disproportionately represented the interests of landlords 
(Matray 1985, Oliver 1999, Oh 2002a) at the expense of professionals and the industrial 
working class. Landed interests and right-wing bureaucrats, fearing the possibility of a 
peasant-based, communist revolution akin to the one occurring simultaneously in China, 
chose authoritarianism over democracy. 
 As noted in the opening chapter, agrarian political economies (with their low per 
capita incomes) and inequality do tend to undermine democratic consolidation. 
Democratic institutions pose a redistributive threat to owners of land-based wealth 
factors. The fear is that less privileged interests will use legislative authority to confiscate 
land or to levy extortive taxes on property, raw materials and commodities (Boix 2003). 
This threat could lead land owners to push for constitutional safeguards on private 
property, contracts and taxation. In a low-information environment when institutions are 
young and protections afforded by constitutional safeguards are uncertain, this fear also 
creates an incentive to block democratic reforms altogether. Such fears are not 
unfounded. Koreans did call for the redistribution of both Japanese colonial holdings and 
fallow farmland deeded to absentee landlords. Just across the East Sea, Hodge’s boss—
General MacArthur—authorized a comprehensive land reform that successfully 
redistributed holdings from absentee Japanese landlords to tenant farmers. It is perfectly 
understandable in this circumstance that the wealthiest South Koreans would choose a 
mild authoritarianism over a democratic regime, especially if that regime had the backing 
of a powerful occupation government.  
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 Neither of Liem’s or Cumings’ explanations fully explains the failure of 
democracy in this case, but they are supportive of the hypotheses of the Marginal Value 
Model. States that do not plan enough before they occupy another state are plausibly less 
likely to make the necessary commitment to domestic pro-democracy elements and to the 
security of the occupied state in general, if only because the lack of planning indicates a 
lack of interest in the region itself. The fears that Liem shared as a contemporary and the 
failures that Cumings saw in retrospect both support the theory occupiers must narrow 
the range of acceptable political contestation in order to foster and protect democracy in 
the long run. The initial strength of the optimal winning coalition becomes irrelevant 
when the occupying force uses its power to marginalize them and empower others. By 
looking at the case through the Marginal Value Model, we see below what effects the 
conditions cited in the rival hypotheses had on the prospects for stable democracy, as 
well as others that played a larger, if not more obvious, role. 
 
 
Test of Working Hypotheses versus Case History 
Threat Environment 
 Despite Edelstein’s (2004, 2008) characterization—that there was no significant 
foreign threat during the US occupation of South Korea—there is substantial reason to 
view the threat environment as critical. By some measures, this may have been the most 
threatening of the four cases in this dissertation. The external threat to South Korea 
existed on three dimensions: historical, geopolitical and contemporary. From an historical 
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standpoint, the Korean peninsula was a long-
standing target of great power expansion. 
Imperial Russia and Japan competed over the 
territory until Japan established its superiority 
following the Russo-Japanese War and the 
Treaty of Portsmouth. The reason for this 
competition was geopolitical: Korea was a 
source of arable land (desired by a resource-
poor Japan) and seafaring warm-water ports (particularly valuable to a hemmed-in and 
frequently ice-bound Russian Empire). This was no less true one-half century later. What 
changed was the forward position of military forces arranged behind the porous boundary 
of the 38th parallel, at first the property of the USSR and later that of a Soviet-trained and 
–armed North Korean army. Finally, both the Soviet Union and the provisional 
government in the North deliberately and repeatedly provoked their counterparts south of 
the 38th. The next few paragraphs will demonstrate that, from any objective standpoint, 
the occupied society that would become the Republic of Korea faced a dire existential 
threat that yielded an exceptional opportunity for the United States to produce marginal 
occupation value. 
 History indicates that the two primary threats to Korean sovereignty prior to 
WWII were Imperial Russia and Japan, with a heavy emphasis on Japan. In the late 
nineteenth century, both Russia and Japan maintained spheres of influence on the Korean 
Peninsula. In 1896, they mutually recognized each other’s interest in the territory, 
agreeing that the Soviets would control the north and the Japanese the south, separated 
Table 6.1: Influences on the Threat 
Environment in South Korea 
 
More Threatening 
• Historical Russian interest in 
Korean Peninsula 
• Geopolitical vulnerability 
• Direct Soviet control of 
government in North 
• Division and mutual non-
recognition of governments in 
Pyongyang and Seoul 







by—notably—the 38th Parallel (Fisher 1954). This arrangement was nullified by Japan’s 
1905 victory in the Russo-Japanese War, after which the two belligerents agreed in the 
Treaty of Portsmouth—brokered by the United States—to place the entirety of the 
Peninsula under Japanese dominion (L and G 1946, Krishnan 1984). Japan formally 
annexed the territory by 1910, with American approval (L and G 1946, Hart-Landsberg 
1998, Cha 1999). 
Korean life under Japanese rule turned for the worst after Japan’s invasion of 
China in 1937. Starting that year, through the end of WWII, Japan forcibly immigrated 
over 700,000 Koreans to assist in the war effort (Caprio 2007). Most were drafted into 
labor, but after 1943 the Japanese used them as soldiers (Hart-Landsberg 1998). 
Meanwhile, Japan systematically attempted to cleanse Korea of its cultural identity, 
banning all independent organizations, the use of the Korean language in all instruction, 
publications and public meetings, and forcing Koreans to adopt Japanese names (Ibid). 
These policies continued until the end of the war, and they firmly established Japan as the 
greatest threat to Korean security and autonomy. 
The conclusion of WWII and the maneuvers of two victorious superpowers 
during an eighteen-day period in mid-August 1945 largely determined the geopolitics of 
the Korean occupation. On August 8, the Soviet Union fulfilled the obligation they took 
on at Yalta and entered the war against Japan (Hart-Landsberg 1998, Stueck 2002, van 
Ree 1989, N. G. Kim 1997). The US and USSR agreed on the 38th Parallel as the 
appropriate line of division on the 16th (Cumings 1981, Stueck 2002, van Ree 1989) On 
the 25th and 26th, Soviet troops took up positions along the 38th Parallel (van Ree 1989). 
In sum, one half of the peninsula was once again under the control of a foreign power that 
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once (albeit, under a different regime) had expansionist aspirations in the area. Moreover, 
the boundary of occupation was an imaginary line of latitude that correlated with the pre-
colonial division of Korea into spheres of influence but provided no strategic barrier to 
invasion in either direction. And why should it? Korea was to be reunited and, in time, 
granted independence, if the Americans and Soviets were to be believed. A Russian 
presence on the Peninsula, this time en force, may very well have raised some alarms. 
Indeed, Syngman Rhee pushed the US to recognize the Korean government-in-exile—to 
which he could no longer claim any direct ties but nevertheless presumed to represent in 
Washington (Cumings 1981)—as the legitimate government of all Korea. Rhee pushed 
Washington to embrace Korea as a bulwark against Russian expansionism (Oliver 1999). 
The plea for a positive security relationship from the man who would run South Korea is 
a powerful indicator than an opportunity to produce security goods and increase the 
occupation’s marginal value existed and that the US was aware of it. 
In essence, with the defeat of Japan in WWII, Korea’s most recent oppressor had 
been heeled. However, it was replaced in part by another threat. In a relative sense, this 
new threat was chronologically distant and lacked the horrifying record of Japanese 
colonialism. In an absolute and hypothetical sense, this new threat wanted something 
(strategically valuable ports) that Korea had and, now more powerful than either Imperial 
Russia in 1904 or Japan in 1937, had the capability to take it.72 The Soviet Union now 
loomed large over a Korea that would be relatively weak even if it remained united. The 
territory is of course a peninsula, hemmed in by water and, at the time, a distracted but 
72 This is not to say that the USSR expressed a specific interest in taking over Korea, but 
rather that Korea had reason to be concerned: they possessed something of military value 
but not the resources to keep others from taking it.  
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unstable Republic of China. The Soviet Union also shared a sliver of border with what is 
now North Korea, while Korean territorial waters are easily accessible from the port city 
of Vladivostok. A state that emerged south of the occupation line would be especially 
weak: the southern reaches were agrarian and unindustrialized, lacking the capital to 
build weapons and the natural resources to power them.73 Moreover, the 38th Parallel 
itself provides no natural barrier. All told, the national capabilities of either a united or 
divided Korea paled in comparison to the industrial capacity and manpower that any 
middling, great or “super” power would bring to bear in the region, even one that was 
devastated in a recent war and aligned primarily towards the west. From an objective 
standpoint, the threat environment was critical. 
The objectively critical threat environment edged towards an explicitly critical 
state as both regions developed their own provisional governments. Each occupier sought 
to create a government in its own image. While the US occupation authorities made 
several attempts to establish a nationalist-leaning parliamentary democracy in their zone 
(more on this below), the USSR quickly established a “Provisional People’s Committee” 
in the north, populated by the parties compatible with Soviet occupation policy and led 
by a hand-picked communist freedom fighter by the name of Kim Il Sung (van Ree 1989, 
Washburn 1947). The establishment of the People’s Committee in February 1946 
coincided with a purge of bourgeois parties and politicians in the Soviet zone (Ibid). 
Almost immediately, AMG-backed reconnaissance claimed that Soviet-led military 
maneuvers north of the 38th signaled an imminent invasion (Cumings 1981). It was a 
73 The Japanese had oriented industrial development of their domain in the north, where 




                                                 
false alarm, but it grew out of a fear that the thinly disguised Soviet puppet state in 
Pyongyang posed a material threat to the security to the South as well as the likelihood of 
a peaceable reunification of Korea.74 The eventual establishment of a provisional 
government south of the 38th Parallel only crystallized the division, as did the failure of 
the first US-Soviet Joint Commission and the resultant diplomatic volleys and 
recriminations.75 These failures increased the likelihood that one or both provisional 
governments would attempt to unify the peninsula by force, thereby amplifying the 
already precarious threat environment. 
Soviet-American negotiations over the fate of the territory dragged on through 
1947 without resolution (Oh 2002a, 2002b, Matray 1985, Stueck 2002). During that time, 
the Soviets reduced their troop commitment from 40,000 to 10,000 (van Ree 1989). This 
reduction in Soviet troops in 1946 only preceded the construction of a 100,000-strong 
volunteer army in the north by the end of 1947, supplied and trained by the USSR 
(McCune 1947a), easily outnumbering its equivalent in the south. Tensions increased as 
it became clear that the US and Soviet Union would be unable to reach an agreement on 
unification and independence. In May 1948, following elections to South Korea’s first 
representative assembly—but before the end of the US occupation—and following 
months of threats to do so, the Soviet occupation authorities in the north (not yet 
officially the DPRK) cut transmission of power from their hydroelectric plants to the 
74 Just as the establishment of a more-or-less pro-American government in the South 
would give those north of the 38th cause to worry about the prospects of unification. 
75 Following the adjournment of the Joint Commission, the USSR closed its consulate in 
Seoul and blocked the establishment of an American consulate in Pyongyang (van Ree 
1989). That fall, in the UN, the Soviets (who still retained over 10,000 troops in the 




                                                 
south (Morley 1965, Dobbs 1985, Matray 1985). The Soviets offered to restore power 
only if the US recognized the Provisional People’s Committee (Matray 1985). This 
represented the first direct provocation, and educated anyone who was not already aware 
about the relative military and economic disadvantage of the emerging Republic of 
Korea.  
After the USSR removed the last of its occupation forces from the north, they left 
behind a few hundred military advisors (van Ree 1989, Morley 1965). More importantly, 
the USSR maintained total control over North Korean trade—rendering the new state a 
de facto suzerainty of the Soviet Union (Ibid)—while commencing a crash course of 
modernization and mechanization of the North Korean People’s Army (K.-K. Kim 1995). 
The first border skirmishes between DPRK and ROK troops began not long after (Hart-
Landsberg 1998). Such was the situation that South Korea faced at the end of the 
American occupation. In the north was a separate state, backed by a superpower with a 
forward position in the region and good reason to covet the geopolitical advantages that 
the Korean Peninsula conferred. The Soviet-backed DPRK boasted a substantial, rapidly 
modernizing army that was separated from the South only by an imaginary line on a 
map—and that was beginning to press its advantage. 
The threat to South Korea and the provisional regime that preceded it had roots in 
turn-of-the-century great power competition, the distribution of geographic defenses and 
material capabilities in 1945, and the signals produced by the Soviet Union and the 
northern provisional government during the timeframe of the case. At any given point 
after 1945 there was a very real and very obvious threat to the southern regime, and this 
threat grew critical by 1949. The critical nature of the threat is confirmed the invasion of 
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North Korean troops the following year. Considering the geographic and military 
disadvantages that South Korea faced, the threat environment in this case is all but 
certainly the most critical of all four cases in this dissertation. In no other case was the 
possibility of interstate conflict so great as it was on the Korean Peninsula in 1949, and in 
no other case would the outbreak of war so likely result in the destruction of the regime 
and its inchoate institutions—absent the intervention of a powerful foreign state. This 
threat environment was favorable to the production of marginal occupation value, an 
opportunity the US was well positioned to exploit. The United States maintained its own 
forward positions in the region—not just in Korea but also in Japan—and enjoyed naval 
superiority in the corresponding littorals and open seas. Now boasting the world’s most 
potent military, and emerging relatively unscathed from the ravages of the Second World 
War, there is little doubt that the US—if so motivated—could have produced marginal 
occupation value by offering a credible commitment to defend the territorial integrity and 
existential prospects of a nascent Republic of Korea. 
 
Signaling Security Value 
It was into this threat environment that the United States initiated the military 
occupation of Korea. On September 7, 1945, General MacArthur—in his capacity as 
Allied commander in the Pacific—issued Proclamation #1 formally establishing the 
American Military Government (AMG) in Korea south of the 38th Parallel (Hart-
Landsberg 1998). General Hodge and the 24th Corps of Tenth Army arrived at Inchon on 
September 8 (Oh 2002a, Sook 2002, Park 2002, Hart-Landsberg 1998, N. G. Kim 1997, 
Liem 1949). The threat environment present in this case provided an excellent 
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opportunity for the AMG to signal a credible 
defensive commitment. In doing so, the 
occupation could have produced marginal 
security and created a political space in which 
moderate democratic coalitions could survive 
and thrive. A state in a threat environment as 
precarious as Korea’s in 1945 cannot rely on 
internal balancing alone to ensure its own 
security. Potential external balancers would 
have to be capable enough to deter the local 
threat, demonstrate a credible commitment to Korean security, and communicate their 
resolve to intervene if necessary. The only state in the international system that could 
possibly have fulfilled all three criteria at that time was the United States. Objectively, 
the threat environment in 1945 provided the opportunity for the United States—and only 
the United States—to produce marginal security. 
However, the US was not successful in doing so, either as a result of a failure to 
intentionally protect South Korean interests or an indifference to South Korean 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. In terms of convincing domestic elements in Korea 
that they came bearing gifts of security and prosperity, the US military and government 
had already dug themselves quite a hole before they had a chance to climb out. Prior to 
WWII, the United States had publicly and explicitly approved of Japan’s dominion over 
Korea. While mediating negotiations for the Treaty of Portsmouth (which concluded the 
Russo-Japanese War), the US and Japan agreed to recognize each other’s influence over 
Table 6.2: Indicators of Occupation 
Security Value in South Korea 
 
Positive 
• US defeat of Japan 
• Signals of aid for Korea 
(unrealized) 
• Modest remilitarization 
 
Negative 
• US support for Japanese 
annexation 
• US demands for Koreans to 
obey Japanese administrators 
• Retention of colonial-era 
regulations and personnel 
• Moscow Declaration 
• US-Japan security cooperation 
• Undersized US aid to Korea 





the Philippines and Korea, respectively (Cha 1999). When Japan officially occupied 
Korea in 1910, the United States was the first state to recognize the annexation (Caprio 
2007). After Woodrow Wilson called for self-determination in his Fourteen Points 
speech, Syngman Rhee, then with the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, 
called on the United States to liberate Korea from Japan and steward Korea’s transition to 
independence. Washington refused to heed Rhee’s entreaties, reluctant to disturb the 
balance of naval power in the Pacific or queer the deal that preserved American influence 
in the Philippines (Choi 2002).  
The US relationship with Korea grew no closer as Washington resumed its cozy 
relationship with Tokyo. By 1947, MacArthur was set on turning his once-mortal enemy 
into an American ally in the nascent Cold War. In doing so, the US very publicly 
broadcast its new commitment to the security and prosperity of Korea’s historic enemy 
across the East Sea. The United States’ about face on Japan (covered in detail in Chapter 
4) included efforts to remilitarize the state and culminated in formal security pact in 
September 1951 (Tsuzuki 2000, Destler, Sato, et al. 1976, Morley 1965, Eiji 2000). 
When considering what sort of signal this broadcast to Korea, note that by 1947, Korean 
repatriates from Japan—vast numbers of whom served as the indentured auxiliary to the 
Japanese war effort—represented 15% of the total South Korean population (Cumings 
1981). The memory of Japanese dominion was fresh and the wounds had yet to heal (Cha 
1999), and this was the country with which the United States had decided to be friends.  
In order to produce marginal security, the US not only needed to overcome the 
inherent threat that any occupying power posed to the occupied territory, but also make 
up for the role it played as accessory to Japan’s imperialist crimes and the new role it 
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played as Japan’s chief benefactor. This was by no means an insurmountable obstacle. 
One cannot overlook the fact that the occupiers were not so much conquerors as the force 
that had vanquished the Japanese colonial overlords, an advantage the US did not enjoy 
in its occupations of Germany or Japan. But it was an obstacle nonetheless. And if the US 
was sensitive to how their relationship with Japan would play in Korea, the actions of the 
occupying forces indicate otherwise. Initially, the ranking officer in the American 
Military Government (AMG), General John R. Hodge, planned to rely extensively on the 
Japanese colonial forces that remained in Korea (Park 2002). Before his arrival, he 
ordered the dropping of leaflets instructing Korean citizens to obey their Japanese 
overlords; privately he commanded his troops to treat Korea as enemy territory (Hart-
Landsberg 1998). He quickly backtracked when Washington objected to the employment 
of Japanese, but left it up to the Japanese themselves to nominate potential replacements 
from the local population (Hart-Landsberg 1998). 
Instead of liberating South Korea after four decades of subjugation, Hodge left 
many Korean institutions in the status quo ante bellum. The AMG initially ruled out any 
plans to redistribute Japanese colonial properties to Koreans, although they changed their 
position later (McCune 1947b). When the US reopened the Japanese-administered 
Korean schools that closed on V-J Day, they did so with Japanese administrators still at 
the helm (Armstrong 2003). On November 2, the AMG issued Ordinance 21, explicitly 
retaining all laws and ordinances that predated the Japanese surrender (Park 2002). These 
laws included those that the Japanese used to prohibit political opposition, including the 
Act Prohibiting Political Meetings of 1910 and others that prohibited free political 
expression (Cumings 1981). Perhaps most importantly, the US kept the Japanese colonial 
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police establishment—known as the National Police Force—and filled it with former 
collaborators (Han 1974). As late as December 1946, five hundred Japanese troops (not 
civilians) remained on the Korean peninsula, not as prisoners but as an auxiliary force in 
aid to the AMG (Caprio 2007). Incidentally, the AMG ignored the recommendation of 
the Left-Right Coalition Committee (an early attempt at a provisional government) that 
all former Japanese and collaborators be purged from government positions (Park 2002). 
Slowly but surely, the Hodge and the AMG were eroding Korean confidence that the 
United States would be an agent of liberation rather than continued oppression. 
The American plan for Korea was a temporary occupation that would help Korea 
transition from colony to sovereign state—a period of “tutelage.” Such plans did not sit 
well with Koreans who hoped for immediate independence. The US had been planning 
on a period of trusteeship for Korea as early as the Cairo Conference in late-1943. The 
Cairo Declaration promised independence for Korea, but “in due course” (Choi 2002, 
Cumings 1981, L and G 1946, Borton 1966). The Soviet Union signed onto this plan at 
Yalta in February 1945 (Choi 2002). Korean supporters of trusteeship were few and far 
between, Korean Democratic Party leader Song Chin-u being one of the lonely advocates 
of tutelage prior to the Moscow Conference (Ibid).76 Opponents to trusteeship occupied a 
diversity of positions on the ideological spectrum, including Yo Un-hyong on the left 
wing and right-wing nationalists Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku (Ibid). 
Domestic opposition notwithstanding, the US and USSR (and UK and nationalist 
China) settled on a maximum five-year period of trusteeship (Ibid, Cumings 1981, van 
76 Song reversed his position on December 29, 1945, one day before an agent working 




                                                 
Ree 1989, Han 1974, N. G. Kim 1997, Morley 1965, Choi 2002). The decision drew 
strong and swift rebuke. The Korean Democratic Party labeled trusteeship a Communist 
plot to divide Korea (Cumings 1981), despite the fact that the Korean Communists also 
initially opposed trusteeship (Choi 2002). The Korean People’s Party joined the chorus 
(Ibid). Moderate Song Chin-u, who initially favored trusteeship, reversed his position 
(just prior to his assassination by anti-trusteeship radicals; Ibid). Syngman Rhee publicly 
broke with Hodge for the first time over the issue (Oliver, Transition and Continuity in 
Korean-American Relations in the Postwar Period 1999). The Korean Communist Party 
would eventually reverse its position (under pressure from its counterpart in the North 
and the Soviet Union) but the rest of the Korean political scene remained strongly 
opposed (Choi 2002, Cumings 1981, Morley 1965). Facing massive domestic opposition, 
Hodge did his best to spin trusteeship favorably—perhaps to the point of insubordination. 
Publicly, Hodge claimed that the US wanted to leave as soon as possible and blamed the 
Soviet Union for the trusteeship provision of the Moscow Declaration, and US Secretary 
of State Byrnes clarified that trusteeship would end as soon as the US and Soviet Union 
reached agreement on an exit strategy (Cumings 1981, Sook 2002). Hoping to corral 
unstable domestic groups and constituencies, Hodge began to secretly rally opposition to 
the Moscow Declaration  (Cumings 1981).77 
77 Cumings’ (1981) characterization of the episode depicts Hodge stirring anti-trusteeship 
sentiment in an attempt to challenge official policy. I find this assertion questionable. 
Even a cursory review of the historical record indicates that anti-trusteeship elements in 
South Korea required no outside assistance to arouse their constituencies. The prior 
declarations of Yo, Rhee, Kim Ku and others—most importantly their riotous response to 
the Moscow Declaration—and the near absence of any pro-trusteeship sentiment should 
have, would have, made this patently clear all but the most oblivious American officer. 
One could just assume that General Hodge was in fact the most oblivious American 
officer, but this is a lazy assumption. The sound assumption, and the one that yields a 
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Along with a quick return of sovereignty, Koreans desired unification. 
Washington delivered neither. Following the Moscow Communiqué, the two occupiers 
formed the US-USSR Joint Commission in order to reach a compromise on the Korean 
question (Choi 2002, Morley 1965, Oh 2002a). The first attempt to reach an agreement 
was a failure, and the commission dissolved in a matter of months. When MacArthur 
offered suggestions on how best to pull out of Korea in January 1947, he and officials 
back in the US already assumed that there would be no cooperation from the Soviet 
Union (Matray 1985). By the time a second US-USSR Joint Commission convened in 
May 1947 (Lee 2006, Wells 1948), the US was set on an independent track (Morley 
1965). Part of this new strategy involved submitting the Korean question to the United 
Nations (Matray 1985). Knowing that the USSR would likely oppose UN intervention in 
their zone, policymakers in Washington were confident that this would force a two-state 
solution (Ibid). In the summer and autumn of 1947, the US took the necessary steps to 
request a UN resolution of the Korean matter, including a nationwide election for a 
provisional government and joint troop withdrawal (Ibid, Oh 2002a, Oliver 1999, Hart-
Landsberg 1998, Lee 2006, Stueck 2002, Morley 1965). 
more rigorous test, is that Hodge was in fact aware of the situation and retained an 
ulterior motive for his rabble rousing. While Hodge opposed trusteeship, he could not 
publicly state so without drawing charges of insubordination from Washington. Nor 
would his verbal opposition seem credible to Koreans without some sort of collateral to 
back up his claims. Hodge’s private support for anti-trusteeship activities was the 
collateral he needed, the costly signal that might retain the cooperation of Rhee, Kim 
Kyu-sik and the other “respectable” (read: conservative) factions. Doing so privately, he 
avoided opprobrium from Washington and—insofar as it mattered—Moscow. This is a 
far more plausible explanation of Hodge’s behavior than one that has him stoking a fire 
that blazed furiously before him, and one that bears the added benefit of compatibility 
with the underpinnings of the Working Model. 
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In October, the US delegation moved to form the United Nations Temporary 
Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), a motion that was formally approved by the General 
Assembly on November 11, 1947 (Hart-Landsberg 1998, Oliver 1999). The motion also 
called for elections no later than March 31, 1948, a provision that pleased Rhee and other 
nationalists (Oliver 1999). Eight states’ delegations comprised UNTCOK: China, 
Canada, Australia, the Philippines, France, India, El Salvador and Syria (Hart-Landsberg 
1998). The Soviet delegation understandably protested, claiming that such a motion 
violated the UN Charter articles pertaining to joint consultation and postwar settlements 
(Articles 32 and 107; Hart-Landesberg 1998). When the USSR signaled that they would 
deny UNTCOK access to the north, the US successfully set about convincing the UN to 
follow through on the motion below the 38th Parallel (Oh 2002a). 
The UNTCOK delegation arrived at Seoul in January 1948 (Lee 2006, Hart-
Landsberg 1998, Oliver 1999). Opinion in the South was split. Rhee supported the idea of 
separate elections in the South (as he would, since he felt he had the support to win 
them), while Kim Ku denounced the latest version of foreign intervention in Korean 
affairs (Oliver 1999). In February, the UN backed the American delegation’s position and 
ordered UNTCOK to proceed with elections wherever they were capable of holding them 
(Hart-Landsberg 1998, Lee 2006). Nevertheless, the plan went forward, leading to 
elections in the South and a new republic. The Soviets responded by establishing their 
own government in Pyongyang. The American delegation won one more victory when 
the UN recognized the government in Seoul as the legitimate government of all Korea 
(Hart-Landsberg 1998, N. G. Kim 1997). Ostensibly, the occupation authorities 
succeeded in establishing a government that was anti-Communist and democratic, but the 
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division of Korea created two issues. The first was that the southern state was inherently 
insecure without American assistance. The second was that it failed to resolve a primary 
grievance held by Korean citizens opposed to the occupation. 
It is possible that the Soviet Union sensed dissatisfaction among those Koreans in 
the South with the American Military Government. While civil unrest continued and the 
US continued to implement unpopular ordinances, the Soviet Union appeared to be 
devolving authority to local elements (Park 2002). North of the 38th Parallel, the USSR 
retained the People’s Committees established by Yo Un-hyong and the CPKI before the 
official start of the occupation; superficially, the North appeared calm. 78 This, and the 
uproar over trusteeship, may have encouraged the AMG to begin devolving power to 
local authorities in March 1946 (Ibid). This process included a demobilization of several 
key military posts, the handing over of administrative duties to Korean civilians, and the 
general attempt to build a provisional government populated by Koreans (Ibid, Cumings 
1981).  
In an alternate history, these could have been the first signs of an about-face on 
American occupation policy—much like the reverse course that MacArthur implemented 
in Japan. In this history, however, Korea was hardly ever a priority for Washington. For 
instance, Hodge and the AMG operated without instructions from Washington well into 
October 1945 (Park 2002). Foreign aid to Korea in the year ending 1945 totaled a paltry 
$4.9 million (Morley 1965). Aid levels rose to $49.5 million in 1946, $175 million in 
78 We now know this to be an illusion, that the local Korean authorities were Soviet 
puppets, and that the calm was less indicative of public sentiment and more indicative of 
the occupiers’ ruthlessness. As Edelstein (2004, 2008) asserts, the Soviet occupation of 
North Korea may be the only modern example of a state successfully realizing its 
occupation goals solely via repression. 
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1947, $180 million in 1948 and $116.5 million in 1949 (Ibid), but the cost of the 
occupation was nothing but a source of consternation to the War Department and, later, 
the Department of Defense. As early as January 1947, General MacArthur and the War 
Department were citing cost overruns resulting from occupation management as a 
rationale for evacuating the peninsula as soon as possible (Matray 1985). 
Plans to evacuate Korea ahead of schedule did not dissuade the State Department 
from devising a plan for social and economic reform in Korea, not dissimilar from its 
plans for Germany and Japan. The plan—which called for the stabilization and 
rehabilitation of the industrial and agricultural sectors—was never fully implemented due 
to lack of support from Congress and the War Department, and the already-dilapidated 
state of the economy in South Korea (Park 2002). Yet for a while, there were signs that 
policymakers stateside might elevate Korea to the level of priority accorded Japan and 
Western Europe in General. In February 1947, then Undersecretary of State Dean 
Acheson called upon Secretary Marshall to request $600 million in reconstruction aid for 
Korea, to be distributed over a three-year period (McGlothlen 1989, Matray 1985, Park 
2002). Acheson also called for a high commissioner to replace Hodge and the AMG, and 
argued that US forces should remain in Korea until the US could guarantee the territorial 
integrity of a democratic Korean state (Ibid). This represents the first example of an 
American official seriously calling for a long-term commitment to a democratic Korea. If 
there were constituencies in the South who still looked to the United States as a guarantor 
of security and prosperity, the spring of 1947 would have been their most optimistic 
season. On March 12, in his famous “Doctrine” speech, President Harry S. Truman 
(1947) pledged to "assist free peoples to work out their own destinies." In May, Acheson 
243 
 
spoke publicly about the benefits of rebuilding postwar Asian economies (McGlothlen 
1989). Later that month, he presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a three-
year Korean aid plan totaling $540 million (Ibid, Matray 1985 N.G. Kim 1995; 
opposition from the War Department had already caused Acheson to pare the request 
down by $60 million). 
 That request would remain the most promising signal from the United States, as it 
was soon erased by congressional politics and lack of interest. The aid bill never did 
reach a vote on the floor of the Senate (McGlothlen 1989). There was some talk of 
approving a one-year, $215 million appropriation, but Truman opposed this on the 
grounds that it would divert from funding for European reconstruction (Matray 1985). In 
late June, Senate Foreign Relations Chair Vandenberg decided to refuse all grants-in-aid 
requests for Korea (Ibid). The following month, MacArthur abandoned plans to fund 
Korean reconstruction with Japanese reparations (Park 2002). This ensured that all 
money sent to Korea during the occupation period would be directed towards basic 
occupation maintenance and preparations for exit. The Joint Chiefs saw this as a 
necessity, since defense appropriations had been cut down to $13.1 billion from their 
wartime high of $81.6 billion; they saw a quick exit from Korea as a means of saving 
funds that were dwindling quickly (McGlothlen 1989). Despite a few small victories on 
Acheson’s parts, those who remained uncommitted to Korea in the long run succeeded in 
imposing their policy stateside. That same August, George Kennan declared Korea 
strategically unimportant and advised the JCS on a quick exit, a position they already 
held (McGlothlen 1989, N. G. Kim 1997). On the issue of economic assistance, Kennan 
called for disbursements through the Economic Cooperation administration small enough 
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to impose a minimal drain on the US economy and to avoid the implication of any 
commitment to South Korea (McGlothlen 1989). 
One last opportunity to rekindle Washington’s interest in Korea presented itself 
with Acheson’s reappointment as Secretary of State in January 1949 (McGlothlen 1989). 
Truman and Acheson hashed out a policy that would continue the military withdrawal but 
increase direct military and economic assistance (Ibid). Of course, this was after the 
occupation formally ended, once the US had already tipped their cards to domestic 
elements in the ROK. Besides, the promises were fleeting; Congress continued to reject 
any large financial outlays to South Korea until the start of the Korean War (Matray 
1985). 
The occupation’s effect on marginal security in this case was not entirely 
negative. Despite the initial wishes of MacArthur and those in Washington, Hodge did 
succeed in remilitarizing the South and rending the new state dependent on American 
security. By mid-1948, the AMG had raised a 50,000 strong constabulary from nothing, 
an army in all but name so as not to violate official policy or raise suspicions about US 
intentions in Korea (Matray 1985, Park 2002). In February 1948, Truman approved a 
plan that would pull American soldiers off of the Peninsula by the end of the year 
(Matray 1985). Washington agreed to delay their exit, however, leaving troops in the 
South to aid the new government in corralling insurgents (McGlothlen 1989). By the time 
the US left the constabulary had grown to 65,000, constituting the entirety of the South 
Korean armed forces (McGlothlen 1989). The small force left Rhee, who once called for 
the immediate departure of occupying forces, begging the US to keep its forces on the 
peninsula (Matray 1985). In short, the US succeeded in convincing domestic elements in 
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Korea that they relied on American forces for their security, only to tell them that they 
were out of luck. By 1950, even Acheson had given up on Korea when he declared the 
region beyond the “US security perimeter” (McGlothlen 1989). The Secretary of State 
effectively told the world—and most fatefully, Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang—that 
the US was not willing to risk American lives in the defense of Korean ones. In reality, 
he was only affirming publicly what Kennan, the National Security Council and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had settled on privately. 
The few positive signs that the US might commit itself long-term to the security 
of a Korean state were overwhelmed by American indifference. The evidence indicates 
that American actors, outside of perhaps General MacArthur and his staff, failed to see 
the threat posed by Kim, Mao and Stalin.79 While the security configuration during and 
immediately after the occupation of South Korea was not as destructive as it was during 
the occupation of the Rhineland a quarter century earlier, it was hardly constructive. 
Undoubtedly, the US was opposed to Soviet expansionism and the new communist 
regime in Beijing. Truman and Acheson saw “opportunities” to contain the Soviet Union 
in several regions: Central Europe, Indochina, Japan, the Philippines, Iran and Latin 
America. Acheson’s statement of January 1950, however, indicates that the US was not 
(yet) willing to extend the containment doctrine to the Korean Peninsula—or, for that 
matter, the Taiwan Strait. The US refused to commit fully to backing the Kuomintang 
during the civil war in Mainland China, and in January 1950 refused military support to 
79 There is in fact evidence that MacArthur and Rhee had leading edge intelligence 
suggesting an imminent invasion by North Korea, but they failed to pass it along to 
Washington (Stone 1952, Cumings 1983).  
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the exiled nationalists on the island of Formosa—operatives with whom Syngman Rhee 
and his bureaucracy had maintained close ties (Buhite 1978). 
Generally, the US made it clear that it was not getting into the business of 
defending small, precarious territories in East Asia against Communist aggression 
whether it derived from Beijing or Pyongyang. In October 1946, General Hodge 
lamented that there were not enough US forces to repel an invasion from the North 
(Matray 1985). What was perhaps hyperbole then was now the undeniable truth. The 
haste with which the US had made its exit from South Korea only emphasized a lack of 
interest in maintaining a forward position. Three days prior to the invasion that set off the 
Korean War, US administrators of the Korean Military Advisory Council—a small corps 
of just under 500 American military officers stationed in South Korea to help modernize 
the newly sovereign country’s armed forces—recommended a 50% reduction in forces  
(N. G. Kim 1997). 
 The swift—and initially very successful—North Korean invasion might have 
confirmed fears that the US was not committed to South Korean security. Just the same, 
US diplomatic maneuvering in the UN, MacArthur’s historic landing at Inchon, the UN 
counteroffensive, and the multi-year involvement in the Korean War (Morley 1965) 
might have changed some minds. Rhee saw things differently, however. Following the 
Chinese intervention, Truman (and later Eisenhower) set their sights on an armistice 
(Ibid). Rhee’s frame of reference, and that of his key constituency, was unification. A 
peace that seemed a best-case scenario to the US and the UN coalition was a strategic 
failure for pro-unification South Koreans. Rhee demonstrated his commitment to 
unification at a high cost by actively trying to sabotage peace talks between Washington, 
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Beijing and Pyongyang (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2009). But Rhee’s meddling aside, 
American escalation in Korea beginning in the summer of 1950 reveals the greatest irony 
of the occupation. It turns out, the United States was concerned with and willing to 
defend South Korean sovereignty and territorial integrity—they just failed to share this 
crucial bit of information with everyone else! Indeed, Truman and his cabinet failed 
recognize their own latent preferences regarding the Republic of Korea before it was very 
nearly driven into the sea. 
 
Facilitating Domestic Consolidation 
 The narrative of the AMG’s interaction with domestic elements in the southern 
occupation zone is one of multiple halting attempts to establish a provisional government 
that was both moderate and democratic. The landscape was not an easy one to navigate—
when AMG arrived there were already three different bodies politic competing to 
establish themselves as the legitimate government of a new Korean state. Singling out the 
optimal winning coalition was not easy. The political spectrum was replete with 
communists masquerading as liberals, liberals posing as communists and radical 
nationalists pretending to be moderates. In order to empower the appropriate coalition, 
Hodge needed to sift through these muddied partisan identities and identify moderate 
democrats who would cooperate with the military government. Ultimately, General 
Hodge chose to work through an anti-communist, nominally democratic coalition led by 
Syngman Rhee. 
General Hodge chose poorly. 
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When American occupation forces 
first reached Korea, they encountered Korean 
organizations already claiming to constitute a 
legitimate government. The Japanese 
established an interim regime to keep the 
peace in the interregnum, and the Korean left 
took advantage of this opportunity to establish 
a toehold in postwar Korean domestic politics. 
The Japanese placed Yo Un-hyong, a left-of-
center nationalist, in charge of the new 
government. Yo formed a coalition with communists and progressive nationalists under 
the banner of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence or CPKI (Hart-
Landsberg 1998, Han 1974, Park 2002). While the original raison d’être for the CPKI 
was peacekeeping and preventing reprisals against Japanese colonial officials, Yo and his 
compatriots set about organizing people’s committees across the peninsula that served as 
local governments (Han 1974, Cumings 1981). To this end, the CPKI renamed itself the 
Korean People’s Republic on September 6, 1945, declaring itself to be the legitimate 
government of Korea just before the Americans arrived (Ibid, Oh 2002a, Sook 2002, 
Hart-Landsberg 1998, C.-P. Park 2002, Oliver, Transition and Continuity in Korean-
American Relations in the Postwar Period 1999). Another competitor for the rightful 
government of Korea was the Korean Provisional Government, founded in Shanghai in 
1919 (Han 1974). In 1940, they formed a militant wing known as the Liberation Army, 
which fought alongside Chiang Kai-shek in China during WWII, killing both Japanese 
Table 6.3: Evidence of Facilitating 
Regime Consolidation in South Korea 
 
Constructive 
• Attempts to build representative 




• US support for anti-Communist, 
anti-democratic factions 
• US support for Rhee 
• US refusal to punish right-wing 
radicals 
• Initial refusal to redistribute 
Japanese, fallow Korean 
properties 
• Inability to control inflation 






invaders and Chinese Communists (Ibid). The two sides had very little in common other 
than joint preferences for independence and unification and a mutual opposition to 
trusteeship (Choi 2002). While the KPG was in exile at the time the occupation began, 
nationalists in Korea formed the “Preparatory Committee for Welcoming the Return of 
the Korean Provisional Government” (Cumings 1981). 
Truman prohibited the occupation authorities from endorsing any pre-existing 
coalitions (Oh 2002a). The AMG’s response to competing authority centers was swift 
and resolute. On September 7, 1945, General MacArthur simultaneously ordered the 
creation of the American Military Government in Korea and declared pre-existing 
government organs illegitimate. (Han 1974). General Hodge reinforced the position on 
October 10 when he declared the AMG to be the only government south of the 38th 
Parallel (Krishnan 1984). Later, in December, Hodge declared the KPR an “unlawful” 
organization (Cumings 1981, N. G. Kim 1997, Hart-Landsberg 1998). Despite Truman’s 
orders, the AMG showed clear preference for right-wing factions over left-wing. As early 
as September 21, the AMG allowed Song Chin-u, head of the Korean Democratic Party 
(which the Committee for welcoming the KPG reconstituted itself as after the AMG’s 
declaration of its illegitimacy) to denounce the Korean People’s Republic over official 
radio (Cumings 1981). The AMG and Washington considered the KDP to be a 
“respectable” organization. Accordingly, Hodge relied on them to counter radical leftist 
threats to the occupation (Park 2002). One of the more useful members of the KDP was 
Cho Pyŏng-ok, whom the AMG placed in control of the National Police Force (Cumings 
1981). Moreover, when Hodge attempted to build a South Korean Army (without the 
knowledge or consent of Washington), he recruited right-wing paramilitary groups to 
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swell its ranks while eschewing left-wing paramilitaries (Ibid). In what was likely an 
honest attempt to narrow the spectrum of political contestation, Hodge’s policies in fact 
empowered radicals of one feather at the expense of radicals of another, all the while 
marginalizing moderates who got in the way. 
The beneficiary of the American state-building policy was Syngman Rhee. Rhee 
had once represented the KPR, but was dismissed due to improprieties such as 
embezzlement and over-stepping his authority decades before the occupation began 
(Ibid). Nevertheless, he continued to claim to represent the KPR, making connections and 
building support in Washington, DC, during the 1920s, 30s and 40s (Ibid). When he 
returned to Korea on October 16, 1945, he did so on a military plane chartered by 
General MacArthur (Hart-Landsberg 1998, Cumings 1981, Oliver 1999). When it came 
time to appoint a provisional government independent of the KPR or KPG, Hodge 
appointed Syngman Rhee chairman (Choi 2002). Rhee’s stated aims were plain enough. 
Via his American spokesman in an article in the New York Times, Rhee declared several 
goals: disband the AMG; establish a separate South Korean government with its own 
arms and a barrier against the North; Soviet withdrawal from the North; secure admission 
for the new state in the UN; establish a South Korean currency with convertibility; and 
rehabilitate the economy (Oliver 1999). He remained steadfastly opposed to trusteeship. 
When the KDP reversed their position and endorsed trusteeship—ostensibly to gain 
access to the AMG and the interim government—Rhee denounced them as traitors (Han 
1974). While Rhee often accepted support from various political parties, he preferred to 
operate outside the party system whenever possible (Ibid). 
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Hodge’s preferential treatment of Korean nationalists extended to social and 
economic policy. Perhaps out of fear of communist infiltration, the AMG’s “right-to-
work” Ordinance 19 denied labor unions the right to intervene in labor disputes and 
presaged the “Reverse Course” in Japan’s occupation policy by over two years (Ibid). 
Naturally, this sapped the power of the pro-labor left, both radical and moderate. Later, 
Ordinance 34 banned strikes entirely and required mediation of labor disputes via a five-
member panel (to which the AMG nominated three officials from the KDP; Ibid, Hart-
Landsberg 1998). In contrast to MacArthur’s policies in Japan and Soviet occupation 
policy in their zone in Korea, Hodge’s AMG postponed the redistribution of lands—both 
former Japanese colonial holdings and fallow land held by absentee Korean landlords—
until the South Korean government was about to take over (Farley 1950). Also in contrast 
to MacArthur’s policies in Japan, Hodge attempted to impose open-market reforms 
almost immediately (Cumings 1981). These policies sat well with Rhee and both Kims, 
as the marginalization of organized labor undermined political opponents who relied on 
that constituency (especially the Korean Communist Party and Yo Un-hyong’s moderate-
left coalition). Anti-labor and anti-redistribution policies placated the landlords and 
professional classes that supported the KDP, KNP and Rhee. However, in empowering 
the conservative landed classes and marginalizing moderate workers, these policies 
weakened the natural constituency of the optimal winning coalition. 
These are appropriate tactics for improving the prospects of the optimal winning 
coalition, so long as they applied to radicals independent of their position on the 
ideological spectrum and so long as there is no collateral damage. However, Hodge’s 
shock therapy and zeal for purging communist elements harmed left-wingers both inside 
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and outside the optimal winning coalition. At the same time, Hodge’s policies improved 
the prospects of anti-democratic nationalists such as Rhee and Kim Ku. Hodge’s 
suspicion of communist infiltration ran deep. Long before the “Red Scare” gripped the 
United States, Hodge privately questioned the motives of moderate, pro-democracy 
groups south of the 38th Parallel, lumped them in with the radical leftists and branded 
them enemies (Cumings 1981). The commanding US general in South Korea routinely 
attributed just about every early policy failure to communist infiltration despite a lack of 
corroborating evidence (and a wealth of evidence pointing towards interference from 
Rhee, Kim Ku and other violent and meddlesome extremists). In one instance, Hodge 
claimed definitive evidence that pro-trusteeship politician Song Chin-u was a victim of a 
left-wing terror attack. There was no evidence to back this claim, and in fact it was right-
wing extremist Kim Ku who confessed to orchestrating Song’s assassination (Ibid). Kim 
Ku’s punishment amounted to a stern opprobrium and loss of access to the American 
Military Government (Ibid). 
 Hodge’s views in this area remained steadfast, even after May 1946, when he 
realized that Rhee and Kim Ku were unsuitable partners for building the type of Korean 
(or South Korean, if necessary) state that Washington demanded (Cumings 1981). When 
the Left-Right Coalition Committee came under attack from both sides of the ideological 
spectrum, Hodge viewed the right-wing opponents as blameless while arresting moderate 
left-wing organizations (such as Yo Un-hyong’s Democratic National Front, a coalition 
of left-liberals) and politicians on the charge of fostering dissent (Ibid). It seems in this 
case that Hodge’s anti-communist zeal got the better of him. While he could have 
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employed this motivation to strengthen the center, instead—either intentionally or 
unintentionally—his fear of infiltration led him to pick the wrong side. 
In a private letter dated February 2, 1948, Hodge seemed to recognize his folly, if 
belatedly. He blamed Rhee for obstructing US policy for over a year (in truth he had been 
doing so from the very start) and for fomenting mistrust of the AMG and its policies 
(Oliver 1999). Unfortunately, it was too late to reverse course. The AMG had succeeded 
in neutralizing any opponents to Rhee’s contingent, radical or moderate. He had the 
landlords, the support of the people, and the police—whom Hodge had all but handed 
over to the would-be president of the Republic of Korea. The spectrum of political 
contestation had indeed narrowed. Unfortunately for Korean democrats, it narrowed in 
such a way as to exclude the optimal winning coalition. 
During the period of occupation, there is a clear divide between policymakers in 
the State Department and the officers of the Army, Navy and what would eventually 
become the Department of Defense. State committed itself to fostering democracy in 
Korea, calling for the AMG to build a coalition of moderates who shared the values 
expressed in the late President Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech (Oh 2002b). 
Furthermore, on February 28, 1946, State instructed the AMG to sever its ties with the 
groups under the control of Rhee, Kim Ku, and those infiltrated by the Soviet Union, and 
specifically called for a draft of progressive elements to form a legitimate, provisional 
government (Cumings 1981). In March, attempting to walk back some of the earlier 
occupation policies and paint a better picture of the AMG, Hodge asserted that the United 
States was committed to enabling freedom of expression in its zone (Ibid). The US took 
several opportunities to establish a provisional government—with Korean participation—
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in the South, in hope of establishing a legitimate state organ that could pave the road to 
an American exit. The first of these efforts was the Representative Democratic Council 
(RDC) of South Korea (Choi 2002). Hodge appointed Syngman Rhee to preside as chair 
over a presumed coalition of left- and right-wing moderates (Ibid, Oh 2002a), but 
allowing Rhee to appoint its entire membership led to an unbalanced, extremist 
selectorate (Choi 2002). This should have been no surprise to Hodge, as Rhee had been 
publicly critical of his opposition (via the radio time that Hodge himself had offered; 
Cumings 1981) and had made it clear that he opposed party politics and preferred a 
unified front of likeminded anti-communists to lead Korea into independence (Han 
1974). With Rhee as chair and several extreme right-wing politicians on the council, 
however, the left-wing moderates refused to join. The rightists, on their part, simply 
stonewalled the AMG and used the RDC as a platform to further oppose trusteeship (Park 
2002, McCune 1947b). 
In response of the failure of the RDC, officials in Washington pledged only to 
work with “truly democratic” parties and organizations (Ibid, Choi 2002). Hodge took up 
this cause in April, attempting to build a Left-Right Coalition Committee that included 
only moderates, specifically Kim Kyu-sik and Yo Un-hyong (Cumings 1981, Sook 2002, 
Oh 2002b, C.-P. Park 2002, Borton 1948). It was also about this time that the AMG 
began aiding the NPF in its investigation and eventual arrest of Korean Communist Party 
members (Park 2002). In June, Hodge was proud to announce a partnership with the Left-
Right Coalition under Yo Un-hong (brother of Yo Un-hyong, who refused to join) of the 
newly formed Social Democratic Party, although the coalition was not as broad as the 
AMG or State Department would have hoped (Cumings 1981). Any optimism was 
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unwarranted, however, as there was virtually no cooperation between the left and right 
wings of the Coalition Committee. The Democratic National Front—a coalition of far-left 
and liberal-left organizations including the KCP and KPP—demanded land reforms, the 
resurrection of people’s committees and punishment for former Japanese collaborators, 
all of which the right wing refused (Ibid). Syngman Rhee refused to acknowledge the 
Coalition Committee, which became a far more relevant organization for coordinating 
right-wing political activities (Ibid, Oh 2002b). 
Unable to build a large enough coalition under the banner of the Left-Right 
Coalition, the AMG proposed a new provisional government known as the South Korean 
Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA). Unlike the previous attempts at a provisional 
government, this legislature would be half-elected (indirectly, and only by taxpayers and 
landlords) by Korean citizens and half-appointed by the AMG (Cumings 1981, Sook 
2002, Oliver 1999). Elections notwithstanding, SKILA was illegitimate in the eyes of 
many Koreans and contrary to the interests of others. Kim Kyu-sik originally declared 
some of the elections to be rigged. Following a re-vote, Kim would serve as the body’s 
president (Sook 2002). Rigged or not, the elections placed only right-wing officials in the 
forty-five elected seats. To remedy this imbalance, Hodge appointed mostly moderates 
and leftists to the forty-five appointed seats. In response to this move, Rhee’s faction of 
twenty-seven right-wing representatives boycotted the interim legislature (Oh 2002a, 
Matray 1985). 
But in many ways, it appears that the AMG was never so interested in building a 
democracy in Korea, despite the avowed policy of Hodge, of policymakers in 
Washington, or the claims of the right-wing politicians with whom they aligned 
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themselves. Unlike in Japan, the AMG resisted large-scale land reform until early 1948, 
leaving the landlord class—and a power base for those opposed to democratic and 
liberalizing reforms—intact (Farley 1950). There are many instances that bring their 
intent into question. First is the aforementioned retention of laws from the colonial era 
that granted the AMG and domestic organs such as the NPF wide berth in suppressing 
political activities it deemed subversive (Cumings 1981). Another instance is the issuance 
of Ordinance 55, which required parties to open their finances and membership rolls to 
the government while allowing local entities to dissolve parties that, in their eyes, failed 
to comply (Ibid). Laughably, General Lerche called the ordinance "usual...for regulating 
political parties in democratic countries" (Ibid). Ordinance 72, issued in May 1946 just as 
Hodge undertook his attempt at building a moderate coalition, virtually outlawed all 
dissent against the AMG (Ibid, Park 2002). When the coalition faced criticism from left- 
and right-wing parties and politicians who refused to join, Hodge’s response was to issue 
arrest warrants (pursuant to Ordinance 72) to left-wing dissenters (but not those on the 
right, such as Kim Ku and Rhee; Cumings 1981). In February 1947, Hodge did warn that 
right-wing parties that dissented against the AMG might be dissolved, but there is no 
evidence that this actually occurred (Matray 1985). By December 1947, the number of 
political prisoners topped 21,000—4,000 more than those who served time for political 
crimes under the Japanese (Hart-Landsberg 1998). The number soared to 30,000 before 
the withdrawal of the AMG despite the repeal of the oppressive, colonial era laws 
restricting political expression in April 1948 (Ibid, Cumings 1981). 
Whether due to negligence, indifference or naiveté, the occupation policy of the 
US military government in Korea empowered a coalition that paid only lip service to 
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representative democracy. They narrowed political competition in such a way that 
excluded radicals on the left but also pro-democracy elements in the middle, handing the 
territory to a coalition of nationalists organized around the personality of Sygnman Rhee 
rather than a coherent policy platform. Despite the failure to ensure a truly democratic 
government in the American occupation zone, Washington and the AMG pushed ahead 
with the establishment of a sovereign South Korean state. The final preparations began in 
March 1948, when candidates began to register for elections to the Constituent Assembly 
(later, the National Assembly; Han 1974). The first parliamentary elections took place on 
May 10 in a semi-competitive environment (Ibid, Oh 2002b, Hart-Landsberg 1998, Park 
2002, Morley 1965, Stueck 2002, Croissant 2001). The Assembly convened in July and 
promulgated a constitution two weeks in, claiming it to be the basic law of all Korea 
(Hart-Landsberg 1998, Oliver 1999, Matray 1985, Morley 1965). On August 15, the 
National Assembly elected to the presidency Syngman Rhee, who then declared the 
independence of the Republic of Korea (Oh 2002a, Lee 2006, Hart-Landsberg 1998, 
Morley 1965, Han 1974, Croissant 2001). Between September 1948 and June 1949, US 
forces undertook a phased withdrawal from the peninsula (Buhite 1978). When American 
troops left the peninsula in June 1949, de facto and de jure sovereignty returned to a 
Korean state for the first time since 1905 (Oh 2002a, N. G. Kim 1997, Oliver 1999). 
They would not be gone for long. 
 
Domestic Outcomes 
 The historical record of the American occupation of Korea indicates that 
emergent regime was neither democratic nor consolidated, despite the efforts of the AMG 
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to establish a representative government based on competitive elections. Syngman Rhee’s 
government politicized the national police force and ignored constitutional restraints on 
power before, during and after the Korean War. On the Polity IV scale, South Korea’s 
government never exceeded -3 before the First Republic was dissolved in the 1960 coup 
that deposed Rhee (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Moreover, South Korea was beset with 
multiple rebellions and uprisings that began during the occupation period. The case of the 
American occupation of Korea was a failure from a democratic standpoint. 
Election data is not particularly useful in this case for three reasons. First, the 
elections themselves were, at best, semi-competitive. Second, the parties were more 
personalist than programmatic, and therefore say less about the ideological spectrum of 
those who supported them. Third, independent candidates swamped party candidates in 
the popular vote in three of the four elections during the first republic (Croissant 2001). 
These are candidates about whom we have basically no information regarding their 
positions and politics, and therefore the data tells us little about the preferences of voters. 
All is not lost, however; there are a few things we can learn about South Korea 
based on electoral data. One can tell that the right and far right were successful in 
establishing control over the government due to the total absence of far-left participation 
in electoral activities, and a near-absence of participation among moderate-left and 
centrist parties (Croissant 2001). Even if one were to consider these elections 
competitive, one would see that parties tied to candidates that commonly espoused 
violence and opposed democratic procedure won the lion’s share of votes that did not fall 
to independents. Moreover, the dominance of independent candidates as a group confirms 
the finding that party-based democracy never fully developed in South Korea. The good 
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fortunes of independent candidates would not subside until Rhee’s Liberal Party and the 
opposition Democratic Party divided the electorate in the late 1950s (Ibid). The electoral 
system itself was heavily weighted in favor of the ruling coalition, with the Liberal Party 
averaging 55.1% of the seats in the National Assembly following the 1956 and 1958 
elections, despite averaging only 39.5% of the popular vote. (Ibid) These data all 
corroborate the findings of the Polity project’s evaluation of South Korea’s “First 
Republic” as undemocratic. 
 The one issue that may have forged consensus in occupation-era Korea did so 
only in the narrowest sense, and not in a way that benefitted the occupation. While 
essentially all parties and organizations, save the KCP, came out in opposition of 
trusteeship, the right wing of the Representative Democratic Council (the earliest attempt 
at an AMG-directed interim regime) chose to continue opposing trusteeship but not the 
actual implementation of an interim government (Park 2002). The moderate left opposed 
both (Ibid), putting them on the opposite side of the AMG. The largest party of the 
moderate left, the Korean People’s Party, allied with the KCP, left-leaning nationalists 
and numerous workers groups to form the Democratic Nationalist Front as a counter to 
the political heft of the right (Choi 2002). In order to salvage a moderate coalition, the 
AMG urged Yo Un-hyong to leave the KPP and form a new Social Democratic Party that 
would cooperate with the right and the AMG, but Yo refused (Cumings 1981). The 
trusteeship debacle served more to divide the domestic political scene than to unite it, and 
not along lines that were favorable for the consolidation of a democratic regime. 
The initial reaction against trusteeship erupted into a violent crescendo that 
resulted in an assassination and an attempted coup. Song Chin-u, a member of the Korean 
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Democratic Party who maintained a positive relationship with the American Military 
government, had sought the cooperation of ardent trustee opponent Kim Ku. Han Hyon-
u—a supporter of Kim Ku—murdered Song hours after that meeting (McCune 1947b, 
Cumings 1981, Choi 2002). This was only Kim’s first strike against the government, 
which culminated in a weak and easily repulsed coup against the Korean Provisional and 
American Military Governments (Cumings 1981, L and G 1946, Sook 2002). Kim Ku 
was seeking an alliance between the Korean Democratic Party and the Korean 
Provisional Government to establish a united front in favor of independence, and the 
Moscow Declaration’s call for a provisional government aside from the existing KPG 
raised his ire (Ibid). Kim’s attempt to rectify the situation was laughably unsuccessful and 
met with no efforts on behalf of the AMG to punish him for his activity (Cumings 1981). 
Assassination was a favored tactic of right-wing extremist and ultranationalist 
Kim Ku. It began with Hyon-Hu’s December 1945 assassination Song Chin-u for his 
advocating of trusteeship (McCune 1947b, Cumings 1981, Choi 2002) and continued 
with the murder of KCP leader Yo Un-hyong in July 1947 (after a failed attempt two 
months earlier), also by associates of Kim Ku (Cumings 1981, Oh 2002a, Oh 2002b, 
Matray 1985, Sook 2002). Kim Ku’s followers claimed another victim in December; 
right-wing politician Chang Tok-su fell after coming out in favor of foreign supervision 
of Korean elections (Matray 1985). 
Although not on a scale as large as that of Weimar Germany, paramilitary forces 
were powerful and consequential elements in the South Korean political scene in the 
years before the war. By mid-1946, there were two competing right-wing youth groups 
competing for recruits: the National Youth Movement, under the leadership of Syngman 
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Rhee, and the National Youth Corps, under the tutelage of Yi Pŏm-sŏk (Cumings 1981, 
Han 1974). Four months after their formation in June, the Korean Youth Corps had 
20,000 recruits (Han 1974). By January 1947, the National Youth Movement—which 
Syngman Rhee had just placed under the control of a Chinese Nationalist with ties to 
Chiang Kai-shek—boasted 30,000 recruits and the support of wealthy landlords and 
businessmen (Matray 1985). Following elections and Rhee’s ascent to power, Rhee 
sought to merge the competing youth groups and place them under his control. Along 
these lines, Rhee founded the Korean Youth Corps in December 1948, and merged the 
KYC with the National Youth Corps in January 1949 (Han 1974). The KYC would serve 
as Rhee’s personal police force (Ibid). 
Civil unrest was common during the occupation period. As noted above, the 
interregnum between the end of the Japanese occupation and the beginning of the 
American occupation saw the rise of independent political factions. Naturally, these 
factions posed some problems for the outgoing Japanese authorities and incoming 
American military authorities (who later declared these elements illegitimate). 
Immediately following Japan’s announcement of surrender, the historical record indicates 
hundreds of attacks on Japanese and Koreans who collaborated with the occupation (K.-
K. Kim 1995). In October, there was a small clash between elements of the Nanwŏn 
People’s Committee (affiliated with the CPKI and later the KPR) and AMG troops 
(Cumings 1981). These incidents were but a harbinger of the challenges the occupation 
authorities would face from both left and right. 
For all the right-wing extra-parliamentary activity in occupation-era South Korea, 
the most impressive examples were leftist: the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1946 and the 
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Jeju Rebellion of 1948-9. Tensions between right-wing factions that controlled the 
national police and left-wing factions that opposed the AMG and KPG had simmered in 
the early years of the occupation. The period saw an increase in right-wing youth groups. 
One of the most prominent was the National Youth Corps, which anti-Japanese resistance 
fighter Yi Pŏm-sŏk established in June (Han 1974). His group competed for recruits with 
Syngman Rhee’s Korean Youth Corps, which retaliated against left-wing youths 
protesting in front of the Soviet Consulate a month earlier (an attack that led to 
renunciation by the AMG and some short jail terms for the assailants; Cumings 1981). 
Simultaneously (between April and August), the Korean National Police carried out a 
campaign against leftist political leaders. Most prominent leftists ended up in jail or went 
into hiding by September (Cumings 1981). One of the raids included the headquarters of 
the National Council of Korean Labor Unions in August (Ibid). In response to the raids, 
8,000 rail workers walked off the job in protest on September 23. Within a few days the 
strikes spread to printers, electricians, and student workers. Students refused to attend 
classes, and newspapers supported the strikes (Ibid). 
The unrest that began in Pusan would soon spread throughout the south, 
expanding into the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1946. The initial strike became a general 
protest by all those who claimed grievances under the occupation government; the list of 
demands the strikers sent to General Hodge included increases in rice rations, higher 
wages, housing and rice for jobless workers and returnees, betting working conditions, 
freedom to organize, a labor law along the lines of that in the north, the release of 
political prisoners and an end to reactionary terror, and the transfer of power back to the 
people's committees (Cumings 1981). On September 29, the protest turned violent: 3,000 
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strike breakers joined with 3,000 police and youth group members and attacked 3,000 
strikers in the Seoul rail yards (Ibid).80 The violence escalated on October 9 when a 
bloody battle between rioters favoring the strikers and police—supported by AMG 
soldiers—left twenty-four dead (Ibid, Hart-Landsberg 1998). 
It was this event that triggered the revolt that spread throughout the south. Most of 
these attacks were retributive against local police and administration (Ibid, Park 2002), 
but some of the attacks were directed at the AMG for having coordinated the 
strikebreaking activity (Hart-Landsberg 1998). Hodge, in support of the provisional 
government, sent in tanks as reinforcement and declared martial law, but the riots raged 
well into November (Ibid, Cumings 1981, Park 2002). Ten of thousands of South 
Koreans participated in the riots, resulting in attacks on thousands of police officers, 
hundreds of installations and residences of the police and local administrators. While 
Hodge blamed the attacks on the Korean Communist Party, its leader—Yo Un-hyong—
denied responsibility; the gradual and diffuse nature of the riots indicates a spontaneous 
contagion-like movement rather than a coordinated attack (Hart-Landsberg 1998). 
The rebellion on the island of Jeju in 1948 began as a direct protest against the 
elections and grew into an outright guerilla war against the South Korean police and 
military (Hart-Landsberg 1998). The violence took 40,000 lives, and left only 170 of the 
400 villages on the island inhabitable (Ibid). Anti-government activity began in March 
1948, peaked in the autumn of that year and continued well into the first months of 1949. 
Between March and June 1948, terrorists operating under the banner of Communism 
torched and destroyed nearly 350 government buildings, killed 147 rightist candidates, 
80 The mishmash of opponents to the strike continued to patrol industrial areas, wielding 
blunt weapons, and attacked publications that supported the strike (Ibid). 
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campaigners, officials and their families, and left 600 wounded (Han 1974). A guerilla 
army of four thousand established control over the central villages on the island by the 
summer (Hart-Landsberg 1998). 
South Korean forces launched their counterattack in May, with mixed results. 
Police forces managed to arrest 3,000, and attempted to control the insurgency by forcing 
civilians into guarded towns and defoliating wooded areas in which the rebels might hide 
(Hart-Landsberg 1998). The situation took a turn for the worse in Jeolla, when 
communists who had infiltrated the National Police Force successfully mutinied and 
drew the support of 3,000 villagers in nearby Yosu (Ibid, Matray 1985, Han 1974). This 
new wave of the rebellion established kangaroo courts and summarily tried and executed 
policemen and military officers. Sympathizers in Sunch’on raised the flag of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and pledged their allegiance to the North 
(Matray 1985). South Korean police and military forces, now officially an organ of the 
Republic of Korea, responded by executing suspected sympathizers without trial under 
the protection of a recently-passed National Security Act. The National Security Act 
declared martial law over the island of Jeju and permitted the government to dismiss 
educators and journalists suspected of disloyalty, engage in prior censorship of 
publications, and imprison editors (Ibid). Low-level fighting continued after this 
crescendo, and slowly petered out by May 1949 (Hart-Landsberg 1998) 
Rhee’s eventual dominance in South Korean politics is largely tied to the right 
wing’s monopolization of extra-parliamentary power, specifically through the police 
force and paramilitary elements. The AMG put the National Police Force (NPF), a 
remnant from the colonial era, under the control of anti-communist Cho Pyŏng-ok (Han 
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1974, Cumings 1981). Working in conjunction with Rhee and Kim Ku, the NPF forced 
the KCP into hiding (Cumings 1981). From the very start, the NPF helped secure votes 
for Rhee and his allies through violence against potential competitors (Ibid). In the lead-
up to the first elections in May 1948, hundreds of electoral officers and candidates died at 
the hands of police (Matray 1985, Gordenker 1958). The employment of police and 
paramilitary forces to influence electoral outcomes is the ultimate example of Rhee’s 




The AMG’s attempts to establish a democratic regime failed. While the threat 
environment was more than favorable, the American Military Government in Korea 
passed up its opportunity to produce marginal occupation value. While they did help arm 
the provisional government, the threat environment demanded a higher commitment than 
the United States was willing to supply. Moreover, by not sufficiently distancing 
themselves from the former Japanese colonial government, and perhaps by strengthening 
their ties with Korea’s most recent and hated enemy, the US increased the security deficit 
it needed to overcome. By not producing marginal security, the US lacked a public good 
that it could have distributed in order to build support for the occupying authorities and 
for the regime they fostered. This hamstrung any efforts to narrow the spectrum of 
acceptable political contestation in such a way that would have empowered moderate 
elements. Moreover, the AMG’s misguided support for coalitions that were outside the 
optimal winning coalition, driven largely by miscalculation of these domestic coalitions’ 
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aims and methods, empowered a constituency that was uninterested in building a 
democratic regime. The results reflect the expectations of the working hypotheses. A 
brief history of uprisings, and the response by the South Korean government, clearly 
indicates that the new regimes were unable to consolidate their authority without 
undermining democratic institutions. The leader of that government was a man who 
openly shared his disdain for democratic procedures. The democratic elements that did 
vie for power ran up against a system that was rigged against them. Executive and 
legislative recruitment were anything but open, as reflected in South Korea’s Polity IV 
score during that period. The AMG and the government they imposed failed to narrow 




Reconciliation of Competing Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1—that there will be fewer protests and less political violence when 
the occupier is offering improvements in living conditions and establishing itself as an 
ally—is difficult to test in this case because it is difficult to find a period that reflects 
these conditions. The period most characteristic of this condition would have been the 
spring and summer of 1947. This was the period during which Acheson and the State 
Department were calling for increased aid to Korea and when relations between the US 
and USSR started to break down, but before the US embarked upon the reverse course in 
Japan and declared that it would not offer any substantial security commitment to South 
Korea. So was the American occupation zone more stable during this period? It does 
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seem that this was a period of relative calm. The Taegu Uprising and the general strikes 
that accompanied it faded by spring 1947; the Jeolla Rebellion would not occur until the 
following year. This period was not perfectly stable—it saw two assassination attempts 
on Yo Un-hyong, one of them successful. It was, however, relatively calm across the 
span of the case. If there is a problem with this finding, it is whether the greatest 
perceived external threat was the Soviet Union or Japan. If it is the latter, then this period 
does not fit the conditions set by the hypothesis. If it is the former, then this claim makes 
sense. At worst, the findings fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 Furthermore, aside from their attempts to build a provisional government, the 
AMG took a generally laissez faire position on domestic Korean politics, and so it is 
difficult to say which US policies were detrimental, beneficial or neutral. There were 
food riots and peasant rebellions in response to skyrocketing food prices, largely due to 
reforms that the AMG implemented and then quickly abandoned. However, food 
shortages that result in food riots are not a strong confirmation of the Marginal Value 
Model. The best example is the outbreak of anti-trusteeship protests, assassinations and 
Kim Ku’s attempted coup against the AMG that followed the Moscow Communiqué. The 
overwhelming preference of Koreans in the south was for immediate independence and 
unification, and the announcement that the USSR and US would stick to their wartime 
plans for an interim of tutelage provoked understandable rage. Beyond these examples, 
there’s no significant correlation between US policy in its occupation zone and the worst 
periods of unrest, during the Taegu and Jeolla revolts (perhaps because there is not a 
significant amount of variance in AMG domestic policy in this case).  
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However, the history indicates an increase in domestic instability as the occupier 
makes friends with the occupied state’s enemies. While the Soviet Union steadily became 
a greater threat as the occupation progressed, Koreans continued to harbor fear and 
loathing towards Japan throughout the occupation period (and long after). The last period 
of relative calm during the Korean occupation—the interlude of spring and summer 
1947—ended just as the US began to openly support the remilitarization of Japan. It was 
also at this time that it became clear the US would not risk its own resources to defend 
Korea from the Soviet Union or the puppet regime in the north. The period between 1945 
and mid-1947 was not perfectly calm by any means, but it was measurably more stable 
than the period between late 1947 and mid-1949. The data here support the working 
hypothesis. 
 Liem (1949) and Cumings (1981) supply some insightful theories as to why the 
first Republic of Korea was undemocratic. It is more than plausible that backing 
ultranationalists, empowering landlords who had reason to fear redistributive policies, 
and a lack of planning, understanding and respect for the actual situation “on the ground” 
had an adverse effect on political freedom. These hypotheses are perfectly compatible 
with the Marginal Value Model, particularly in terms of managing the occupation 
relationship. Moreover, while the Liem piece is remarkable for its prescience and 
Cumings’ history is one of the most comprehensive about the US occupation of Korea, 
neither provides a testable, social-scientific foundation for their conclusions. In sum, 
neither of these hypotheses are substantial rivals to the working hypotheses. If anything, 





 As in the other cases, we should not ignore economic variables. As is the case 
with Korean electoral politics, there is a dearth of economic data during the period of the 
case. What we do know about the occupation-era economics of South Korea is that the 
situation was bleak. Inflation grew out of hand. Agricultural prices skyrocketed. 
Industrial production was lacking, although it’s important to note that the southern half of 
the Korean peninsula was not an industrialized region to begin with (and wouldn’t 
seriously begin to industrialize until the 1960s). It is also important to note the connection 
between the economic conditions of the period and the policies that foreign powers—
both Japan and the United States—imposed on the region. Although Hodge’s government 
in Korea took a different tack than MacArthur’s in Japan by ending agricultural price 
controls early on, occupation agricultural policy in South Korea was initially just as 
unsuccessful (Cumings 1981). Aware of the possibility of runaway inflation, 
skyrocketing rents and hoarding, occupation officials issued Ordinance #9 on October 5, 
limiting rents to one-third of the harvest. The popular measure went unenforced while 
landlords frequently disregarded the decree (Ibid). Massive inflation in food prices 
ensued, and the AMG felt it necessary to rescind Ordinance 9 and re-impose the colonial-
era system of forced collection and redistribution (Cumings 1981). 
 The situation was dire enough for Secretary of State Acheson to attack the ROK 
leadership in April 1950, chastising their failure to rein in inflation and reindustrialize 
(Farley 1950). Inflation was certainly a problem, but one could hardly place all the blame 
on Syngman Rhee & Co. In the first year of the occupation, rice prices exploded by a 
factor of nearly 300. They tripled again in the following year (Cumings 1981). The 
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general cost of living surged by a factor of 140 in that first year, while overall food prices 
increased hundredfold (McCune 1947b). Inflation was the result of a massive increase in 
the supply of the Korean yen (which was pegged to the Japanese yen and controlled by 
the colonial authorities) during WWII. The Korean yen supply increased from K¥300 
million in mid-1939 through K¥8 billion by the time of Japan’s surrender in order to 
subsidize the wartime economy (Ibid). 
 As brutal as the colonization of Korea may have been, most of the economic 
growth of the past half-century was the result of Japanese investments in industry and 
agriculture. Korean industrial production increased threefold between 1929 and 1938, but 
said production was concentrated in the northern reaches of the peninsula (L and G 
1946). Between 1932 and 1943, the population of Korean industrial workers tripled 
(Cumings 1981). Meanwhile, over 90% of large factories were the property of Japanese 
owners (K.-K. Kim 1995). The industrialization of Korea was largely for the benefit of 
Japan, which purchased Korean goods and consumed Korea’s agricultural produce. 
During this general period, 70-80% of Korean exports went to Japan, although Japan’s 
dependence on Korean rice declined after the Japanese invaded Indochina (N. G. Kim 
1997, Cumings 1981). Moreover, millions of Koreans worked (often involuntarily) in 
Japan in support of the war effort. In the final year of the war, 32% of the Japanese 
workforce was in fact Korean, while a majority of the mineworkers were Korean born 
(Cumings 1981). When the Japanese occupation ended, demand for Korean labor 
plummeted. Korean workers returning from Japan represented an additional burden when 
they returned home. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of Japanese repatriated to 
the main islands after WWII, draining the territory of the industrialists and managers who 
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had been responsible for Korea’s rapid industrialization (McCune 1947b). Finally, due to 
the northerly distribution of light and heavy industry on the peninsula, much of the 
growth potential and power generation in Korea belonged to the North and the Soviets, 
leaving the South to deal with subpar infrastructure and shortages in power, industrial 
goods and—crucial to an agrarian economy—fertilizer (Matray 1985). 
 One should not ignore Korea’s economic situation, which likely contributed to the 
domestic unrest. Likewise, one should also not ignore the lack of interest in the 
occupying government to rebuild (or build, as it may have been) the economy in the 
region. We cannot assume that deprivation in this case was endogenous to the South 
Korean economy. In stark contrast to US actions in West Germany and Japan, the US 
made no substantial efforts to construct an industrial base in the occupation zone, to 
modernize their currency or to manage inflation. Such efforts could have produced goods 
that endeared the population to the occupying authorities and cleared the path towards a 
consolidated democracy.  
 
 
Summation of Findings and Conclusion 
 The intra-case study of the US occupation of Korea and the attempted 
establishment of a democracy in South Korea conforms to the expectations of the 
working hypotheses. The period of greatest domestic unrest occurred during the period 
when the AMG grew more comfortable with Korea’s historic enemy and failed to 
balance against the new one. Events indicating instability were less common when the 
US looked to be on the verge of enhancing its commitment to Korea and before the 
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improvement in military ties between the US and Japan. The Marginal Value Model 
sufficiently encompasses the expectations of rival hypothesis. Despite an external threat 
level critical enough to produce marginal security, Washington failed to do so when it 
refused to signal its intentions to align with Seoul against Moscow, Beijing and 
Pyongyang. Even if the AMG had achieved these goals, it could easily have erased them 
all by promoting domestic actors outside of the optimal winning coalition whose 
preferences conflicted with those of the US. 
Finally, this case study contradicts Edelstein’s interpretation of the US occupation 
of Korea. While he also comes to the conclusion that the occupation failed, he claims this 
is due to an absence of a foreign threat. An examination of the objective threat 
environment during the occupation indicates that he is—to quote Don Herbert—“right for 
the wrong reasons.” It is not the absence of an external threat that undermined the 
occupation. Indeed, the external threat level was objectively critical. Rather, it was the 
failure of the United States to demonstrate a credible commitment to defend Korea 
against that threat that doomed the endeavor. So long as the United States failed to 
persuade domestic elements of the added value of the occupation, Korea viewed the 
occupiers as the primary threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is 
understandable considering Korea’s experience with colonial subjugation, but it is 
nevertheless inaccurate in light of how vulnerable South Korea became once American 
soldiers left. Yes, Edelstein is right that Koreans did not perceive the threat north of the 
38th. What Edelstein fails to do is explain why. This dissertation fills that gap. 
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Chapter 7: Review of Findings and Conclusion 
Review of Hypotheses and Findings 
Through four case studies the working intra-case hypotheses have held up well.  
 
H1: Events indicating regime instability will be less common among cases in which 
the occupiers increase marginal occupation value through the provision of 
security and other goods than they will be among cases in which occupiers reduce 
the value of the occupation. 
 
There were fewer events indicating regime instability in West Germany when 
occupation policy abandoned reparations and factory dismantlement and when the 
Western Allies brought West Germany into their security perimeter. In West Germany, 
what little political instability occurred seem to do so in the earliest years of the 
occupation, before the Allies ended their policies of demontage and fully renounced the 
desire to pastoralize Germany. Afterwards, the western occupation zones and the Federal 
Republic were generally calm. Electoral support for the optimal winning coalition 
remained generally strong throughout. There are no situations in which the Western 
Allies occupy with any obvious enemies of the Federal German Republic after WWII, or 
in which the US allies with enemies of Japan. 
In Japan, civil unrest is more common prior to the Korean War and in the earliest 
days of the occupation when the nation was on the brink of famine. However, electoral 
indicators do not conform as well as the extra-parliamentary indicators. For instance, the 
Communist Party’s success in the 1949 election directly contradicts H2, as the US 
seemed to be providing domestic wellbeing as well as aligning itself with Japan at that 
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point. The late success of the Japanese Communist Party in 1949 also seems to contradict 
the hypothesis—the optimal winning coalition should have been strong at this moment. 
One might want to attribute these anomalies to lag. 
 In the Weimar Republic, domestic unrest appears to have dissipated during 
periods matching the description above—specifically after the Locarno agreement. The 
optimal winning coalition was more successful in capturing the Reichstag during these 
periods, as well. In Korea, this hypothesis is difficult to test due to a lack of variation on 
the independent variables. However, political unrest seems to have died down during the 
fleeting moments when it appeared the US might be willing to commit to Korea in the 
long run, and before the US set its sights on remilitarizing Japan.  In the occupation-era 
Weimar Republic, the optimal winning coalition suffered its worst losses in response to 
the punitive nature of the Versailles treaty and its harsh enforcement. This era also saw a 
significant surge in paramilitary recruitment and political violence. There is a clear-cut 
case in Weimar Germany of the occupation forces pursuing security cooperation with a 
current or recent enemy of the occupied state. Through 1923, the AAF (specifically the 
French and Belgian authorities) sponsored Rhenish separatist movements and a Polish 
insurgency. During this period, we see an increase in paramilitary recruitment and 
massive losses for the optimal winning coalition. 
 There is no situation in which the US strived for an improvement of living 
standards in the Korean case. There is, on the other hand, a clear cut situation in which 
the US sided with one of Korea’s enemies. Beginning in 1948, the US began to signal to 
the USSR and anyone else who might be listening—including those in the southern 
occupation zone in Korea—that they would rearm Japan and bring them into the US 
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security perimeter. This period correlates with one of the most extreme periods of 
political violence. 
 In addition to measuring how well the model holds up within each case, we can 
apply the Marginal Value Model to comparative case histories. These hypotheses hold up 
against the inter-case comparison. 
 
H2: Events indicating regime instability with be less common within cases when the 
occupiers increase marginal occupation value than they will be when the 
occupiers reduce the value of the occupation. 
 
 
 Without question, the two calmest cases in terms of domestic unrest are Japan and 
post-WWII Germany, while the two deadliest cases are the Weimar Republic and South 
Korea. If one were to rank the cases in terms of domestic unrest, we would see the 
following ordering: 1) South Korea; 2) Weimar Germany; 3) Japan; 4) West Germany. 
While both South Korea and Weimar Germany experienced periods of tumult and 
upheaval, only South Korea experienced two legitimate uprisings during the occupation. 
Japan was only slightly more unruly than West Germany, largely due to the volume of 
(typically nonviolent) mass protests prior to 1950. However, if were to rank the cases by 
paramilitary organization, we would flip the Weimar and Korea cases. If we were to 
focus on success of pro-democracy parties, we would see a reverse ordering: Japan and 
post-WWII Germany would be at the forefront, Korea and Weimar Germany would bring 
up the rear. Regardless of how you measure regime instability, there is a clear dichotomy: 
West Germany and Japan were exceptionally stable; Korea and Weimar Germany were 
exceptionally unstable. This mostly correlates with the H2 in the direction that the 
Marginal Value Model expects. The US failed to directly promote the welfare of Koreans 
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during its occupation, while Washington and made no effort to establish a Korean-
American alliance until after the occupation concluded and the Korean War began. In 
Germany, the US, UK and France pursued a policy of reconstruction and paired 
reconstruction with a major defense commitment. The same applies to the American 
occupation of Japan. The case that stands out is the Weimar Republic, where the AAF 
eventually did act to promote domestic welfare and acted in support of the occupied state, 
but did so after pursuing the exact opposite policy for five years. One can consider this a 
case in which the Weimar Republic does not fit the specified population or one in which 
it fails to support the hypothesis. Either way, the findings strongly support the hypothesis 
in three cases and may support all for. 
The cases in which the allies pursued the most constructive occupation policies 
were Japan and Germany, with the occupiers outlaying substantial resources to rebuild 
political and economic institutions. The most deleterious policies occurred in the Weimar 
Republic with reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr. The US neither pursued a 
constructive nor destructive occupation policy in Korea from any objective standpoint. 
However, the US did align itself with Japan, Korea’s arch-enemy at that point in history. 
Just the same, the AAF aligned itself with the Polish insurgents and Rhenish separatists 
in the Weimar. In contrast, the occupiers allied themselves with Japan and post-WWII 
Germany against the Soviet Union. The occupiers established a mutual security pact with 
the occupied territory in both German cases and the Japan case. In the Weimar case, 
however, the occupied territory concluded a secret pact with Russia before the more 
public agreement at Locarno. This is also the case with the higher level of regime 
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instability. The case history supports the hypothesis. The US made no attempt to establish 
a security pact with Korea before the conclusion of the occupation. 
 
H3: Democratic regimes will survive only in cases where the occupiers manage to 
provide economic aid and commit materially to defending the new regime from a 
foreign threat before the occupiers aid an enemy of the occupied state and/or 
before the occupied state forms an alliance with another, non-occupying state. 
 
 In all cases, the occupiers offered some sort of security pact to the occupied state 
at some point during the observation period. However, only in two cases did the 
occupiers offer security assistance before assisting the occupied state’s enemies or before 
the occupied state found another security partner. In the Weimar Germany case, the 
occupiers secured a mutual security pact with the German government, but only after the 
occupiers aided Rhenish separatists and Polish insurgents, and only after these threats and 
the disarmament mandates drove Germany into Soviet Russia’s arms. In the case of 
South Korea, the US offered security assistance only after the end of the occupation in 
response to the Korean War (and after the US had begun to recruit Japan as the first line 
of defense in the Cold War in Asia). Only in the Federal Republic and Japan did the 
occupiers offer a security guarantee early enough to mitigate the threat posed by the 






Reviewing Rival Hypotheses 
Demilitarization 
The four cases indicate that, contrary to the demilitarization thesis proposed by 
Linz (1990) and Stepan (1991), remilitarization is far more important. The two successful 
cases—Japan and Germany—were cases in which the military was initially disbanded but 
then rebuilt in such a way that it bolstered institutions that favored the optimal winning 
coalition. In the failed cases, either demilitarization failed or was not necessary in the first 
place. Disarmament was a key component of the Weimar occupation and it failed in a 
spectacular fashion. This highlights the fact that a weakened state in a threatening 
anarchic system always has some demand for security. If a state and its constituencies 
prefer survival, they will seek external security from one source or another. In the case of 
Weimar Germany, they sought security from the remnants of Kaiser Wilhelm’s II regime 
and from Russia. They sought security from these sources because the occupation 
relieved the Weimar state of its own capacity to produce its own security goods without 
providing an alternative source. Demilitarizing the Weimar Republic endangered the 
regime rather securing it, and it was the remilitarization of the FRG and Japan that 
secured the new regime and empowered the optimal winning coalitions. Finally, in the 
case of South Korea, demilitarization was irrelevant to the consolidation of the regime—
the Japanese had largely completed that task long before the Americans arrived. The 





 Political re-education through educational policy and institutional learning may 
play a significant role in consolidating democracies in the long run, but it is not a process 
that is applicable to all cases. It is conceivable that the banishment of anti-democratic 
actors from the domestic scene and reconfiguration of educational policies to engender 
democratic values did increase pro-democracy affect in future generations. This theory is 
problematic considering that weak democracies often fail to survive a full generation. 
This was the case for Weimar Germany and South Korea. Political re-education might 
strengthen democracies, but only democracies that are on the path to consolidation. 
Therefore, re-education processes shed no light on the weakest cases and no light on half 
the cases in this dissertation.  
 
Institutional Design 
 The character of the institutions that develop under occupation may in fact have a 
major impact on the survival or collapse of a democratic regime, but the literature on 
institutional design and its correlation (or lack thereof) with success and failure in these 
cases sheds little light. It is difficult to separate the effect of the institutions from the 
effect of a polarized electorate. However, we have established that electoral 
constituencies in South Korea and Weimar Germany were more radical than those in 
Japan and the Federal Republic. We have also established that radical groups in South 
Korea and the Weimar Republic directed their energies towards extra-parliamentary 
politics. In other words, institutions themselves do not marginalize radical elements, 
although they can deny them access to the formal reins of power. It is important not to 
empower radical groups, but it is first important to marginalize them before they can 
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seriously threaten the new regime. This is the joint responsibility of the occupation forces 
and the new regime. In order for electoral and representative institutions to be successful 
in a young regime imposed from above, powerful actors must marginalize extra-
parliamentary threats to those institutions. This is what the occupation forces and their 
domestic partners accomplished in the Federal Republic and Japan, and it is what they 
failed to accomplish in Weimar Germany and South Korea. 
 
Delegitimation via Defeat 
 In the three cases in which the occupiers ousted a pre-existing regime of domestic 
origin (the two German cases and Japan), delegitimation of the previous regime does not 
seem to play a significant role in democratic consolidation (or its absence). The defeat of 
the Third Reich plausibly delegitimized the NSDAP, however this does not explain the 
marginalization of non-Nazi radical parties on either the right or left after 1945. In Japan, 
defeat did not lead to the immediate delegitimation of the old regime—administrators and 
legislators from the old regime remained out of politics only so long as MacArthur’s 
occupation forbade them from participating. In Weimar Germany, defeat delegitimized 
the coalition that supported Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Great War. However, these parties 
remained illegitimate only until the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles largely 
delegitimized its signatories—the optimal winning coalition that brought democracy to 
Germany. This illustrates the primary deficiency of the delegitimation thesis: it only 
applies until the behavior of the occupation forces begins to have an effect on domestic 
constituencies. Domestic constituencies reject the ancien régime because it became a 
threat to their continued existence. If the new regime also becomes a threat due to its 
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association with destructive occupation policies, then that regime will lose legitimacy as 
well. This is what happened in the Weimar case, and it is similar to the failure of the 
American military government’s attempts to establish a legitimate democratic 
government in South Korea. There seems to be no correlation between the type of 
delegitimation process described by Sa’Adah (2006) and the consolidation of democratic 
regimes in these cases. 
 
Geographic Division 
 The argument that an occupation can excise antidemocratic elements by dividing 
the territory may be a sound one but it is difficult to test in this dissertation. There are 
only two cases in which the occupiers divided the territory: West Germany and South 
Korea. One case was a spectacular success, while one was a terrible failure. However, in 
the division of the Korean Peninsula, it was the industrialized north that fell to the Soviets 
and the agrarian south that fell to the Americans. Perhaps, in an alternate universe, where 
South Korea was initially more industrialized and filled with capitalists and proletarians, 
the results may have been different. However, we cannot test this case nor can we test the 
possible effects of dividing Weimar Germany or postwar Japan. What is evident, 
however, is that attempts to divide a country against its will tend to turn its people against 
the occupiers. Koreans and Germans both opposed unification; Germans East and West 
clamored for unification until it finally occurred at the end of the Cold War, while 
Koreans still clamor for unification today. Syngman Rhee openly disobeyed General 
Hodge and American policymakers stateside in his attempts to reunify the peninsula. 
Likewise, French attempts to separate the Ruhr and Saar from Germany drew protests in 
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both postwar cases. Division would likely do more harm than good if it signals that the 
occupiers are enemies rather than allies. Nevertheless, these cases are not an appropriate 
sample to test this hypothesis.  
 
 
Retention of Institutions 
 Coyne’s (2008) hypothesis about how the retention of pre-existing institutions 
smoothed the transition from autocracy to democracy is problematic for several reasons. 
In the Japanese case, it assumes that the Japanese people would be unaware that the 
Japanese government was serving the interests of its American occupiers. This is an 
absurd assumption that underestimates the understanding of domestic constituencies. 
Moreover, it ignores the fact that coopting Japanese institutions dispossessed the previous 
elite class, meaning that the previous elite is no more or less likely to oppose the 
occupation. In the case of the Federal Republic, despite Coyne’s claims to the contrary, 
this is simply not what took place. The occupation forces did not leave significant 
democratic institutions intact in Germany following WWII—the Allies erased preexisting 
military institutions and rebuilt them from scratch; replaced institutions that had been 
ruthlessly centralized with a federal system; discarded the legislative body that Hitler had 
rendered irrelevant and replaced it with a new system with electoral and representative 
rules that differed significantly from the Weimar-era Reichstag. The Allies neither 
intended to preserve, nor did they preserve, the character of either the Nazi or Weimar 
institutional arrangements. In South Korea, the United States largely did retain Japanese 
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institutions from the colonial era—including property laws, restrictions on expression, 
administrators and police forces—with less than optimal results. 
If there is one case in which Coyne’s thesis may hold up, it may in fact be 
Weimar Germany. The limited involvement of the Allied and Associated Forces in 
destroying the old regime and constructing the new meant that the revolutionaries worked 
with the institutions that the Kaiser left them. The primary contributions of the Weimar 
Constitution were the enumeration of new rights, granting the Reichstag new powers and 
the formal elimination of the aristocracy. That said, the socialists and democrats who 
took power in the early years of the Weimar Republic largely ruled through pre-existing 
institutions just as the Americans ruled through Japanese ones. Of course, this contributed 
to the ruin of the regime when Adolf Hitler successfully manipulated the powerful 
executive (itself a relic of the previous regime). Moreover, the retention of institutions 
did nothing to stem the rising tide of radical nationalist and communist forces that saw no 
legitimacy in the Weimar Constitution. In none of these cases does Coyne’s hypothesis 
seem to adequately explain consolidation or failure, and in one key case it seems to 
explicitly contradict the historical record. 
 
Prewar Modernization 
 That Japan modernized before WWII—in other words, that it transitioned towards 
a market economy with industrial modes of production and a political system capable of 
distributing public goods—may certainly have played a roll in the successful 
democratization of that country. Pempel (1992) emphasized the role of the Meiji 
Restoration and the industrialization of the Tokugawa Era, building on work by Lipset 
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(1959) and Moore (1966) indicating the importance of modern values and social 
structures to the evolution and consolidation of democracy. However, this hypothesis 
fails to explain why Japan evolved more like the Federal Republic and less like the 
Weimar Republic, both of which evolved after Germany became a centralized state with 
broad redistributive capabilities and an industrialized economy. It also fails to explain 
why Weimar and Federal Germany evolved so differently. It also fails to explain what to 
expect in new democracies with both an autocratic and democratic history (such as the 
Federal Republic). Prewar modernization does not provide a satisfactory explanation for 
understanding the diversity in processes and outcomes in the four cases here. 
 
Economic Growth 
 I have stressed several times in this dissertation that one should not discount the 
role of economic growth in democratic consolidation, in regimes imposed or otherwise. It 
is most important to remember that growth is dependent on good policy, and rarely are 
indicators of growth truly independent variables. It is tempting to refer to the Japanese 
and German postwar growth stories as “miracles,” but this ignores the intentional role the 
occupations assumed in rebuilding the economies of these states, recapitalizing their 
markets, and plugging them into a global trading regime that created an outlet for their 
goods and access to cheap materials. One of the primary reasons the occupation forces 
were able to facilitate consolidation and marginalize antidemocratic constituencies in the 
Federal Republic and Japan was due to the massive amounts of economic aid and the 
construction of open economies in these cases. It is possible that the failure to privilege 
democratic constituencies in Weimar Germany was due to the fact that the Allied and 
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Associated Forces did the opposite: they isolated Germany with customs barriers and 
sucked capital out of the market through reparations. In South Korea, the antidemocratic 
coalition that eventually took power was deeply aligned with a landlord class that 
opposed market reforms and had no special interest in opening or industrializing their 
economy, while American intervention into markets primarily took the form of abortive 
liberalization attempts without any plans for global integration or recapitalization. 
Economic growth is important in consolidating imposed regimes, but growth is a function 
of occupation policy: a prerequisite, just like producing marginal value through providing 
goods of security and public welfare. In other words, economic growth is not a rival 




 This dissertation considers several alternative hypotheses that attempt to explain 
the consolidation and collapse in each case. Some of these alternative approaches apply 
universally to all cases of democratic consolidation, while some specifically address the 
case at hand and make no claims of generalizability. In the cases where the authors claim 
to explain consolidation in general, their hypotheses either fail to explain these cases in a 
satisfactory manner or do so in such a way that complements, rather than invalidates, the 
Marginal Value Model. In the cases where the authors claim to explain a specific case, 
the models prove their limited utility by demonstrating their lack of generalizability and 
their inability to explain what the Marginal Value Model does not. All in all, the 
Marginal Value Model both explains democratic consolidation and collapse in the cases 
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Brief Application of the Marginal Value Model to Ongoing Cases 
 The Marginal Value Model yields predictions about the prospects of three salient 
ongoing democratization projects: Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom, Afghanistan 
following Operation Enduring Freedom and the Palestinian Authority under Israeli 
occupation. There is not space to deal with these in the detail applied to four cases in this 
dissertation. Nonetheless, a cursory glance can tell us what the Marginal Value Model 
expects about the future of the regimes in these three cases. As established constantly 
throughout this thesis, there are three requirements for a successful consolidation of a 
democratic regime under occupation: the presence of an external threat apart from the 
occupier, the provision of security goods by an occupier to defend against said threat, and 
additional goods of a sort that make the occupied state better off than it would be 
otherwise. Let us examine whether these three conditions exist in each case. 
 
Palestine 
 Few occupations in history have drawn closer scrutiny and greater opprobrium 
than Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza beginning in 1967 (Kassis 2001). 
The occupation has been characterized by sporadic violence, including two broad 
uprisings from 1987-93 and 2000-05 (the First and Second Intifadas; Hilal 2003). It was 
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not until twenty-seven years after the occupation began that it became an exercise in 
democratization. The Palestinian Authority was established in 1994 as a result of the Oslo 
Accords (formally known as the on Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements), which provided a roadmap for the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process, reconstruction of the West Bank and a transition to a democratic Palestinian 
government (Shikaki 1996; Hilal 2003). The United States injected itself into the process 
of democratization following the Declaration of Principles, and then once again as part of 
the George W. Bush Administration’s broader Middle East policy beginning in 2002 
(Veliotes 2002). 
 Is there an external threat greater than the state of Israel? There does not appear to 
be. The Palestinian people find themselves in their present situation primarily due to the 
existence of Israel. Palestine was denied statehood as a result of the victory of Israeli 
forces in 1948, and predominantly Palestinian areas came under Israeli occupation 
following the pre-emptive 1967 war against Egypt, Jordan and Iraq (McWilliams and 
Piotrowski 2009). Palestine and allied forces failed to significantly dislodge Israel 
following the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Ibid). While the relationship between Israel and 
various Palestinian opposition groups has varied over the years, the current state of affairs 
primarily stems from the results of these two wars. It would be hard to imagine any 
situation in which a foreign threat could pose a greater threat to Palestine than Israel 
itself. 
 Without a strong external threat, it is doubtful that Israel could produce security 
goods that would compensate for the threat of the occupation itself. Highlighting this fact 
is the comparatively large amount of aid that arrives from non-Israeli sources, such as the 
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European Union (Stetter 2003). The recent economic deprivation following the Second 
Intifada and Israeli blockade has had no success in narrowing the range of acceptable 
political contestation around pro-democracy constituencies; instead they have eradicated 
an already weak Palestinian middle class and driven support from the moderate Fatah 
faction to the radical Hamas (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2009). In the absence of a 
strong external threat apart from Israel, no capacity for Israel to provide security goods, 
and occupation policies that have done more harm than good to the most important 
Palestinian constituencies, the Marginal Value Model would predict failure of 
consolidation for any democratic regime under the Palestinian Authority—or any 
authority in the creation of which Israel plays a major role. 
 
Afghanistan 
 The US-led operation in Afghanistan, officially Operation Enduring Freedom, 
commenced on October 7, 2001, and evolved into a multinational peacekeeping and 
state-building operation led by NATO’s multinational International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF; Goodson 2005). It is difficult to find a foreign threat in the Afghan case 
unless one stretches the definitions of “foreign” and “threat.” Technically, the Taliban 
grew out of the Pakistani Mujahedeen, enjoyed (enjoys?) Pakistani sponsorship, and 
overthrew the post-Soviet Islamic State of Pakistan (replacing it with the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan in 1996; Ibid, Price 2012). After an initial defeat at the hands of US and 
NATO forces, the Taliban resurged from 2004 onward, resulting in the majority of 
Afghan civilian deaths and threatening to disrupt the 2009 elections (Worden 2010). The 
problems with classifying the Taliban as a foreign threat are A) it emerged from a faction 
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that helped expel the Soviet Union following the 1980s occupation, and B) it is composed 
primarily of Pashtun tribesmen who are native to Afghanistan as well as Pakistan and 
move relatively freely across the mountainous border region (Ibid). However, for the 
purposes of this exercise, let us consider the Taliban a pressing foreign threat to 
Afghanistan. 
 How well have the United States and ISAF managed the Taliban threat since their 
intervention? At first, very well; the coalition mustered its forces quickly and drove the 
Taliban out of Kabul and Kandahar. The intervention came with billions of dollars in aid 
and a program of militarization intent on building a centralized, 70,000-strong Afghan 
National Army (Goodson 2003, Goodson 2005, Rubin 2006). Moreover, coalition forces 
have made a determined effort to modernize and democratize Afghanistan. The 
provisional government, led by Hamid Karzai and installed by the coalition, transitioned 
to a constitutional, presidential republic in 2004 (Rubin 2004, Worden 2010). Through 
2010, the US and ISAF participant states spent over $4 billion on infrastructure, electoral 
mobilization and arming local warlords to fight the Taliban and allied militias (Ibid; 
Rubin 2006; Nixon and Ponzio 2007).  
 Unfortunately, commitments of force and economy have not produced the desired 
results. The first elections in 2004 went smoothly but produced victories for local 
warlords and war criminals whose only virtue is that they opposed the Taliban (Hill 2010; 
Worden 2010). Even these efforts have been largely unsuccessful. While the dollar 
commitment was large, the US and ISAF never deployed more than 20,000 troops 
(Goodson 2005)—not much for a country the size of Alaska and a population as large as 
California’s, but as much as the United States was willing to commit while administering 
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simultaneous occupations. Moreover, US and ISAF missions have often been at cross 
purposes, one (the US) funding anti-Taliban militias that are often as deadly as their 
enemy, and the other (the ISAF) attempting to keep the peace by disarming warlords 
(Rubin 2006). The result is an unstable country wherein large swaths of territory are still 
under the control of private militias (Ibid). The most recent elections were far less 
promising: registration and vote counting were rife with fraud, Karzai’s most serious 
challenger withdrew at the last moment, and only a last minute deal prevented Taliban-
affiliated terrorists from turning the poll into a bloodbath (Worden 2010). 
 While it is clear there has been a major effort to state-building and 
democratization in Afghanistan, and the US and ISAF have signaled their commitment 
through significant aid disbursements, it does not appear that the coalition has produced 
marginal occupation value, nor have they successfully narrowed the spectrum of political 
contestation to include democrats and exclude antidemocratic factions. The meager force 
commitment was enough to bed down the Taliban early in the occupation, but Islamist 
radicals have rebounded since, in many cases joined by equally violent factions that once 
enjoyed US or NATO support. Moreover, while electoral institutions are in place, these 
institutions are often nothing but a conduit for local warlords to exercise their 
paramilitary influence through more formal channels and protect their interests. Rather 
than exclude antidemocrats, the introduction of elections and a representative parliament 
(the Loya Jirga) have served only to institutionalize the power structure that emerged in 
2002. While more hopeful than the Palestinian case, the Marginal Value Model does not 





 The most recent confrontation between Iraq and a US-led coalition began on May 
20, 2003, ostensibly in response to Iraq’s alleged noncompliance with UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 (banning the production of weapons of mass destruction and 
requiring the admission of weapons inspectors; McWilliams and Piotrowski 2009). 
Coalition forces defeated Saddam Hussein’s regime quickly, declaring victory on April 9, 
2003 and establishing the Coalition Provisional Government (Diamond 2005). The US 
appointed Paul Bremer to lead the Coalition Provisional Government until the coalition 
officially returned sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004 (Dodge 2010). The civilian 
occupation of Iraq ended with the departure of US forces on December 15, 2011 (Dodge 
2012). The Marginal Value Model does not predict success in this case. 
 The greatest potential foreign threat to Iraq at this time would be Iran, with which 
they fought a bloody war during the 1980s (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2009). However, 
there is no evidence that Iran poses an existential threat to the Iraqi state at this time. The 
most prominent threats to personal security in Iraq following the 2003 invasion were 
internal, not external. Among the more prominent was the uprising led by Muqtada al-
Sadr, which drew support from the disenfranchised Shia population in Baghdad and 
Basra (although the uprising drew Shia insurgents from Iran as well as other neighboring 
states; Dodge 2010). Also contributing to violence in occupation-era Iraq was the 
dissolution of the Revolutionary Guard and Bremer’s de-Ba’athification policy, 
aggrieving the predominantly Sunni population which enjoyed a privileged position in 
Hussein’s government (Diamond 2005; Moon 2009). These uprisings, both Sunni and 
Shia, produced violence that significantly hampered reconstruction efforts and, through 
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2009, made Iraq a far more dangerous place than it was before the invasion (Dawisha 
2005). In other words, the greatest threat to Iraqi security post-2003 was internal violence 
that emerged as a result of—not in spite of—intervention by the United States, United 
Kingdom and the rest of the coalition. 
 The intervention is not without its silver linings. A surge in the US troop 
presence, reconstruction of the Iraqi armed forces, and a ceasefire between Sunni and 
Shia insurgents ended the civil war by 2009 (Dawisha 2010; Dodge 2010). While voting 
in the first elections in 2005 was divided along ethnic lines, the March 2010 poll 
produced support for secular and nationalist factions (Dawisha 2010). Civil society in the 
form of private, active, local organizations seems to be rebounding from the oppression 
of Hussein’s regime (Dawisha 2005). At the moment, the regime is nominally democratic 
with generally fair elections and a representative legislature (Ibid). However, the 
potentially dictatorial ambitions of Prime Minister al-Maliki are cause for concern. 
Maliki has retained control of the premiership since 2006, during which he has sponsored 
the proliferation of private “death squads” and secured control over a counter-terrorism 
force that is accountable only to him (Dodge 2010). 
 The inability of either the coalition or the new regime in Baghdad to limit the 
reach of violent extra-parliamentary politics in Iraq for several years is troubling, an 
indicator of the incapacity of the occupation force to successfully narrow the spectrum of 
political consolidation. The rise of a leader who is reluctant to submit his capacity for 
violence to rule of law is indicative of the same. The eventual end to sectarian violence is 
a point in the coalition’s favor, but the fact that the civil war began as a result of the 
intervention and the decapitation of the Ba’athist regime indicates that the occupation did 
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not yield marginal value. The absence of a clear foreign threat, the introduction of a 
domestic threat by the occupiers run counter to what the Marginal Value Model indicates 
is necessary for the successful consolidation of an imposed democratic regime. 
Moreover, any US-led coalition must also account for their responsibility for the 
economic deprivation resulting from the imposition of sanctions following 1991’s 
Operation Desert Storm. In order to demonstrate that the US could be a credible ally to 
Iraq, it must produce a strong enough signal to overcome the damage the United States 
has inflicted since they forced Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. There is no evidence in 
this case that this has occurred, and so the Marginal Value Model does not expect that 
this regime will consolidate successfully. The dictatorial tendencies of the Maliki regime 




 While the model does not fit the observed outcomes perfectly, the patterns are 
reasonably clear. Within cases and across cases, regime instability is more common when 
the occupying states engage in behaviors that indicate the production of marginal 
security. When the occupying power is protecting the occupied state against a foreign 
threat, the electoral and parliamentary fortunes of the optimal winning coalitions 
improve, paramilitary expansion and recruitment trends downward, and domestic 
insecurity dissipates. We see the same when the occupying power supplements these 
behaviors with occupation policies that improve the welfare of the electorate. Moreover, 
we witness increased regime instability when the occupier sides with the enemies of the 
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occupied regime. When occupiers produce more security than they consume, they 
improve the fortunes of pro-democracy constituencies by eliminating grievances and 
demonstrating the value of democratic institutions and parties. This narrows the spectrum 
of acceptable political contestation, bolstering moderates and marginalizing radicals. The 
result is a society wherein groups that rely on democratic institutions thrive while groups 
that oppose democratic institutions are absorbed by pro-democracy coalitions or fade into 
irrelevancy. By ensuring that the democratic regime has significantly more allies than 
enemies, this process safeguards democratic institutions for the long haul. 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 I see this thesis as a first attempt to contribute to multiple literatures in 
international relations. First and foremost, this study contributes to our understanding of 
foreign imposed regime change, specifically those of the democratic type. To understand 
whether or not it is feasible to impose democracy in foreign powers, one must have some 
understanding of how nascent democratic regimes fare under the constraints of foreign 
occupation. Moreover, the first step toward assessing the practical value of such a policy 
begins with understanding what types of occupation policy are more or less conducive to 
the long-term success of the new democratic regime. This remains a small, 
methodologically homogenous literature, and it is here where I believe this work can 
have its biggest impact. 
 Second, this work addresses the equally small literature examining the success of 
foreign occupations. Albeit, this thesis addresses a particular goal—democratization—
whereas states consider multiple explicit and implicit goals when occupying foreign 
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states, but it picks up where Edelstein left off by narrowing the focus, defining more 
clearly the a priori conditions of success and failure, and relying on objective rather than 
subjective variables in both the independent and dependent variables. In looking more 
closely at occupation outcomes in future scholarship, we should consider the role of 
external and internal threats, as Edelstein argues. But we also have to consider the 
capacity of the occupiers to respond to that threat in a way that is favorable to the 
occupied state. This is the mechanism by which threat dynamics should influence success 
and failure. 
 Third, I see this work as the latest contribution to the broader catalog of work 
examining democratic consolidation. While scholars have expended a great deal of 
energy attempting to explain why some democratic regimes consolidate and others do 
not, a relatively minuscule segment of the literature is dedicated to understanding the role 
of external security dynamics. This is critical in the case of imposed regimes, or simply 
democratic regimes that arise under foreign occupation. In such situations, the regime is 
constrained both from above and below. Since the institutional setting for political 
competition is significantly different when states exercise their powers in foreign states, it 
is unreasonable to simply assume that consolidation will fail or succeed in these cases as 
well as it does in others. In other words, there is a gap in the consolidation literature, a 
gap I believe this project begins to fill.  
 Finally, I believe this approach to the issue of imposed democratization be an 
improvement on the existing approaches spearheaded by Coyne, Enterline and Greig. As 
noted in the first chapter. The statistical approaches by Enterline and Greig warp the 
concepts of imposition and consolidation so grotesquely that their findings cease to be 
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relevant to real-world processes. On the other hand, Coyne’s comparative historical 
approach only scratches the surface of the cases he studies, missing important processes 
and assuming the presence of others for which there is no evidence. This thesis attempts 
to forge a middle path, although one that skews closer to Coyne than Enterline and Greig. 
The Marginal Value Model clearly defines what is meant by democratization, 
consolidation and occupation, and then seeks to investigate these phenomena through 
historical process tracing on multiple levels of analysis. In doing so, we unearth a deeper 
understanding of the process of democratic consolidation in pre-sovereign states that 
retains the potential for generalization once applied to other cases. 
 
Going Forward 
 There is still much work to be done along the lines of this dissertation. First, there 
is room to improve the depth of each case study. By drilling deeper into lower levels of 
analysis one might uncover evidence of the actual ideological and psychological 
processes that are taking place in the minds of constituents elites. Second, I need to 
include more cases. There are at least nine other cases of democratic regimes arising 
under military occupations. If the Marginal Value Model is accurate, then we should be 
able to uncover the same relationships in Cuba and the Philippines as in Korea, in Austria 
and Italy as in Germany. Finally, there are ongoing cases that this model may be able to 
shed some light upon. Most obvious are the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also 
applicable is the case of the occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel. Will 
democratic institutions in these regimes resemble the success of West Germany and 
Japan, will they flounder as they did in the Weimar Republic and South Korea? The 
297 
 
answer comes down to the prevailing threat environment, measures to provide security, 
and the general tenor of relations between the occupiers and the occupied. This would be 
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